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rights	 protection	 has	 become	 a	 topic	 of	 considerable	 importance	 in	 recent	
times.	The	wide-ranging	discretion	and	enhanced	investigatory	powers	that	the	
Commission	 derives	 under	 Regulation	 1/2003,	 coupled	 with	 the	 European	
Union’s	proposal	 to	 accede	 to	 the	European	Convention	 for	 the	Protection	of	
Human	 Rights	 and	 Fundamental	 Freedoms,	 underlines	 the	 need	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 policies	 and	 procedures	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 necessary	 rights	
protection	requirements.	 	This	 issue	is	amplified	in	cartel	cases,	because	when	
the	Commission	 fines	 an	undertaking,	 the	 fine	 aims	not	merely	 to	 punish	 the	
undertaking	 in	 question	 but	 also	 to	 deter	 other	 undertakings	 from	 being	
involved	in	cartels	in	the	future.	
	
This	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	with	procedural	rights	and	the	ECHR.	Alongside	this	analysis,	the	thesis	
identifies	 ways	 of	 enhancing	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies,	
whilst	 ensuring	 they	 remain	 in	 compliance	with	 the	 relevant	 rights	protection	
provisions.	 It	 does	 so	 by	 considering	 each	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	policies	in	turn.	Chapter	2	lays	the	foundations	of	the	analysis	by	
investigating	why	we	would	want	 undertakings	 to	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	
and	whether	 they	 do	 indeed	 qualify	 under	 the	 Convention.	 In	 Chapter	 3,	 the	




specifically,	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 EU	 courts	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	
confidential	leniency	documents	and	the	recently-enacted	Damages	Directive.	It	
concludes	 that	 the	drafters	of	 the	Damages	Directive	were	 correct	 to	 enact	 a	
blanket	 ban	 against	 disclosure	because	 an	undertaking	may	have	 a	 legitimate	
expectation	of	non-disclosure.	However,	the	chapter	also	determines	that	there	
	 4	
is	 a	 more	 effective	 means	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 rights	 of	 all	 the	 parties	 are	
adequately	 protected.	 Chapter	 5	 assesses	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	
procedure	 and	 the	 ways	 it	 can	 be	 enhanced	 whilst	 complying	 with	 rights	
requirements.	Although	it	establishes	that	a	US-style	plea	bargaining	procedure	
could	 be	 implemented	 within	 the	 EU	 –	 and	 would	 bring	 a	 variety	 of	
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This	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter	 ‘the	
Commission’)	cartel	enforcement	policies	comply	with	procedural	rights	and	the	
European	 Convention	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Fundamental	







The	benefits	of	 competition	are	multiple	and	may	 include	 lower	prices	 for	all,	
improved	 quality,	 greater	 choice	 for	 consumers,	 increased	 innovation,	 more	
efficiency,	 and	 heightened	 competitiveness	 in	 global	markets.3	In	 an	 effort	 to	
see	these	benefits	realised	within	the	EU	market,	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	

















deadweight	 loss	 to	 society.5	Because	 of	 this,	 cartels	 have	 been	 likened	 to	
“cancers	 on	 the	 economy”.6	Article	 101(1)	 of	 the	 TFEU	 tackles	 cartels	 by	
prohibiting,	 inter	 alia,	 agreements	 between	 competitors,	 concerted	 practices	
and	 decisions	 of	 associations	 of	 undertakings	 that	 fix	 prices,	 restrict	 output,	
share	markets	or	rig	bids.7	The	Commission	is	tasked	with	enforcing	Article	101	
TFEU	and	has	the	power	to	impose	fines	on	corporations	for	breaches	of	Article	
101(1)	 TFEU.8	The	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime	 consists	 of	 four	
main	 tools	 or	 policies.	 The	 first	 is	 Regulation	 1/2003,9	which	 sets	 out	 the	
Commission’s	powers	and	the	rules	on	implementing	competition	that	are	laid	
down	 in	 Article	 101	 and	 102	 TFEU.	 The	 second	 of	 these	 is	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	 guidelines. 10 	These	 guidelines	 set	 out	 the	 various	 steps	 that	 the	
Commission	undertakes	when	calculating	the	fine	for	a	breach	of	Article	101(1)	
TFEU.	 The	 third	 of	 these	 enforcement	 policies	 is	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
notice.11	This	 policy	 explains	 how	 and	 in	what	 circumstances	 the	 Commission	
will	award	an	undertaking	a	reduction	in	fine	for	self-reporting	its	involvement	
in	 a	 cartel	 and	 for	 providing	 the	 Commission	 with	 continued	 and	 complete	
cooperation.	The	fourth-main	cartel-related	policy	operated	by	the	Commission	
is	the	direct	settlement	procedure.12	This	procedure	grants	an	undertaking	a	ten	
























strengthen	 the	 practical	 enforcement	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 by	 assisting	 the	







came	 into	 force	on	3rd	 September	1953	and	 seeks	 to	protect	 individuals	 from	
arbitrary	 abuses	 or	 interferences	 by	 the	 State.	 The	 desire	 and	 need	 for	 this	
protection	has	stemmed	from	a	variety	of	concerns	regarding	rights	protection	
within	 Europe	but,	 in	 particular,	 relates	 to	 the	 atrocities	 that	 occurred	during	
World	 War	 Two.	 Since	 the	 Convention	 has	 come	 into	 force,	 it	 has	 been	
recognised	that	individuals	also	need	protection	from	powerful	private	powers	
that	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 unduly	 interfere	 with	 an	 individual’s	 rights.	 The	
protection	 offered	 by	 the	 Convention	 extends	 beyond	 ‘natural	 persons’	 to	





















law	 –	 and	 analyses	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	 with	 procedural	 rights	 and	 the	 rights	 contained	 within	 the	 ECHR.	 In	
addition	to	this	research	question,	this	thesis	also	identifies	ways	of	 improving	
and	enhancing	 the	Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	policies	whilst	 remaining	
compliant	with	an	undertaking’s	procedural	rights.	To	effectively	answer	these	




To	begin	with,	Chapter	2	 seeks	 to	determine	whether	corporations	qualify	 for	
rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	we	might	want	corporations	to	have	
human	 rights	 protection.	 It	 then	 proceeds	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 ECHR	 has	
primarily	been	chosen	for	this	analysis	and	the	reasons	why	the	protection	of	an	
undertakings	 procedural	 rights	 are	 important,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	 regime.	 The	 research	 questions	 in	 this	 chapter	 form	 the	
foundation	of	 the	 remainder	of	 the	 thesis	 and	are,	 therefore,	 of	 fundamental	
importance.	 This	 chapter	 is	unique	 in	 that	 it	 is	 one	of	only	 a	 few	 studies	 that	
considers	 why	 undertakings	may	 need	 rights	 protection	 in	 the	 context	 of	 EU	
cartel	enforcement.	
	
Chapter	 3	 asks	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 complies	 with	 the	
necessary	 requirements	 of	 the	 ECHR	 (particularly	 legal	 certainty)	 and	 the	 EU	
principle	 of	 equal	 treatment.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 its	




the	 Fining	Guidelines	 equally	 to	undertakings,	 particularly	with	 regards	 to	 the	





whether	 the	 blanket	 ban	 it	 places	 on	 disclosure	 –	 in	 the	 context	 of	 leniency	
documents	–	 is	 the	 correct	 approach	 for	 the	EU	 to	adopt.16	It	 undertakes	 this	
analysis	 by	 considering	 three	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenges	 that	 an	
undertaking	may	attempt	to	make	to	disclosure:	(a)	its	legitimate	expectation	of	
non-disclosure,	 (b)	 its	 right	 to	privacy	 (Article	8	of	 the	ECHR),	and	finally,	 (c)	a	
breach	of	 its	 confidence	 if	 disclosure	 occurs.	 Indeed,	 the	 discussion	 regarding	
the	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 can	 bring	





Chapter	 5	 proceeds	 to	 identify	 what	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	
procedure	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	
utilisation,	success	and	efficiency	–	whilst	remaining	compatible	with	Article	6	of	




be	made	 to	 the	 current	 system	 based	 upon	 the	 lessons	 learned	 from	 the	US	
system.	
	
The	 thesis	 finally	 concludes	 with	 Chapter	 6	 considering	 how	 the	 current	 EU	
cartel	 enforcement	 programme	 can	 be	 improved	 to	 ensure	 fair	 and	 equal	
treatment	 to	 undertakings	 within	 the	 fining	 procedure,	 comply	 with	 rights	
protection	and	enhance	 the	EU	settlement	programmes	overall	 efficiency	and	
utilisation.	 This	 chapter	 will	 identify	 and	 propose	 the	 policy	 reforms	 and	










1969	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 ECJ’)	 itself	 acknowledged	
that	it	has	a	responsibility	to	protect	‘the	fundamental	human	rights	enshrined	
in	the	general	principles	of	Community	law’.18	This	was	reaffirmed	in	the	case	of	
Internationale	 Handelgesellschaft	 where,19	in	 its	 dictum,	 the	 ECJ	 stated	 how	
fundamental	 rights	 form	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 general	 principles	 of	 EU	 law	




One	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 decisions	 regarding	 fundamental	 rights	
protection	by	 the	ECJ,	particularly	 in	 light	of	 Internationale	Handelgesellschaft	
(owing	 to	 the	 conflicts	 with	 national	 law),	 was	 that	 it	 became	 necessary	 to	
develop	 a	 doctrine	 to	 protect	 fundamental	 human	 rights	within	 the	 EU	 itself.	




issue	 that	 the	 EU	 and	 its	 courts	 have	 sought	 to	 effectively	 promote	 for	 a	
prolonged	period	of	time.	A	consideration	of	whether	the	Commission’s	cartel	














for	 Enlargement	 and	 European	Neighbourhood	Policy,	 he	 stated	 that	 “for	 the	
EU,	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 are	 the	 silver	 thread	 running	
through	our	actions	both	at	home	and	in	our	external	relations”.23	His	words	are	
a	 testament	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 policies	





result	 of	 Article	 6(2)	 TEU,	which	 obliges	 the	 EU	 to	 accede	 to	 the	 ECHR,	 there	
now	exists	a	formal	requirement	for	EU	law	and	the	Commission’s	policies	and	
procedures	to	be	compliant	with	the	ECHR.25	While	full	membership	by	the	EU	
of	 the	 ECHR	 is	 currently	 on	 hold,	 given	 CJEU	 Opinion	 2/13,	 the	 clearly	
mandatory	nature	of	Article	 6(2)	 TEU	 (“The	Union	 shall	 accede	 to	 the	 ECHR”)	
means	membership	must	come	at	 some	stage.26	Given	 that,	 if	 it	 remains	non-
compliant	 with	 the	 ECHR,	 the	 Commission	 risks	 breaching	 human	 rights	





certainty,	 equality	 and	 fairness.	 The	 importance	 of	 legitimacy	 within	 the	
application	of	the	law	should	not	be	underestimated.	If	laws	or	the	enforcement	



















consequence,	 it	 is	 now	more	 likely	 that	 an	 undertaking	 accused	 of	 breaching	
competition	 law	 will	 argue	 that	 its	 rights	 have	 been	 infringed.28	Indeed,	 the	
rights	 of	 corporations	 are	 more	 important	 than	 they	 have	 ever	 been	 in	 the	
context	 of	 potential	 competition	 law	 breaches,	 as	 fines	 for	 breaching	
competition	 law	 appear	 to	 be	 increasing	 along	with	 the	 impact	 they	 have	 on	
firms.29	As	these	fines	are	seen	as	punitive	and	aim	to	deter	future	breaches	of	
competition	 law,	 and	 thus	 may	 well	 constitute	 ‘proceedings	 of	 a	 criminal	
nature’	and	so	come	within	the	ambit	of	Article	6	and	7	of	the	ECHR,	they	run	





unfairly	or,	more	 importantly,	 it	may	 lead	 to	potential	breaches	of	procedural	
rights	or	the	ECHR.	This	problem	has	been	exacerbated	in	recent	years	with	the	
Commission	 gaining	 even	 wider	 and	 enhanced	 investigatory	 powers	 under	
Council	 Regulation	 1/2003.31	Owing	 to	 this	 wide-ranging	 discretion,	 concerns	
surrounding	 abuses	 of	 process	 or	 unfairness	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Commission’s	procedures	can	be	raised	by	undertakings.	Determining	whether	

























influence	 in	 the	 shaping	 and	 scoping	 of	 it	 have	 been	Wouter	Wils,32	Arianna	




and	 policies.	 However,	 to	 date,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 literature	 that	 analyses	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 against	 the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	


























authors	 have	 considered	 a	 selection	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 and	
policies	against	particular	aspects	of	human	rights	or	in	an	isolated	context.39	
	
Wils	 has	 conducted	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 various	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 the	
Regulation	 1/2003.40	His	 work	 consisted	 of	 six	 essays	 that	 analysed	 the	main	
characteristics	of	the	new	enforcement	systems.41	The	key	part	of	his	work,	for	
this	 research,	 is	 his	 assessment	 of	 the	 compatibility	 of	 the	 new	 enforcement	
system	with	the	ECHR	and	CFREU.	Wils’	main	focus	was	around	the	right	to	fair	
trial,	ne	bis	in	idem,	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination,	and	the	right	to	an	
independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 thesis	 is	 appreciably	
different	 to	Wils’	 work.	 This	 thesis	 focuses	 its	 attention	 on	 the	 Commission’s	




Andreangeli	 has	 considered	 the	 procedural	 rights	 protection	 that	 those	
investigated	by	the	Commission	have	 in	 relation	to	Article	101	and	102	of	 the	
TFEU	and	the	Merger	Control	Regulation.42	Her	analysis	focuses	predominately	
on	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘administrative	 fairness’	 enshrined	 within	 the	 ECHR	 under	
Article	 6	 and	 the	 role	 the	 hearing	 officer	 plays	 in	 this	 regard.	 This	 is	 a	 good	
foundation	 when	 considering	 procedural	 rights	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	enforcement	 regime	but	 this	 thesis	 considers	a	 variety	of	
different	 aspects	 to	 Andreangeli’s	 work.	 To	 begin,	 this	 thesis	 focuses	 its	
attention	 solely	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime,	 whereas,	
Andreangeli’s	 work	 considers	 a	 much	 broader	 range	 of	 competition	











analysis	 focuses	 solely	 on	 the	 consideration	 of	 ‘administrative	 fairness’.	
Conversely,	this	thesis	considers	a	much	wider	array	of	procedural	rights;	legal	
certainty,	 the	 right	 to	 privacy,	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial,	 legitimate	 expectations	
and	equal	treatment.	Furthermore,	this	thesis	considers	the	Commission’s	fining	
guidelines,	 leniency	 policy,	 the	 recently	 enacted	 Damages	 Directive	 and	 the	
Commission’s	Settlement	procedure	against	these	various	rights	requirements.	
The	 role	of	 the	hearing	officer	 is	 considered	within	 this	 thesis	but	only	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	 and	 how	 to	 improve	 this	
role,	 as	Andreangeli	 has	 already	 conducted	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	of	
the	hearing	officer	within	the	context	of	cartel	enforcement.	
	
The	 research	 that	 has	 conducted	 the	 greatest	 extensive	 analysis	 (and	 is	 the	
most	 akin	 to	 this	 thesis)	 is	 that	 of	 Scordamaglia-Tousis,	 who	 has	 looked	 at	
various	 aspects	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies.43	However,	
this	thesis	varies	significantly	to	this	previously	conducted	research	in	a	number	
of	 aspects.	 To	 begin	 with,	 this	 thesis	 considers	 the	 Commission’s	 three	main	
cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ECHR	 and	 other	 procedural	
rights	 protections.	 It	 also	 conducts	 a	 detailed	 assessment	 of	 whether	
corporations	have	human	 rights	 and	why	we	would	want	 this	 to	be	 the	 case,	
something	that	is	lacking	in	the	work	of	Scordamaglia-Tousis	and	the	literature	













Emberland	 has	 studied	 the	 ECHR	 and	 the	 jurisprudence	 from	 the	 European	
Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (hereafter,	 the	 ‘ECtHR’)	 and	 explored	 the	 rights	
protection	afforded	to	companies	under	the	Convention,45	identifying	how	the	
Court	 has	 managed,	 and	 dealt	 with	 cases,	 which	 involved	 ‘non-human	 legal	
persons’.46 	This	 is	 an	 excellent	 work	 for	 us	 to	 build	 our	 analysis	 of	 the	
application	 of	 corporations’	 rights	 to	 competition	 law	 within	 the	 EU	 on	 –	
something	 that	 is	 omitted	 in	 Emberland’s	 work	 and	 analysis.	 However,	 there	
has	 been	 research	 conducted	 by	 Sanchez-Graells	 and	 Marcos	 regarding	
corporate	 right	 protection	 in	 antitrust	 cases.47	Their	 research	 identified	 that	
there	has	been	an	increase	in	the	rights	protection	of	companies	in	competition	




This	 thesis	 will	 therefore	 make	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 the	 existing	
literature	 by	 addressing	 these	 gaps.	 It	 analyses	 the	 Commission’s	 fining,	
leniency	and	direct	 settlement	policies	 in	 the	 context	of	 rights	protection	and	












to	 be	 answered	 in	 the	 most	 effective	 ways	 possible;	 specifically,	 it	 utilises	
doctrinal,	 comparative	 and	 empirical	 methodologies.	 Broadly	 speaking,	 this	
thesis	 considers	 two	 separate	 areas	 of	 law	 and	 how	 they	 interact	 with	 one	
another;	‘EU	cartel	enforcement’	and	‘human	rights	law’.	The	aim	of	the	thesis	
being,	 (a)	 to	 establish	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	
comply	with	procedural	rights,	and	(b)	identifying	ways	that	cartel	enforcement	
procedures	 can	 be	 further	 enhanced	 whilst	 remaining	 compliant	 with	 rights	
protection	requirements.	
	
The	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 analysis	 adopted	 within	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 conduct	 a	
detailed	 doctrinal	 evaluation	 of	 the	 guidelines	 against	 the	 relevant	 ECHR	
provisions,	the	ECtHR	jurisprudence	and	other	legislation	and	case	law	from	the	
relevant	 jurisdictions	 that	 considers	 procedural	 rights.	 This	 is	 crucial	 for	






Chapters	 3	 and	 5	 then	 also	 undertake	 empirical	 analysis	 –	 which	 is	 both	
quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 –	 of	 Commission	 decisions.	 Chapter	 3	 seeks	 to	
identify	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 policies	 have	 been	 applied	 equally	 to	





Review’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 GCR’)	 raw	 data	 set,	 ‘GCR	 EU	 Cartel	 Survey’,	 which	
	 43	
contains	 information	 on	 cartels	 from	 January	 2005	 -	 July	 2012.	 In	 addition	 to	
this,	 Chapter	 3	 also	 consults	 and	 considers	 the	Commission’s	 non-official	web	
versions	 of	 decisions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 First	
Instance,	hereafter	the	‘CFI’,	and	the	ECJ.	Chapter	5	seeks	to	use	empirical	data	
to	 identify	 how	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 settlement	 procedure	 can	 be	
improved.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 thesis	 utilises	 a	 second	 empirical	 dataset	 that	was	
compiled	 by	 the	 author	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 published	 non-confidential	
decisions,	 summary	 decisions	 and	 press	 releases.	 It	 comprises	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 seventeen	 settlement	 decisions	 thus	 far	 and	was	 up-to-date	 on	
the	 30th	 March	 2015.	 By	 including	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
application	 of	 its	 policies	 to	 undertakings,	 the	 thesis	 benefits	 from	 a	 greater	
robustness	in	terms	of	identifying	trends	and,	in	addition,	it	affords	weight	–	in	
the	 form	 of	 hard	 data	 –	 to	 the	 findings	 regarding	 equal	 treatment	 and	 the	
Commission’s	settlement	procedure.	
	
Further	 to	 the	 above-discussed	 methods,	 Chapter	 5	 also	 undertakes	 a	
comparative	 analysis,	 considering	 the	 approach	 undertaken	 in	 the	 US	 –	 with	
regards	to	plea	bargaining	–	to	identify	what	the	EU	system	can	learn	from	the	
US	approach	 in	order	 to	 improve	 its	own	 system	of	direct	 settlements,	whilst	










The	common	theme	running	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 regards	assessing	whether	
the	 Commission’s	 various	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 comply	 with	 the	
necessary	procedural	rights	–	particularly	those	rights	that	are	enshrined	in	the	
ECHR.	 Additionally,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 identify	ways	 of	 further	 enhancing	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 whilst	 remaining	 compliant	 with	
right’s	protection.	Because	of	these	common	themes,	and	the	fact	that	Chapter	
2	answers	foundation	questions	regarding	this	research,	the	thesis	is	best	read	
as	 a	 monograph.	 However,	 the	 thesis	 has	 been	 constructed	 so	 that,	 if	 one	
desired,	each	chapter	may	be	read	independently.	
	
The	 importance	and	the	benefits	of	utilising	rights	 to	assess	 the	Commission’s	
cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 will	 be	 illustrated	 throughout	 the	 thesis	
(Chapters	 2-6).	 Indeed,	 it	 will	 be	 shown	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 core	 threads	
running	throughout	this	thesis	which	binds	it	together	and	makes	the	research	
and	 analysis	 unified	 and	 unique.	 Broadly,	 the	 significant	 benefits	 this	 analysis	





The	 thesis	 is	 constructed	 of	 six	 chapters,	 with	 Chapters	 3-5	 each	 assessing	 a	
separate	 Commission	 cartel	 enforcement	 policy	 against	 specific	 rights	 to	














and	are,	hence,	often	 very	high	and	 severe.	With	 the	EU	 recently	 agreeing	 to	
accede	to	the	ECHR	–	in	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon	–	it	will	thus	be	crucial	to	ensure	
that	the	Commission’s	policies	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	ECHR	and	
identify	 whether	 undertakings	 will	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	 under	 the	
Convention.48	Therefore,	 the	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 assesses	 whether	
companies	in	the	EU	can	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	
one	would	want	companies	 to	have	 their	 rights	protected.	This	 section	of	 the	
chapter	identifies	that	companies	do	indeed	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	





research	question.	 It	begins	by	 identifying	why	 this	 thesis	chooses	 to	 focus	 its	
attention	 predominately	 on	 the	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 ECHR	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
CFREU.	Therein,	the	section	identifies	the	key	ECHR	rights	and	other	procedural	
rights	 that	 the	 remainder	of	 this	 thesis	 shall	 apply	 to	 the	Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	 policies.49	The	 chapter	 identifies	 the	 following	 key	 rights	 for	 the	
assessment	of	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies	against	procedural	
rights	 protections:50	legal	 certainty,	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 one’s	 private	 and	





















Commission	 have	 been	 substantial.	 For	 example,	 the	 highest	 fine	 the	
Commission	 has	 imposed	 on	 an	 undertaking	 was	 in	 excess	 of	 €896	 million,	
whereas	 the	 largest	 fine	 imposed	 on	 a	 cartel	 was	 over	 €1.3	 billion.52	It	 is	
therefore	 important	 that	when	 the	Commission	 imposes	 fines	 there	 is	 a	 clear	
and	 transparent	 process	 within	 which	 these	 fines	 are	 decided	 and	 that	 this	
process	 is	applied	equally	 to	each	undertaking.	There	are	a	variety	of	 reasons	
why	 this	 is	 important,	 but	 one	 of	 particular	 relevance	 is	 that,	 following	 the	
entrance	into	force	of	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon,	there	is	now	an	obligation	for	the	EU	
to	accede	 to	 the	ECHR.	 This	 therefore	means	 that	 it	will	 be	necessary	 for	 the	






fining	 process	 are	 assessed.	 First,	 the	use	of	 non-exhaustive	 lists;	 second,	 the	






to	 impose	 a	 fine	 under	 this	 cap.	 It	 identifies	 various	 concerns	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 current	 fining	 process,	 but	 notes	 that	 these	 issues	 are	 not,	 in	
themselves,	sufficient	to	lead	to	a	breach	of	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.			
	
The	 second	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 analyses	 Commission	 fining	 decisions	 to	
identify	 whether	 the	 Commission	 has	 applied	 its	 fining	 process	 equally	 to	 all	
undertakings.	 Specifically,	 it	 considers	 the	 awarding	 of	 the	 inability	 to	 pay	
discount,	 the	 nationality	 of	 an	 undertaking,	 and	 whether	 the	 undertaking	 is	
classified	as	a	so-called	‘National	Champion’.	At	this	stage,	the	section	identifies	









leniency	 policy.	 This	 helps	 the	 Commission	 to	 detect	 cartels	 by	 allowing	 an	
undertaking	—	which	has	participated	 in	an	 illegal	cartel	—	to	report	 it	 to	the	
Commission	 in	 exchange	 for	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine	 or	 immunity.	 In	 order	 to	 be	
granted	complete	immunity	or	a	reduction	in	fine,	there	are	strict	requirements	
placed	 on	 an	 undertaking.	 One	 of	 these	 requirements	 is	 that	 an	 undertaking	
seeking	 immunity	 (or	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine)	 is	 to	 disclose	 and	 provide	 the	
Commission	with	 information	 regarding	 the	cartel.	Recently,	 there	has	been	a	








many	 that	 this	may	deter	potential	 future	 leniency	applicants.	To	address	 this	
issue,	 part	 of	 the	 recently	 passed	 Damages	 Directive,	 provides	 for	 a	 total	
prohibition	on	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	to	third	parties.		
	
Given	 this	 recent	 development,	 the	 chapter	 takes	 this	 unique	 opportunity	 to	
discuss	the	Damages	Directive	in	the	context	of	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	
procedural	 rights.	 In	 particular,	 it	 seeks	 to	 answer	 whether	 the	 blanket	 ban	
placed	on	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	 is	 the	correct	approach	or	 indeed	
necessary.	 It	 achieves	 this	 analysis	 by	 considering	 three	 potential	 procedural	
right	 challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 may	 attempt	 to	 make	 if	 leniency	
documents	were	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties:	(a)	its	legitimate	expectation	of	
non-disclosure;	 (b)	 its	 right	to	privacy	(Article	8	of	 the	ECHR);	and	finally,	 (c)	a	
breach	of	 its	 confidence	 if	disclosure	occurs.	Using	 the	analysis	of	 these	 three	
potential	 procedural	 rights	 challenges,	 the	 chapter	 concludes	 by	 considering	
whether	the	Damages	Directive	has	struck	the	correct	balance	with	regards	to	
disclosure.	The	chapter	identifies	that	an	undertaking	would	appear	not	to	have	
a	 legitimate	 challenge	 under	 (b)	 and	 (c).	 However,	 it	 does	 seem	 that	 an	
undertaking	 would	 have	 a	 strong	 claim	 under	 (a)	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	
non-disclosure.	The	chapter	concludes	that	though	the	Damages	Directive	does	
address	a	potential	rights	protection	issue,	a	better	balance	could	be	achieved	
by	 implementing	 an	 altered	 approach	 to	 the	 complete	 blanket	 ban	 on	
disclosure;	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 an	 undertakings	 procedural	 rights	 and	 the	








Since	 2008,	 the	 Commission	 has	 operated	 a	 settlement	 procedure	 for	 cases	
involving	cartels.53	This	procedure	allows	the	Commission	to	quickly	settle	cases	
involving	cartels	via	a	simplified	procedure.	This	procedure	can	only	be	followed	
in	 certain	 circumstances.	 For	 example,	 where	 an	 undertaking	 agrees	 to	




mere	 seventeen	 cartel	 cases	 have	 been	 settled.	 The	 US,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
operates	 a	 highly	 developed,	 refined	 and	 efficient	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 for	
the	 settlement	of	US	 cartel	 cases,54	which	 in	 the	 last	 twenty	 years,	 has	 led	 to	
over	 ninety	 percent	 of	 cartel	 cases	 in	 the	 US	 being	 concluded	 by	 plea	
agreements.55	The	EU	settlement	procedure	has	a	variety	of	differences	to	that	
of	the	US	plea	bargaining	system.	For	example,	the	EU	system	is	not	designed	to	
be	a	bargaining	 system	but,	 rather,	 is	one	which	operates	a	 fixed	 ten	percent	
reduction	in	fine	for	cooperation.56	This	chapter	therefore	asks	the	question	of	
what	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	
system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	 utilisation,	 success	 and	 efficiency,	 whilst	 ensuring	
that	 it	complies	with	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR.	The	chapter	begins	by	considering	
the	 cases	 that	 the	 Commission	 has	 settled	 so	 far	 under	 the	 procedure	 to	
identify	weaknesses	and	procedural	 issues	within	 the	current	approach.	Then,	
the	 question	 of	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	
ECHR	 is	 deconstructed	 and	 analysed.	 Once	 it	 has	 been	 established	 that	 it	 is	
compatible,	 a	 discussion	 is	 had	 about	 the	 possibility	 of	 implementing	 such	 a	
system	within	the	EU.	This	chapter	identifies	that	it	would	indeed	be	possible	to	













met	 to	 utilise	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 within	 their	 jurisdiction	 –	 so	 that	 it	
remains	 compliant	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR.	 The	 chapter	 concludes	 by	
identifying	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 efficiency	 and	 utilisation	 of	 the	 EU	 direct	




Conclusions,	 recommendations	 and	 improvements	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 EU	
cartel	enforcement	programme	and	its	compliance	with	procedural	rights		
	
The	 sixth	 and	 final	 chapter	 concludes	 the	 thesis	 by	 considering	 the	 previous	
chapters’	 analysis	 and	 identifying	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 current	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	 procedure	 can	 be	 improved	 to	 enhance	 compliance	 with	 the	
ECHR,	the	equal	treatment	of	undertakings	and	to	tackle	other	procedural	rights	
concerns	that	have	been	identified.	This	research	is	presented	as	policy	reforms	














This	 chapter	 of	 the	 thesis	 assesses	 whether	 corporations	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 under	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR). 2 	In	
addition	 to	 this,	 it	 determines	 how	 specific	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 ECHR	will	
apply	 to	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 cartel	
enforcement	 procedures	 once	 the	 EU	 has	 acceded	 to	 the	 ECHR	 and	why	 it	 is	
important	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 Convention,	
procedural	 rights	 requirements	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 treatment.	 This	
chapter	 forms	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 thesis	 as,	 by	 answering	 the	
aforementioned	questions,	it	establishes	why	the	research	in	the	latter	chapters	
of	 the	 thesis	 are	 of	 fundamental	 importance.	 This	 chapter	 will	 illustrate	 that	














basis	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 within	
Europe.	The	Convention	provides	protection	of	civil	and	political	rights	that	are	
considered	‘essential’,3	and	the	ECHR	itself	was	a	direct	response	to	the	human	
rights	 abuses	 that	 occurred	 during	 the	 Second	 World	 War.4	The	 Convention	
clearly	 states	 in	 Article	 1	 ECHR	 that	 signatory	 states	 must	 secure	 the	 rights	




































cover	 various	 areas	 of	 law	 –	 where	 corporations	 have	 argued	 that	 their	









There	 has	 been	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 literature	 written	 generally	 on	
whether	 corporations	 should	 qualify	 for	 human	 rights,	with	 a	 sizable	 amount	
arguing	against	corporations	having	rights	protection,	and	a	significantly	 lesser	

































discussion	 across	 the	 Atlantic	 too.12	There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 arguments	 for	 and	
against	corporations	having	rights	protection	and	these	shall	be	 identified	and	




of	 corporations	 under	 the	 ECHR	 is	 by	 Emberland.13	He	 identifies	 the	 ECtHR’s	
response	to	complaints	from	corporations	and	how	the	Court	has	dealt	with	and	
managed	these	cases.	This	is	an	excellent	piece	yet	it	can	be	distinguished	from	







































ensure	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 do	 not	 breach	
these	rights.	
	
In	 the	 specific	 context	of	 competition	 law	 there	has	been	a	 lack	of	discussion	
regarding	whether	corporations	qualify	for	rights	protection	and	whether	they	
should	 or	 should	 not.14	MacCulloch	 has	 briefly	 engaged	 in	 a	 discussion	 on	
corporations	 and	 human	 rights,	 and	 has	 suggested	 that	 they	 have	 been	
extended	 to	undertakings	 in	competition	 law	 investigation	cases,	with	 specific	
regards	 to	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination. 15 	The	 most	 detailed	
discussion	to	date	is	that	which	Sanchez-Graells	and	Marcos	contributed.16	They	
identified	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 trend	 towards	 the	 increased	 protection	 of	
‘corporate	 human	 rights’	 in	 competition	 law	 cases,	 and	 are	 very	 skeptical	 of	
this;	arguing	that	this	 increase	 is	based	upon	an	uncritical	extension	of	human	
rights	protection	to	corporations.	They	conclude	their	piece	by	warning	of	 the	
potential	harmful	effects	 that	 can	arise	 for	 competition	and	human	 rights	 law	






Scordamaglia-Tousis	 has	 considered	 procedural	 rights	 and	 how	 they	 can	 be	
reconciled	 with	 the	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement.18	Within	 this	 analysis	 he	 briefly	
discusses	 whether	 corporations	 can	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 as	 legal	
entities.	He	has	not,	however,	discussed	the	important	and	fundamental	issues	








proceedings	 or	 why	we	would	wish	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	to	adhere	to	fundamental	rights.19		
	
Because	 of	 this	 lack	 of	 detailed	 analysis	 –	 of	 these	 issues	 within	 the	 current	
literature	 –	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	 address	 the	 gap	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 EU	
cartel	enforcement.	To	effectively	achieve	this	the	chapter	 is	structured	 in	the	
following	 manner.	 The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 assesses	 whether	
corporations	in	the	EU	can	qualify	for	rights	protection	under	the	ECHR	and	why	
one	would	want	companies	to	have	their	rights	protected.	The	Yukos	Oil	case	is	
utilised	 to	discuss	and	highlight	 the	 reasons	 for	 corporations	 requiring	human	
rights	 protection	 and	 the	 potential	 issues	 that	 can	 occur	 if	 rights	 are	
inadequately	 protected. 20 	The	 second	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 focuses	 on	
something	that	 is	distinct	 from	the	first	section.	 It	begins	by	 identifying	why	 it	
has	 been	 chosen	 for	 this	 thesis	 to	 focus	 its	 attention	 predominately	 on	 the	
ECHR	as	opposed	to	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	of	the	European	Union	
(‘CFREU’).21	Therein,	 the	 section	 identifies	 the	key	ECHR	and	procedural	 rights	
that	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 thesis	 applies	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	 policies.22		 It	 then	 illustrates	 how	 these	 chosen	 rights	 apply	 and	
will	 be	 engaged	 by	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures.	 Finally,	
the	last	section	of	the	chapter	examines	and	explains	why	these	rights	(and	the	
principle	of	equal	treatment)	need	to	be	complied	with,	having	particular	regard	

















The	 first	 place	 to	 begin	 when	 considering	 this	 question	 is	 to	 consult	 the	
Convention	itself.	When	we	read	Article	1	of	the	ECHR,	we	see	it	clearly	states	
that:	 ‘The	 High	 Contracting	 Parties	 shall	 secure	 to	 everyone	 within	 their	





it	 provides	 no	 apparent	 indication	 as	 to	 whether	 its	 definition	 includes	
corporations.	Consequently,	we	need	to	consider	Article	34	of	the	Convention,	
which	 details	 individual	 applicants.	 It	 states	 that	 ‘the	 Court	 may	 receive	
applications	 from	 any	 person,	 non-governmental	 organisation	 or	 group	 of	
individuals	 claiming	 to	 be	 the	 victim	 of	 a	 violation	 by	 one	 of	 the	 High	
Contracting	 Parties	 of	 the	 rights	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 Convention	 or	 the	 Protocols	
thereto’.24	Article	 34	 of	 the	 Convention	 therefore	 establishes	 who	 has	 locus	
standi	to	bring	proceedings	and,	as	is	evident	from	the	wording	of	the	provision,	
this	includes	non-governmental	organisations	and	groups	of	individuals.	Thus,	it	
appears	 on	 a	 literal	 interpretation,	 to	 include	 corporations,	 because	 non-
governmental	organisations	include	businesses.	Furthermore,	when	we	consult	
the	original	drafting	of	 the	Convention,	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	 the	drafters	





Convention.25	For	 example,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 first	 preliminary	 draft	 of	 the	
Convention,	 it	 contained	 a	 right	 petition	 to	 the	 ECtHR	 for	 ‘any	 natural	 or	
corporate	 person’.26	This	 term	 was	 later	 amended	 to	 ‘corporate	 body’	 and,	
eventually	 it	 was	 replaced	 with	 the	 term	 ‘non-governmental	 organisation’.27	
However,	there	was	and	remains	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	these	changes	to	
the	 terminology	 were	 implemented	 to	 diminish	 the	 rights	 protection	 of	











followed	 it	 –	 the	 Court	 has	 had	 no	 concerns	with	 ensuring	 that	 corporations	
have	 their	 rights	 protected.31	For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Société	 Colas	 Est	 v	
France,32	the	ECtHR	confirmed	that	 it	 is	comfortable	with	 the	extension	of	 the	
protection	 offered	 by	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 Convention	 to	 a	 corporation’s	 business	
















the	Convention	–	as	 it	 is	 a	 ‘living	 instrument’	 –	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	wished	 to	
ensure	that	the	Convention	covered	‘present-day	conditions’.34		
	
The	 preceding	 discussion	 clearly	 demonstrates	 that	 corporations	 qualify	 for	
rights	protection	under	the	Convention.	However,	what	has	not	been	shown	is	
why	we	would	want	this	to	be	the	case.	This	is	what	we	shall	now	move	on	to	
consider,	 whether	 corporations	 should	 have	 rights	 protection	 and	 why	 one	
would	wish	for	corporations	to	have	their	rights	protected.	This	assessment	will	
involve	 analysing	 the	 need	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 these	 rights	 from	 a	
‘competition	 law’	perspective.	Other	general	 reasons	 for	desiring	corporations	
to	have	rights	protection	will	also	be	identified,	analysed	and	discussed.	
2.2.2	The	Arguments	For	and	Against	Rights	Protection	
The	 discussion	 of	 the	 arguments	 for	 and	 against	 corporations	 qualifying	 for	




receive	rights	protection.	These	 include:	 that	 the	ECHR	was	never	 intended	to	
protect	 the	 rights	 of	 corporations;	 corporations	 are	 not	 ‘human	 beings’	 or	
‘persons’	so	how	and	why	should	human	rights	be	extended	to	them?;	granting	
corporations	 human	 rights	 dehumanises	 and	 degrades	 human	 rights;	
corporations	 have	 vast	 resources	 whereas	 human	 rights	 were	 developed	 to	
protect	the	vulnerable;	the	‘flood-gate’	argument	and	the	‘selective	rights	only’	
argument.	 These	 arguments	 shall	 now	 be	 analysed	 alongside	 the	 respective	
counter-arguments	 to	 illustrate	 why	 many	 of	 these	 arguments	 are	
fundamentally	flawed,	based	on	a	misconception	or	inaccurate	premises.	Table	










Probably	 the	 most	 oft	 cited	 argument	 against	 corporations	 having	 rights	













































on	 the	 claim	 that	 ‘the	 physical	 embodiment	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 persons	 or	
individuals	 is	 a	 crucial	 and	 central	 feature	 present	 in	 their	 creation	 and	
recognition’.37	The	 argument	 follows	 that,	 given	 corporations	 are	 not	 human	
and	have	no	physical	being,	why	should	we	–	and	how	can	we	–	provide	them	
with	rights	protection?	Those	who	advocate	along	these	 lines	often	claim	that	
when	 corporations	 gain	 rights	 protection	 it	 leads	 to	 an	 extension	 of	 rights	 or	
legal	protection	 that	 the	original	 legislation	never	envisaged,	allowed	nor	was	
designed	 for.	 Proponents	 of	 this	 view	 may	 take	 a	 ‘grant	 theory’	 view	 of	
corporations.	That	 is	to	say,	they	view	corporations	as	an	‘artificial	entity’	that	
owe	their	existence	to	the	State	–	i.e.	it	is	incorporated	and	allowed	to	trade	by	
the	 State	 –	 and	 cannot	 therefore	 derive	 any	 rights.38	This	 view	 was	 very	
prevalent	 in	 the	US	 and	 EU	 in	 the	 pre-19th	 Century	where	 corporations	were	
heavily	regulated	and	severely	limited	to	what	activities	they	could	engage	in.39	
However,	this	is	not	the	case	today.	The	formation	of	a	corporation	within	the	
EU	 and	 US	 is	 far	 easier,	 with	many	 of	 the	 restrictions	 and	 severe	 limitations	
having	been	removed.	
	
Another	 argument	 put	 forward	 (that	 extends	 and	 builds	 upon	 the	 previous	
argument)	 is	 that	 by	 granting	 corporations	 rights,	 it	 degrades,	 devalues	 and	
dehumanises	rights.40	It	is	claimed	that	by	allowing	corporations	to	have	rights,	
the	value	and	importance	of	these	fundamental	rights	is	lost	as	they	are	being	















At	 first	 glance,	 these	 two	 arguments	 –	 regarding	 the	 extension	 and	
dehumanisation	of	rights	–	appear	to	make	some	potentially	robust	assertions.	
Yet	 the	 fact	 of	 the	matter	 is	 that	 both	 of	 these	 arguments	 are	 actually	 very	
dubious	 and	 can	 be	 refuted	 rather	 effortlessly.	 If	 one	 simply	 considers	 the	
original	 intention	of	 the	drafters	of	 the	Convention	and	consults	 the	 language	
used	in	the	Convention	itself,	these	arguments	begin	to	fall.	As	was	illustrated	in	
the	early	 stages	of	 this	 chapter,	 the	Convention	was	always	 intended	 to	offer	
protection	 to	 corporations.	 Indeed,	 there	has	been	no	extension	of	 the	 rights	
because	 corporations	 qualified	 for	 these	 rights	 from	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	
Convention.	Corporations	cannot	 therefore	be	accused	of	 causing	 rights	 to	be	























changes,	 as	 it	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘living	 instrument’	 that	 adapts	 to	 modern	 day	
circumstances.	 Indeed,	 we	 find	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 that	 the	







claim	 that	 this	 extension	 serves	 to	 reinforce	 the	 protection	 of	 an	 individual’s	
rights.	 Therefore,	 should	 it	 not	 also	 be	 the	 case	 if	 rights	 are	 extended	 to	
corporations,	as	it	will	result	in	better	protection	of	individuals	as	well?	Further	
to	 this,	 if	 we	 consider	 how	 important	 and	 influential	 corporations	 are	 today	
with	 regards	 to	 the	 community,	one	has	 to	question	why	we	would	not	want	
them	 to	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection.	 For	 example,	 corporations	 affect	 our	
everyday	 lives,	 they	 employ	 citizens,	 impact	 on	 the	 local	 community	 and	
economy	 and	 they	 can	 protect	 the	 local	 environment	 too.46	Based	 on	 this	
discussion,	 it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	–	owing	to	the	importance	of	
corporations	 today	 and	 the	 way	 that	 the	 Convention	 adapts	 to	 modern	 day	













criminal	 and	 civil	 offences.47	For	 example,	 corporations	 in	 the	 UK	 can	 be	
charged	with	corporate	manslaughter	where	a	death	occurs	owing	to	a	serious	
management	 failure	 that	 results	 in	 a	 gross	 breach	 of	 a	 duty	 of	 care.48	In	 this	
case,	as	a	corporation	is	a	legal	person,	one	wonders	why	we	would	not	expect	
it	to	have	some	form	of	rights	protection?	This	is	a	serious	charge	that	will	have	
grave	 implications	 for	 the	 corporation	 both	 financially	 and	 for	 its	 reputation,	
alongside	having	an	 impact	on	 the	corporation’s	employees	and	shareholders.	
The	 court	 may	 even	 impose	 remedial	 or	 publicity	 orders	 against	 the	
corporation.49	If,	on	 the	one	hand,	we	are	willing	 to	define	a	 corporation	as	a	





that	 corporations	 will	 consider	 and	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals.50	As	 we	
place	an	expectation	on	corporations	to	not	infringe	or	unduly	affect	the	rights	
of	an	individual,	why	would	we	not	also	expect	them	to	themselves	qualify	for	
rights	 protection?	 This	 argument	 turns	 the	 tables	 on	 one	 of	 the	 arguments	
made	by	 those	opposing	 corporations	having	human	 rights.	 It	 is	 often	argued	





protect	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals,	 if	 it	 cannot	 itself	 qualify	 for	 this	 protection.	
Another	 argument	 raised	 is	 that	 corporations	 often	 have	 vast	 resources	 and	










weak	 individual	 against	 the	 wealthy	 and	 powerful	 State.52 	The	 argument	




At	 first	 glance	 this	 argument	 appears	 to	 have	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 traction;	
corporations	are	often	quite	powerful	and	are	relatively	well-equipped	to	deal	




small	 or	 medium	 sized	 enterprises	 accounting	 for	 99.9	 percent	 of	 these.54	
Consequently,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 we	 provide	 adequate	 protection	 for	 these	
companies,	as	they	will	not	have	vast	resources	and	thus	in	many	instances	will	
be	weaker	and	much	less	powerful	than	the	State.	There	may	also	be	instances	
where	 these	 small	 businesses,	which	 lack	 in	wealth	 and	 resources,	 have	 their	
rights	infringed	by	the	Commission	and	yet	still	wish	to	pursue	a	claim.55	Further	
to	 this,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	Commission	 is	 actually	 a	 powerful	 agency	
when	it	 is	compared	to	a	corporation.	The	powers	they	have	to	 investigate	an	
alleged	 cartel	 are	 robust	 and	 wide-ranging,	 and	 the	 potential	 sanctions	 that	
they	 can	 impose	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 competition	 law	 are	 severe	 and	 potentially	
harmful	to	the	economy.	Therefore,	the	power	balance	is	still	favoured	towards	















harm	 powerful	 government	 bodies	 can	 cause	 to	 corporations.	 Additionally,	 if	






of	 argument	 was	 to	 be	 followed	 through	 completely,	 would	 this	 mean	 that	
suspected	 or	 convicted	 terrorists	 or	 murderers	 should	 not	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 because	 of	 the	 crimes	 they	 have	allegedly	 committed?57	If	 so,	 this	
would	 go	 against	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 would	 lead	 to	 the	
‘conditional	 application	 of	 human	 rights’. 58 	Consequently,	 this	 argument	
actually	 appears	 illogical	 when	 one	 considers	 the	 potential	 outcome	 that	 it	
could	 lead	 to	 if	 it	 is	 followed	 through	completely,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 rights	are	
applied	to	all	individuals	no	matter	what	their	status	or	wealth.	
	
The	next	argument,	which	 is	often	 levied	against	corporations	having	rights,	 is	
linked	to	the	aforementioned	argument.	Because	corporations	often	have	vast	
resources	and	wealth,	it	is	argued	by	some	that	this	–	coupled	with	corporations	
qualifying	 for	 rights	 protection	 –	 will	 lead	 to	 many	 cases	 being	 brought	 by	
corporate	applicants	 that	will	 tie	up	 the	courts	and	 lead	 to	a	 large	amount	of	
cases	going	before	the	ECtHR.	This	in	turn	will	mean	that	individual	right	holders	
will	 struggle	 to	bring	 their	 claims	as	 they	often	have	 fewer	 resources	and	 less	
wealth	 than	 corporations,59	who	 will	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 wait	 for	 the	 case	 to	
proceed	 through.	 This	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 ‘floodgate	 argument’,	 i.e.	 that	 by	
corporations	 qualifying	 for	 rights	 protection	 there	 will	 be	 a	 significant	 rise	 in	
cases	 that	 the	Court	will	 not	be	able	 to	 cope	with.	 Further	 to	 this,	 one	might	
even	 suggest	 that	 corporations	 may	 try	 to	 use	 their	 wealth	 to	 lobby	 and	










we	 see	 that	 the	 empirical	 data	 does	 not	 support	 this	 claim	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	
‘floodgates’	argument	is	currently	a	non-starter.	That	said,	as	the	EU	accedes	to	
the	 ECHR	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 corporations	 gain	 even	 more	 prominence	 and	




The	 final	 argument	 that	 shall	 be	 considered	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 difficult	
argument	 –	 for	 those	 who	 advocate	 for	 corporations	 to	 qualify	 for	 rights	
protection	 –	 to	 counter.	 The	 argument	 extends	 from	 one	 of	 the	 very	 first	
arguments	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 this	 chapter.	 As	 corporations	 are	 not	 human	
beings,	 there	 are	 certain	 rights	 that	 it	 appears	 very	 difficult	 to	 see	 being	
applicable	to	them	–	because	of	the	very	nature	of	those	rights.61	For	example,	
it	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	a	 corporation	having	 the	 right	 to	 life	or	being	able	 to	be	
tortured.	 Therefore,	 how	 can	 corporations	 qualify	 for	 rights	 protection	 if	 a	
variety	of	the	rights	do	not	or	cannot	apply	to	them?	Hence,	 it	 is	claimed	that	
this	must	mean	that	the	ECHR	was	only	ever	intended	to	protect	human	beings	
as,	 if	 not,	 it	 means	 one	 has	 to	 ‘pick	 and	 choose’	 which	 rights	 apply	 to	 a	
corporation.	 Consequently,	 this	 argument	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 regarding	 ‘only	
selective	 rights’.	 The	 argument	 could	 be	 developed	 even	 further	 by	 claiming	
















For	 this	 scenario	 we	 shall	 consider	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
European	 Union	 (TFEU).	 The	 TFEU	 is	 applicable	 to	 both	 individual	 citizens	 as	
well	as	corporations.	We	find	that	there	are	certain	provisions	that	relate	solely	





that	 the	Convention	 still	 functions	as	 it	was	designed	 to	when	 it	 provides	 the	
protection	of	certain	rights	for	human	beings	and,	 in	other	situations,	protects	
the	 rights	 of	 individuals	 as	 well	 as	 corporations.	 Undeniably,	 the	 rights	
themselves	will	not	apply	in	all	situations,	even	when	an	individual	human	being	




This	 section	 has	 illustrated	 that	 there	 are	 many	 misconceptions	 surrounding	
corporations	 having	 rights	 protection	 and	 the	 arguments	 forwarded	 against	
rights	 protection	 for	 corporations	 are	 actually	 weak	 and	 do	 not	 withstand	
deconstruction	 when	 analysed.	 There	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 reasons	 and	















the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedures	 to	 be	 enhanced	 and	 clarified	 where	 the	
need	 arises.	 This	 is	 because	when	 the	 court	 identifies	 the	 breach	of	 a	 right	 –	
owing	to	an	appeal	by	the	corporation	–	the	Commission	will	be	able	to	amend	
the	 guidelines	 to	 reflect	 the	 identified	 infringement	 or	 to	 ensure	 that	 its	
practices	take	into	consideration	the	identified	issue	in	the	future.	Therefore,	by	
corporations	 having	 rights,	 it	 brings	 benefits	 to	 the	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	as	a	whole,	ensuring	that	there	is	enhanced	certainty	and	procedural	
propriety	 for	 all.	 In	 addition,	 it	 also	 helps	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 enforcement	
procedures	 used	 by	 the	 Commission	 are	 applied	 fairly	 and	 consistently	 to	
corporations	as,	where	it	is	not,	the	corporation	could	appeal	the	Commission’s	
decision.	 Consequently,	 by	 allowing	 corporations	 to	 have	 rights	 protection	 it	







better	 protected.	 There	 are	 potential	 situations	 where	 individuals	 would	 not	
have	their	rights	protected	or	 legal	standing	to	bring	a	claim	themselves,	even	
though	 they	may	have	been	affected	by	 a	decision	made	by	 the	Commission.	





corporation	 was	 fined	 heavily	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and,	 for	
arguments	sake,	 the	decision	breaches	Article	7	of	 the	ECHR,	and	the	 fine	the	
Commission	had	imposed	led	to	the	corporation	making	workers	redundant	and	
causes	a	drop	in	share	price.	The	redundant	members	of	the	workforce	and	the	
shareholders	 would	 have	 no	 legal	 standing	 to	 raise	 concerns	 under	 the	
Convention	 about	 what	 has	 happened	 to	 the	 corporation	 regarding	 the	 fine.	
But,	 if	 the	 corporation	 qualifies	 for	 rights	 protection,	 it	 can	 challenge	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 If	 it	 is	 found	 by	 the	
Court	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 7	 then	 these	 issues	 can	 be	
addressed.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 individuals	 affected	 by	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 (who	 themselves	would	not	 qualify	 in	 this	 instance	 for	
legal	protection)	would	have	been	protected.	This	example	illustrates	that	when	
corporations	 receive	 rights	 protection	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 greater	 benefits	 to	
individuals	as	a	whole.	
	
Arguments	 against	 corporations	 receiving	 rights	 protection	 often	 make	
reference	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 beings	 and	 that	 rights	 protection	 was	
designed	 to	 defend	 physical	 beings,	 which	 corporations	 are	 not.	 What	 these	
arguments	overlook	and	forget	to	take	into	account	is	that	corporations	consist	
of	 a	 group	 of	 individuals.	 Indeed,	 a	 corporation	 is	 effectively	 a	 collection	 of	
individual	 right	 holders.	 However,	 within	 UK	 Company	 Law	 we	 see	 that	 the	
company	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 separate	 entity	 to,	 and	 from,	 these	 individual	 right	
holders.64	This	principle	is	known	as	the	‘corporate	veil’	and	it	limits	the	natural	
person’s	 liability	 for	 the	company.	Nevertheless,	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 this	
veil	 can	 be	 pierced	 so	 those	 behind	 the	 company	 can	 become	 liable	 for	 its	
debts.65	What	we	see	is	that	when	these	individual	right	holders	come	together	
for	 this	 shared	 purpose,	 i.e.	 the	 business,	 they	 can	 become	 an	 entity	 that	





holders.66	For	 example,	when	 a	 corporation	makes	 a	 business	 decision,	 this	 is	
not	 inescapably	 the	 decision	 of	 an	 individual	 right	 holder.	 This	 decision	 will	
often	be	made	by	a	group	of	right	holders	communally	(for	example,	a	Board	of	
Directors)	which	means	the	decision	is	not	that	of	one	person	but	of	many,	i.e.	
the	 ‘corporation’.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 ‘corporation’	 has	 a	 will	 of	 its	 own	 as	 it	
creates	 its	 own	 goals	 and	 objectives.	 The	 corporation	 is	 therefore	more	 than	




corporations	 owe	 their	 existence	 and	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 distinct	 and	 unified	
purposes	 and	 wills	 of	 groups.68	What	 this	 argument	 establishes	 is	 that	 a	
corporation	 is	 made	 up	 of	 a	 collection	 of	 right	 holders,	 but	 its	 actions	 and	
decisions	 go	beyond	 those	of	 individual	 right	holders.	As	 such,	 the	 individuals	
behind	the	corporation	need	their	rights	protected	by	the	corporation	having	its	
rights	 protected,	 because	 an	 individual	 right	 holder’s	 rights	 will	 not	 be	
adequately	 protected	 as	 the	 corporation	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	 individual.	
Conversely	 here,	 nor	will	 the	 corporation’s	 rights	 be	 adequately	 protected	 by	
those	 of	 an	 individual	 right	 holder,	 as	 the	 corporation	 is	 distinct	 from	 that	
individual.	 For	 example,	 if	 one	 considers	 when	 the	 Commission	 conducts	 an	
investigation	 into	 a	 suspected	 cartel,	 it	 has	 broad	 powers	 under	 Regulation	
1/2003/EC	 to	 conduct	 its	 investigation.69	These	 powers	 include	 the	 ability	 to	
interview	any	natural	or	legal	person	who	consents	to	being	interviewed	for	the	

















One	 may	 wish	 to	 point	 to	 the	 illogicality	 of	 a	 corporation	 having	 a	 ‘will’	 as	
individuals	control	 the	corporation	and	 it	does	not	have	a	mind	 itself	 to	make	
decisions.	However,	 this	 fails	 to	understand	 the	argument	 raised	 in	 the	above	
discussion	 regarding	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 individual	 right	 holder	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	
corporation	does	not	usually	make	a	decision.	The	decision	is	that	of	a	group	of	
rights	holders,	who	put	forward	their	ideas	and	then,	through	coordination	and	




it	a	worker	 lower	down	 in	the	employment	 line?	The	management	team?	The	
Board	of	Directors?	Or	the	shareholders	perhaps?		
	
The	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 typically	 views	 the	 decision	 of	 a	 company	 as	 having	 been	
made	by	the	shareholders	in	a	company.	This	therefore,	reinforces	the	previous	
point	 and	 view	 that	 a	 corporation	 is	 a	 group	 of	 individuals	 who	 collectively	




rights	 protection	 is	 the	 ‘dual	 prosecution’	 argument.72	This	 argument	 is	 based	
on	 the	 idea	 that	 if	 corporations	do	not	 receive	 the	 standard	 rights	protection	
under	the	Convention	that	 individuals	would	receive,	 it	will	 lead	to	a	situation	
where	 there	 will	 need	 to	 be	 separate	 offences	 or	 procedural	 safeguards	 for	
corporations	as	to	those	provided	for	individuals.	This	could	lead	to	a	variety	of	




involve	 corporations	 as	 well	 as	 individuals	 will	 become	 more	 complex	 and	
difficult	as	they	will	have	differing	 legal	standards	that	will	have	to	be	met,	as	
well	as	potentially	differing	charging	requirements.	This	could	lead	to	the	legal	
system	 becoming	 burdened	 by	 the	 differing	 requirements	 and	 it	 might	 also	
result	 in	 issues	 with	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty.	 This	 is	 because	 two	 separate	
bodies	 of	 case	 law	 will	 materialise	 for	 what	 is	 in	 essence	 the	 same	 offence.	













3. Granting	 corporations	 rights	 degrades,	 devalues	 and	 dehumanises	
human	rights;	





These	 arguments	 were	 analysed	 to	 show	 their	 weaknesses	 and	 flaws,	 and	 a	
variety	 of	 counter-arguments	 for	 corporations	 having	 rights	 protection	 were	
advanced,	including:	
	











This	 analysis	 and	 assessment	 of	 the	 arguments	 has	 shown	 why	 the	 claims	






The	case	of	Yukos	Oil	Company	 (hereafter,	 ‘Yukos	Oil’),73	is	 an	 significant	 case	
which	 needs	 discussion	 when	 one	 wishes	 to	 study	 the	 protection	 of	 a	
corporation’s	 rights.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 its	 outcome	




Before	 discussing	 the	 demonstrative	 case	 it	 is	 pertinent	 to	 make	 a	 few	













case.	This	 case	 is	an	extreme	example	of	 the	problems	 that	a	corporation	can	
potentially	 face,	but	 it	 is	often	 in	 these	type	of	situations	that	we	can	 identify	
why	something	is	required;	in	this	case,	the	protection	of	a	corporation’s	rights	
and	corporations	having	the	ability	to	go	to	a	truly	independent	body.	It	should	
be	noted	that	 the	case	of	Yukos	Oil	did	not	 involve	competition	 law	nor	did	 it	
have	anything	to	do	with	the	Commission	or	its	procedures.	This	case	involved	
Russia	and	its	national	courts.	Russia	is	not	a	member	of	the	EU;	nonetheless,	it	
is	 a	 signatory	 State	 of	 the	 ECHR,	 which	means	 that	 the	 Convention	must	 be	
applied	to	those	in	its	jurisdiction.	Because	of	this	the	ECtHR	has	the	power	to	
adjudicate	cases	regarding	alleged	infringements	of	the	Convention.	Having	said	
all	 of	 the	 above,	 this	 does	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 case	with	
regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 proceedings	 and	 the	 need	 for	 a	 corporation	 to	
have	rights	protection.	This	 is	something	that	 is	 illustrated	and	discussed	after	
the	facts	of	Yukos	Oil	have	been	laid	out.75	
	
Yukos	 Oil	 was	 originally	 a	 State-owned	 petroleum	 company	 until	 it	 was	
privatised	in	1993.	Once	privatised	the	company	traded	for	13	years	until	it	was	
declared	bankrupt	and	ceased	trading	in	August	2006.	During	this	time,	Michail	






its	due	 taxes	 for	 the	 year	of	 2000.	On	 the	8	December	2003,	 the	Russian	Tax	
Ministry	 announced	 a	 re-audit	 of	 Yukos	 Oil’s	 accounts.	 This	 audit	 led	 to	 the	
Russian	Tax	Ministry	concluding	that	Yukos	Oil	owed	2.9	billion	euros.	What	was	






Oil	 was	 summoned	 to	 pay	 this	 amount	 within	 two	 days	 from	 the	 14	 April	
2004.77	The	Russian	Federation	opted	not	to	wait	two	days	and	the	Tax	Ministry	
requested	a	Moscow	Court	 to	order	Yukos	Oil	 to	pay	 the	amount	and	 issue	a	
freezing	 order	 for	 Yukos	 Oil’s	 assets.	 This	 order	 was	made	 on	 the	 same	 day,	
leaving	Yukos	Oil	no	time	to	release	any	assets.	The	hearing	was	scheduled	for	
21	May	2004,	and	Yukos	Oil	requested	an	adjournment	but	it	was	denied.	A	few	
days	 before	 the	 hearing,	 the	 Tax	 Ministry	 supplied	 Yukos	 Oil	 with	 an	
unnumbered	 document	 that	 comprised	 of	 over	 71,000	 pages.78	However,	 the	
Tax	Ministry	 supplied	 a	 well-ordered	 and	 numbered	 document	 to	 the	 Court,	
which	Yukos	Oil	did	not	see	until	arriving	 in	court.	Yukos	Oil	was,	nonetheless,	
given	 a	 thirty-minute	 period	 to	 consider	 the	 document	 on	 the	 lunch	 break.	
Yukos	Oil	was	required	by	the	Court	on	the	26	May	2004	to	settle	a	large	part	of	
the	 claim.	 Yukos	Oil	 attempted	 to	 appeal	 the	 Court’s	 decision,	 but	 this	 failed	
and	thus	the	Tax	Ministry	sought	enforcement	measures.	This	led	to	Yukos	Oil’s	
prime	asset	being	auctioned	off	for	a	very	small	percentage	of	its	actual	worth,	
which	 eventually	 ended	 up	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 state-owned	 Rosneft	 Oil	
Company.	The	Tax	Ministry	 then	pursued	Yukos	Oil	 for	payment	of	back	taxes	
from	 2001-2004	 totaling	 20.1	 billion	 euros.	 By	 this	 point,	 Yukos	 Oil	 was	






exist	by	 the	 time	the	case	was	 to	be	heard.	On	20	September	2011	 the	Court	
gave	its	judgment	on	the	merits	after	previous	dealing	with	issues	of	standing.79	








thus	 the	 Court	 had	 lost	 jurisdiction,	 the	 Court	 acknowledged	 the	 need	 for	 a	
victim	to	initiate	proceedings,	but	refused	to	follow	a	rigid	interpretation	of	this	
throughout.	Again	what	we	see	here	 is	the	Court	treating	the	Convention	as	a	





The	 Court	 held	 that	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 had	 breached	 its	 duty	 to	 provide	
Yukos	Oil	with	a	fair	trial,	owing	to	the	insufficient	time	it	provided	to	Yukos	Oil	
to	adequately	prepare	 its	defence,	and	 the	unjustifiable	 restrictions	placed	on	
Yukos	 Oil’s	 ability	 to	 appeal.	 The	 Court	 also	 held	 that	 the	 interference	 with	
Yukos	 Oil’s	 property	 was	 unlawful	 due	 to	 the	 unforeseen	 change	 in	 the	
interpretation	of	 a	 statutory	 time	bar	 that	 laid	down	 the	period	during	which	
Yukos	Oil	 could	have	been	held	 liable.	However,	 the	Court	 rejected	 the	other	
rights	violations	claimed	by	Yukos	Oil.	
	
This	 case	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 need	 to	 protect	 a	 corporation’s	
rights.	From	providing	the	facts	of	this	case,	it	creates	a	powerful	argument	for	
the	 need	 for	 corporations	 to	 have	 their	 rights	 protected.	When	 one	 hears	 of	
what	happened	 in	 this	case,	 it	 is	difficult	not	 to	empathise	with	Yukos	Oil	and	
see	 what	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 excessively	 unfair	 treatment	 of	 a	 corporation.	
Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 interesting	 features	 of	 this	 case	 was	 the	 ‘potent	 and	
compelling	 demonstration	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 mere	 availability	 of	 the	
[ECtHR],	 as	 an	 international	 independent	 judicial	 venue,	 for	 a	 brutalized	











Some	 may	 wish	 to	 question	 why	 it	 matters	 that	 Yukos	 Oil	 has	 its	 rights	
protected.	 Indeed,	they	may	ask	why	it	 is	 important	as	 it	 is	only	a	corporation	
and	what	 happens	 only	 affects	 shareholders.	 However,	 this	 is	 a	 short-sighted	
view	that	cannot	be	supported	when	one	considers	the	possible	implications	of	
what	 happened	 to	 Yukos	Oil.	 By	 Yukos	Oil	 being	 forcefully	 bankrupted,	 there	
were	consequences	and	‘knock-on	effects’	that	were	felt	far	wider	than	just	by	
the	shareholders.	To	begin	with,	Yukos	Oil	employees	lost	their	jobs	and,	thus,	
their	 livelihoods.	 This	 would	 have	 meant	 that	 they	 had	 to	 find	 another	 job,	
which	 would	 have	 probably	 been	 difficult	 given	 that	 other	 workers	 from	 the	
same	 company	 were	 also	 likely	 to	 be	 looking	 for	 similar	 jobs	 –	 and	 those	
workers	would	 likely	 have	 comparable	 skills	 to	 each	 other.	 Furthermore,	 one	
should	not	forget	the	implications	losing	a	job	would	have	had	on	that	individual	







competitive	 pressure	 as	 a	 corporation	 that	 is	 preforming	 economically	well	 is	
removed	 from	 the	 market.	 This	 increases	 the	 risks	 of	 collusion	 within	 the	
market,	 as	 there	 are	 fewer	 competitors,	 which	 can	 impact	 on	 the	 prices	
consumers	 end	 up	 having	 to	 pay.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 where	 the	 only	
remaining	oil	 firms	 left	within	 the	market	are	state	owned.	Also,	we	must	not	
forget	the	impact	on	Yukos	Oil’s	suppliers	here;	there	will	be	contracts	that	have	
been	 lost,	 having	 an	 impact	 on	 other	 businesses.	 Indeed,	 there	will	 be	 some	
contracts,	which	were	at	the	stage	of	partial	completion	where	significant	time	









particularly	 when	 they	 are	 a	 key	 part	 of	 the	 national	 infrastructure.	 For	
example,	if	we	consider	the	ramifications	of	the	bankruptcy	of	Lehman	Brothers	
in	the	US	and	what	then	happened	within	the	market	to	investor	confidence.82	
This	 uncertainty	 could	 also	 lead	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 investment	 by	 shareholders	 in	
companies	 and	 an	 unwillingness	 by	 banks	 to	 lend	money	 to	 companies.	 This	
then	has	knock-on	effects	to	the	economy	again.	For	the	shareholder	that	has	a	
diversified	and	wide-ranging	portfolio,	this	loss	may	not	be	too	great;	however,	
for	 a	 shareholder	 who	 has	 a	 more	 limited	 portfolio	 or	 only	 invests	 in	 one	




corporation	 appears	 to	 have	been	 systematically	 targeted	by	 the	 government	
and	their	departmental	bodies.	But,	nonetheless,	minor	breaches	of	rights	can	
still	have	drastic	consequences	for	corporations,	the	community	and	the	people	
involved	 and,	 as	 such,	 this	 case	 only	 serves	 to	 strengthen	 the	 claims	 that	
corporations	need	 to	have	 their	 rights	adequately	protected.	The	next	 section	
of	the	chapter	shall	move	on	to	consider	why	the	thesis	focuses	its	attention	on	












be	 assessed	 against.	 Next,	 why	 and	 how	 these	 rights	 will	 be	 engaged	 is	
discussed.	 And	 finally,	 it	 illustrates	 why	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	process	to	be	legally	certain,	clear	and	transparent.	It	also	identifies	why	





The	 next	 part	 of	 this	 section	 outlines	 the	 reasons	why	 this	 thesis	 applies	 the	




The	main	 reason	 for	 this	 choice	 stems	 from	the	nature	of	 the	ECHR.	To	begin	
with,	the	Convention	is	well-developed	and	has	a	strong	body	of	jurisprudence	
behind	 it.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 far	greater	developed	than	the	EU’s	CFREU.	The	CFREU	
only	came	into	force	in	2009,	whereas	the	ECHR	has	been	in	force	since	1953.	
This	means	that	the	ECtHR	has	amassed	a	great	deal	of	case	law	regarding	the	
ECHR	and	how	it	 is	 to	be	 interpreted	and	applied.	By	having	this,	one	can	use	









Another	 important	 reason	 for	 choosing	 the	 ECHR	 over	 the	 CFREU	 is	 that	 the	
ECHR	has	a	long	established	line	of	jurisprudence	of	offering	rights	protection	to	







Additionally,	as	 identified	 in	the	aforementioned	discussion	–	 in	Section	2.2	of	
this	 chapter	 –	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 court	 is	
imperative	to	ensure	that	the	rights	enshrined	within	the	law	are	being	applied	
effectively,	 correctly	 and	 fairly.	As	was	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 study	of	Yukos	Oil,	 in	
extreme	 circumstances,	 a	 corporation	 can	 become	 a	 victim	 of	 a	 personal	
campaign	 by	 a	 State,	 an	 enforcement	 body	 or	 an	 individual.	 By	 utilising	 the	
ECHR	over	 the	CFREU,	we	are	considering	 jurisprudence	which	 is	 independent	
to	 that	of	 the	EU.	Case	 law	 from	the	CFREU	stems	 from	EU	courts,	which	–	 it	
maybe	suggested	–	is	neither	impartial	nor	objective.	Indeed,	the	EU	Courts	may	
be	 reluctant	 to	 find	 breaches	 of	 the	 CFREU	 if	 it	 would	 require	 a	 significant	
amendment	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 in	 cartel	 enforcement	 cases.	
Therefore,	 by	 utilising	 ECtHR	 case	 law,	 it	 allows	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
















come	 at	 some	 stage.	 Therefore,	 this	 means	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	will	 have	 to	 comply	with	 the	 rights	 contained	within	
the	ECHR	and,	thus,	it	is	felt	that	the	best	source	of	rights	to	consider	are	those	
protected	 by	 the	 Convention.87	Nonetheless,	 the	 observant	 will	 note	 that	
currently	 the	 EU	 is	 not	 a	 signatory	 state	 to	 the	 Convention	 and,	 as	 such,	 the	
Commission’s	policies	do	not	need	to	comply	with	 the	Convention.	Moreover,	
an	 undertaking	 will	 not	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 the	
Commission	 as	 only	 signatory	 states	 can	 be	 brought	 before	 the	 ECtHR.	
Consequently,	no	action	can	lie	against	the	Commission.	This	means	that	even	if	





the	 Commission’s	 procedures	will	 need	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 Convention.	 This	
thesis	 therefore	 foreshadows	 how	 the	 Commission	will	 have	 to	 behave	when	
the	ECHR	accession	comes	about.	Additionally,	 the	EU	courts	regularly	seek	to	
follow	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence	 and	 have	 held	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
guidelines	 fall	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 ECHR.88	In	 turn,	 this	 gives	 additional	
weight	to	the	need	to	carry	out	this	analysis	as	the	EU	courts	seek	to	ensure	the	




















National	 Competition	 Law	 incorporates	 EU	 competition	 law	 and	 the	 fining	
procedure	is	often	similar	to	that	of	the	Commission’s.	Thus,	the	findings	from	
this	 thesis	 will	 be	 applicable	 to	 Member	 States’	 National	 Competition	
Authorities.89	Finally,	 the	Commission	can	 take	over	National	Competition	Law	
investigations	 when	 the	 case	 has	 ‘community	 dimension’.	 This	 means	 that,	




Because	 of	 the	 various	 reasons	 identified	 above,	 the	 long-established	 and	
developed	 ECHR	 and	 the	 ECtHR	 jurisprudence	 has	 been	 chosen	 to	 analyse	
against	the	Commission’s	cartel	enforcement	policies.	
	
It	 has	 been	 identified	 that	 the	 following	 ECHR	 and	 procedural	 rights	 are	 the	
most	 pertinent	 to	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
policies:90	legal	certainty	 (which	can	be	 ‘read	 in’	 through	Article	7	ECHR),91	the	
right	 to	 respect	 for	 one’s	 private	 and	 family	 life	 (his	 home	 and	 his	
correspondence	–	Article	8	ECHR),	 the	right	 to	a	 fair	 trial	 (Article	6	ECHR),	 the	
UK	 equitable	 doctrine	 of	 breach	 of	 confidence,	 the	 EU	 principles	 of	 equal	
treatment	and	legitimate	expectations.	It	is	important	to	be	clear	here	that	this	
thesis	 will	 be	 focusing	 its	 attention	 on	 the	 EU	 general	 principle,	 and	
requirement	of,	 equal	 treatment	and	will	not	 be	 considering	Article	14	of	 the	
ECHR	or	Protocol	12.	This	 is	because	both	of	 these	ECHR	rights	 focus	on	non-
discrimination,	 which	 is	 something	 that	 is	 different	 to	 equal	 treatment.	 Non-














applicable	 amongst	 all	 of	 the	 signatory	 states	 to	 the	 ECHR,	 whereas	 the	 EU	








The	 first	 –	 and	 perhaps	 most	 fundamental	 –	 reason	 why	 legal	 certainty	 and	
equal	 treatment	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 important	 to	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 is	 that	
there	is	a	legal	necessity	for	adherence	with	these	principles.93	The	Court	of	First	
Instance	 (CFI)	 has	 stated	 that	 when	 the	 Commission	 are	 calculating	 fines	 the	
assessment	 must	 ‘be	 carried	 out	 in	 compliance	 with	 Community	 law,	 which	
includes	not	only	the	provisions	of	the	Treaty	but	also	the	general	principles	of	
law’.94	Within	the	EU	there	is	a	general	principle	of	law	that	requires	there	to	be	
legal	 certainty	 within	 the	 law.95	This	 aside,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 Commission	













needs	 to	 adhere	 to	 when	 enforcing	 EU	 law.96	For	 example,	 Baroness	 Ashton	
(First	Vice	President	of	the	European	Commission)	has	stated	that	she	believes	
that	 ‘human	 rights	 should	 be	 the	 silver	 thread	 that	 runs	 through	 all	 the	








any	 act	 or	 omission	which	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 criminal	 offence	
under	 national	 or	 international	 law	 at	 the	 time	 when	 it	 was	
committed.	Nor	shall	a	heavier	penalty	be	imposed	than	the	one	




mention	of	 legal	 certainty.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 important	 that	we	begin	by	establishing	
why	and	how	Article	7	includes	the	requirement	of	legal	certainty.	98	It	will	then	
be	necessary	to	show	how	and	why	Article	7	also	extends	to,	and	requires	that,	





















Article	 7	 of	 the	 Convention	 also	 requires	 that	 a	 criminal	 ‘offence	 is	 clearly	




application	 of	 the	 criminal	 law	 […]	 it	 also	 embodies,	 more	
generally,	the	principle	that	only	the	law	can	define	a	crime	and	
prescribe	a	penalty	(nullum	crimen,	nulla	poena	sine	lege)	[...]	it	




decipher	 from	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 provision	 (or	 if	 need	 be	 with	 the	 courts’	
assistance	 in	 its	 interpretation)	 of	 what	 acts	 and	 omissions	 will	 make	 him	
liable.102	Therefore,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 required	 that	 the	 law	 should	 allow	 an	
individual	to	be	able	to	foresee	the	legal	consequences	that	a	given	action	may	
entail. 103 	However,	 the	 Court	 has	 accepted	 that	 ‘absolute	 certainty	 is	



























ECtHR	has	 embraced	 this	 approach	 to	 protect	 human	 rights	 effectively.	 If	 the	
Court	 were	 not	 to	 take	 an	 autonomous	 interpretation	 independent	 of	 the	
categorisation	of	 legal	 proceedings	 under	 national	 law	of	 the	offence	 it	 could	
lead	 to	 rights	 not	 being	 adequately	 protected.	 In	 this	 regard,	 countries	 could	
classify	offences	as	non-criminal	to	avoid	the	ECHR	being	applicable	to	them.108	
Indeed,	without	the	Court	adopting	this	approach,	it	would	lead	to	a	fractured	
application	 of	 rights,	 where	 Member	 States	 may	 contract	 out	 of	 rights	
protection	by	defining	activities	outside	the	scope	of	the	protection.	This	would	
then	 allow	 for	 a	 situation	 where	 unequal	 treatment	 could	 occur	 to	 ECHR	
applicants	based	on	the	Member	State	that	they	are	within.	This	would	damage	
the	 ECHR’s	 purpose	 and	 make	 it	 of	 limited	 use.	 Hence	 an	 autonomous	
interpretation	by	the	Court	is	of	utmost	importance.	
	










The	 ‘Engel-criteria’	 consist	 of	 three	 separate	 considerations.	 First,	 the	 Court	
considers	 the	 classification	 of	 the	 offence	 under	 the	 Member	 State’s	 law.	
Second,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence	 in	 question	 is	 examined	 and,	 finally,	 the	
nature	 and	 degree	 of	 severity	 of	 the	 penalty	 that	 may	 be	 imposed	 is	
assessed.110	It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 the	 Court	 holds	 that	 the	 second	 and	
third	 criteria	 are	 alternative	 and	 not	 necessarily	 cumulative,111	although,	 they	
may	be	used	cumulatively	when	neither	alone	is	conclusive.112		
	
One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 ECtHR	 decisions	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	
competition	law	fines	was	the	recent	decision	given	by	the	Court	in	Menarini	on	
the	 27	 September	 2011.113	In	 this	 case,	 the	 Italian	 Competition	 Authority	 –	
Autorità	 Garante	 della	 Concorrenza	 e	 del	 Mercato	 (hereafter,	 the	 AGCM)	 –	
fined	Menarini	 €6	million	 for	 their	 participation	within	 a	 ‘diabetes	diagnostics	
test’	 cartel.	 Menarini	 sought	 to	 have	 the	 decision	 annulled	 by	 the	 Italian	
administrative	 court.	 The	 administrative	 court	 dismissed	 the	 case,	 as	 did	 the	




















the	 classification	 of	 the	 infringement	 by	 the	 national	 legislation.	 The	 Italian	
legislation	 –	 like	 European	 legislation	 –	 classifies	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	
competition	authority	as	administrative	and	not	criminal.	However,	 the	ECtHR	
did	not	 see	 this	 as	 determinative	 and	 thus	proceeded	 to	 consider	 the	 second	
criterion.	Here,	 the	Court	 looked	at	 the	nature	of	 the	offence	 itself	and	noted	
that	competition	law	sought	to	preserve	free	market	competition	and	that	the	
AGCM	 supervises	 the	 enforcement	 of	 this.115	The	AGCM	 therefore	 affects	 the	
general	 interests	 of	 society	 normally	 protected	 by	 criminal	 law,	 which	 had	
already	been	held	 to	be	criminal	 for	 the	purposes	of	Article	6	ECHR	 in	Société	
Stenuit	 v	 France.116	The	 Court	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 fine	 was	 essentially	 a	
punishment	 to	 deter	 repetition	 of	 the	 conduct.117	Thirdly,	 the	 Court	 assessed	
the	nature	and	severity	of	 the	applied	penalty.	The	Court	 felt	 that	because	of	
the	high	 level	of	 fines	 (€6	million	euros)	 imposed	on	Menarini	 	–	and	 the	 fact	
that	 the	penalty	 is	aimed	not	 just	at	punishing	those	who	breach	the	 law	but,	
primarily,	deterring	those	who	committed	the	breach	as	well	as	deterring	other	
undertakings	 from	 breaching	 the	 law	 –	 the	 fines	 were	 to	 be	 of	 a	 criminal	
nature.118	
	
Yet,	 the	 astute	 will	 note	 that	 the	 Menarini	 judgment	 may	 have	 held	 that	
competition	 law	 fines	are	of	criminal	nature	but	 that	 this	was	with	 regards	 to	
Article	6	ECHR	and	not	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	Therefore,	 it	needs	to	be	shown	













Article	 7.’ 120 	The	 Court	 in	 this	 case	 considered	 the	 relevant	 factors	 in	
determining	whether	a	measure	amounted	to	a	penalty	as	being:	
	




Because	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 adopted	 the	 aforementioned	 approaches	 when	
determining	the	nature	of	proceedings,	it	is	argued	–	and	accepted	–	within	this	
research	 that	 the	 ECtHR	 would	 similarly	 hold	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	
enforcement	sanctions,	fall	within	the	ambit	of	the	ECHR.	Particularly	when	one	
looks	at	the	aims	of	EU	competition	law	fines,	one	discovers	that	a	key	part	of	
the	 fine	 is	 the	deterrence	of	other	undertakings	 from	committing	competition	
law	breaches.122	This	deterrence	factor	means	that	an	undertaking	 is	punished	
more	harshly	 to	deter	other	undertakings.	 Therefore,	 it	 falls	under	a	 ‘criminal	





therefore,	 undertaking	 an	 analysis	 to	 ensure	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	
complies	 with	 legal	 certainty	 is	 a	 moot	 point.	 However,	 this	 argument	 is	
profoundly	flawed	and	the	reasons	for	this	shall	now	be	examined.	
First,	 EU	 jurisprudence	 has	 recognised	 the	 need	 for	 legal	 certainty	within	 the	
law	for	a	long	time.124	Indeed,	we	find	that	the	European	courts	have	held	that	










Second,	 following	 the	 Treaty	 of	 Lisbon	 there	 is	 an	 obligation	 for	 the	 EU	 to	




Third,	we	 find	 that	 the	 European	 courts	 view	 competition	 law	 rules	 as	 falling	
within	the	ambit	of	the	ECHR.		For	example,	the	CFI	in	Hüls	stated	that:127	
	
‘It	 must	 also	 be	 accepted	 that,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
infringements	 in	 question	 and	 the	 nature	 and	 degree	 of	
severity	 of	 the	 ensuing	 penalties,	 the	 principle	 of	 the	
presumption	of	 innocence	applies	 to	the	procedures	relating	
to	 infringements	 of	 the	 competition	 rules	 applicable	 to	
undertakings	 that	 may	 result	 in	 the	 imposition	 of	 fines	 or	
periodic	penalty	payments.’	
	
Whilst	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 this	 case	 concerned	Article	6(2)	 ECHR,	 the	 fact	
that	the	court	accepted	that	ECHR	jurisprudence	applied	to	an	EU	decision	is	the	




although	Article	 23(5)	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 states	 that	 the	 fines	 are	 not	 of	 a	
criminal	 nature	 –	 the	 fines	 are	 of	 a	 criminal	 nature	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	
ECHR.	For	example,	Advocate	General	Bot’s	Opinion	on	the	26	October	2010	in	











in	 Article	 23	 of	 Regulation	 No	1/2003	 are	 comparable	 in	
nature	 and	 size	 to	 criminal	 penalties	 and	 the	 Commission’s	
role,	given	its	investigatory,	examination	and	decision-making	












of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 as	 progressively	 defined	 by	 the	 European	
Court	of	Human	Rights.’	
	
These	 assertions	 help	 to	 illustrate	 that	 this	 is	 not	 just	 the	 perception	 of	 one	
individual,	 but	 also	 that	 of	 the	 community.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 other	 opinions	
that	could	be	offered,	but	it	is	believed	that	the	above	are	sufficient	to	establish	
and	 support	 the	 author’s	 claims. 130 	On	 this	 basis,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	
requirements	specified	under	Article	7	of	the	ECHR	are	viewed	as	applicable	to	
the	Commission’s	 fining	process	and,131	as	such,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 this	 fining	
process	 adheres	 to	 these	 requirements,	 as	 non-compliance	 would	 mean	 the	








TFEU.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 fails	 to	 comply	with	
legal	 certainty	at	 various	 stages,	or	 the	disclosure	by	 the	Commission	 to	 third	
parties	of	confidential	leniency	documents	breaches	Article	8	of	the	ECHR,	every	
time	 the	 Commission	 imposes	 a	 fine	 or	 provides	 third	 parties	 with	 access	 to	
these	 materials	 it	 would	 be	 breaching	 an	 undertaking’s	 rights	 which	 are	
protected	under	the	Convention.	
2.3.2.2	Equal	Treatment	
The	 EU	principle	 of	 equal	 treatment	 is	 also	 a	 prominent	 principle	 to	 consider	
here.	 Owing	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 equal	 treatment,	 the	 Commission	 must	
ensure	 that	 it	 applies	 its	 fining	 policy	 equally	 to	 undertakings	 that	 are	 in	 the	
same	 position	 and,	 therefore,	 similar	 cases	 must	 be	 treated	 alike.132	It	 also	
means	 that	 ‘different	 situations	must	 not	 be	 treated	 in	 the	 same	way’	 unless	
there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 align	 them.133	The	 Commission	may	 derogate	 from	
the	 principle	 of	 equality	 if	 it	 is	 ‘objectively	 justifiable	 to	 do	 so’.134	This	 is	 an	
important	consideration	for	the	Commission,	as	the	General	Court	(GC)	and	the	
CJEU	will	consider	this	principle	when	a	case	is	before	them.135	Thus,	we	can	see	
that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	
equal	treatment	and,	if	it	does	not,	the	European	courts	will	adjust	the	level	of	



















regarding	 the	 parent	 liable	 for	 the	 infringements	 of	 competition	 law	 by	 its	






Chapter	4	of	 the	 thesis	 considers	whether	 the	disclosure	of	 the	Commission’s	
leniency	 documentation	 to	 third	 parties	 –	wishing	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	
claims	–	can	lead	to	a	breach	of	(a)	a	‘legitimate	expectation’,	(b)	Article	8	of	the	




will	 be	 imperative	 to	 establish	 first	 how	 the	 Commission	 disclosing	 leniency	
information	to	third	parties	would	engage	this	right.	The	ECtHR	has	developed	
what	 is	 known	as	 the	 ‘standard	 approach’	 for	 dealing	with	 cases	 that	 claim	a	
breach	of	Articles	8	–	11	of	 the	Convention,138	which	 involves	 five	 stages.	The	















There	 are	 additional	 legitimate	 non-legal	 reasons	 for	 wishing	 for	 compliance	





to	 retain	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 underlying	 offence,	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
fining	process.	Fourth,	for	the	financial	 implications	and	harm	that	uncertainty	
in	 the	 fining	 process	 can	 cause.	 Fifth,	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 leniency	 and	






of	 what	 potential	 punishments	 they	 can	 expect	 for	 infringements	 of	
competition	 rules.139	Indeed,	 this	 is	 imperative	 as	 uncertainty	may	 lead	 to	 an	
over-deterrence	 effect	 –	 or	 even	 an	 under-deterrence	 effect	 –	 being	
experienced.140	Over-deterrence	 is	 detrimental	 to	 the	 market	 as	 it	 can	 deter	















reduction	 in	 competition,	 innovation	 and	 efficiency.141	This	 is	 a	 concern,	 as	
competition	policy	 is	 there	 to	 enhance	 competition,	 innovation	 and	efficiency	
and	 ensure	 that	 the	 marketplace	 is	 not	 being	 restricted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 as	 to	
reduce	 economic	 welfare.142	Thus,	 over-deterring	 pro-competitive	 behaviour	
would	 undermine	 the	 policy	 objectives	 of	 competition	 law.	 Hence,	 it	 is	
important	 that	 the	 fining	 process	 is	 as	 certain	 as	 possible	 to	 avoid	 over-
deterring	pro-competitive	behaviour	by	undertakings.	
	
However,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process	may	enhance	deterrence	and,	accordingly,	it	is	actually	beneficial	to	the	
EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime	 for	 there	 to	 be	 uncertainty	 in	 its	 fining	
procedure.	Neelie	Kroes,	the	former	Commissioner	for	Competition,	stated	in	a	
speech	 to	 the	 International	 Forum	 on	 European	 Competition	 Law,	 that	 she	
‘cannot	see	how	allowing	potential	infringers	to	calculate	the	likely	cost/benefit	
ratio	 of	 a	 cartel	 in	 advance	will	 somehow	 contribute	 to	 a	 sustained	 policy	 of	
deterrence	and	zero	tolerance.’143	Presumably	what	Kroes	is	highlighting	here	is	
that	 if	 an	undertaking	can	conduct	a	 cost/benefit	 analysis	 then	 they	may	well	
use	this	to	decide	whether	to	commit	a	breach	of	competition	law.	Indeed,	the	
undertakings	 could	 theoretically	 then	 add	 this	 on	 as	 a	 business	 charge	 to	
consumers	 so	 the	expense	 for	 any	 fine	 imposed	by	 the	Commission	 for	being	





















argued	 that	 ‘deterrence	 is	 the	 only	 significant	 function	 of	 sanctions	 for	 cartel	
activity,	and	the	specific	deterrence	of	convicted	offenders	clearly	is	secondary	
to	the	general	deterrence	of	potential	offenders’.146	Thus,	because	of	the	harm	





to	ensure	 there	 is	 legal	 certainty	within	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process.	 It	 is,	
however,	 important	 to	 remember	 the	 potential	 problems	 discussed	 above	 in	
regards	to	over-deterrence	by	having	uncertainty	within	the	fining	process.	This	
could	 mean	 that	 having	 uncertainty	 is	 less	 effective	 than	 having	 certainty	
overall.	Additionally,	the	challenge	levelled	by	Kroes	is	a	questionable	one.	Even	




authorities	 will	 investigate	 the	 cartel.	 If	 the	 cartel	 covers	 numerous	markets,	
then	multiple	competition	authorities	may	investigate	the	cartel	and	issue	fines.	

















Secondly,	 the	 undertaking	will	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 costs	 of	 private	 damages	
actions	for	an	effective	cost-benefit	analysis	to	be	conducted.	This	will	be	more	
difficult	 for	 the	 undertaking	 to	 do	 effectively,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 harder	 to	 predict	
these	 costs.148	Finally,	 an	 undertaking	will	 also	 need	 to	 assess	 the	 cost	 of	 the	
potential	harm	done	 to	 its	 reputation	and	brand	 (image)	 for	being	 in	a	cartel.	
This	 could	be	difficult	 to	quantify	effectively	as	 it	will	depend	substantially	on	
the	nature	of	 the	 cartel	 and	how	 it	 is	 reported	within	 the	media.149	For	 these	
reasons,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	 arguments	 put	 forward	 for	 there	 to	 be	




Uncertainty	within	 the	 fining	process	–	both	 in	 the	 sense	of	what	 fine	 can	be	
imposed	and	the	process	(i.e.	how	the	fine	is	calculated)	–	can	also	lead	to	the	
potential	 for	 abuse	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 application	 of	 fines	 on	
undertakings.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	Commission	has	a	great	deal	of	discretion	 in	 the	
application	of	 its	 fining	policy	 this	 could	 lead	 to	undertakings	 raising	concerns	
against	 the	 Commission	 in	 regards	 to	 their	 application	 of	 the	 fining	 policy;	
namely,	that	it	is	not	being	applied	fairly	or	equally	to	each	firm.	This	in	itself	is	
not	 just	 a	 theoretical	 concern	 as	 it	 could	 potentially	 occur	 in	 practice.	 For	
example,	 the	 Commission	 could	 provide	 favourable	 treatment	 to	 a	 European	
firm	 in	 a	 cartel	 which	 involves	 other	 non-EU	 firms	 or	 they	 could	 provide	














when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 within	 the	 procedure	 can	 still	 raise	 legitimate	
concerns	in	regards	to	inconsistency	between	cases.151	These	potential	concerns	
are	 important	 reasons	as	 to	why	undertakings	and	citizens	would	 look	 for	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 policy	 and	 process	 to	 be	 legally	 certain,	 clearly	 defined,	
transparent	 and	 applied	 equally	 to	 undertakings.	 Hence,	 ensuring	 that	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 process	 is	 certain	 and	 applied	 equally	 is	 of	 great	
importance.	
	
Additional	 concerns	 may	 also	 be	 raised	 here	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 effect	 that	
uncertainty	and	unequal	 treatment	can	cause	to	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	offence	
that	 the	 fines	 are	 seeking	 to	 punish	 and	 deter.152	Equally,	 concerns	 can	 be	
raised	in	relation	to	its	impact	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	Commission’s	power	and	
its	fining	process.	It	is	vital	that	the	Commission’s	practice	is	seen	to	be	fair	and	
lawful	because	 if	 citizens	perceive	 the	 fines	as	being	 illegitimate	 this	damages	
the	underlying	offence	–	 the	cartel	prohibition	Article	101(1)	TFEU	–	and	may	
lead	to	the	enforcement	of	the	law	becoming	more	difficult.153	If	fines	are	seen	
as	 disproportionately	 high	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 offence	 –	 or	 that	 they	 are	 being	
calculated	on	an	arbitrary	or	unfair	basis	–	this	too	will	 lead	to	concerns	about	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cartel	 offence.	 The	
author	has	raised	similar	concerns	 in	regards	to	 leniency	and	the	legitimacy	of	
its	 use	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 greater	 good	 before.154	This	 is	 important	 as	 one	















Commission	 would	 lose	 their	 credibility.155	All	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 points	
regarding	 legitimacy	relate	to	the	perception	of	 fairness	and	 justice	within	the	
law.	They	are	broad	concepts	and	ideas	but,	nevertheless,	are	still	significant	for	
citizens	 and	 undertakings.	 Indeed,	 they	 are	 fundamental	 principles	which	 the	
law	 is	based	upon	and	 thus	must	adhere	 to.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 essential	 that	we	




importance	 for	 the	 need	 of	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 fining	
process.	
	
The	 next	 concern	 that	 shall	 be	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 necessity	 for	 legal	
certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 is	 the	
potential	cost	implications	for	undertakings.	By	having	unclear	procedures	it	can	
lead	to	undertakings	having	to	spend	excessive	sums	of	money	on	legal	advice	
in	 an	 attempt	 to	 identify	 how	 they	 –	 as	 undertakings	 –	 will	 be	 treated	 after	
being	investigated	and	what	the	punishment	(fine)	is	likely	to	be.	This	will	have	
a	direct	effect	on	the	undertaking’s	capital	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Firstly,	it	means	
funds	are	 spent	on	 legal	 advice	 instead	of	being	used	more	effectively	by	 the	
undertaking,	 which	 is	 detrimental	 to	 the	 economy.	 For	 instance,	 this	 capital	
could	 have	 been	 better	 invested	 in,	 for	 example,	 research	 and	 development,	











effectively	 when	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 is	 found.	 By	 enabling	 the	

















beneficial	 as	 it	 helps	 the	 Commission	 detect,	 destabilise	 and	 deter	 cartels.158	
However,	to	achieve	these	aims	it	is	a	necessary	requirement	that	the	leniency	
programme	 is	 clear,	 transparent	 and	 certain	 in	 its	 operation.	 The	 reasons	 for	
this	will	now	be	identified	and	explained.	
	
To	 begin	 with,	 if	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 the	 way	 the	 leniency	
programme	will	operate	or	be	applied,	it	is	likely	they	will	not	be	encouraged	to	
report	a	cartel.	Indeed,	Hansen	et	al	note	that	legal	certainty	plays	a	key	role	in	










net	 global	 benefits’.159	This	 is	 because	 undertakings	 prefer	 some	 form	 of	
certainty	in	the	way	they	will	be	treated,	how	the	case	will	be	handled	and	what	
they	are	required	to	do.	If	undertakings	do	not	receive	this	then	it	is	likely	that	
the	 cartel	 will	 go	 unreported	 and,	 potentially,	 the	 cartel	 will	 continue	
undetected	and	lead	to	further	harm	to	society.	Indeed,	what	we	can	see	from	
the	history	of	the	Commission’s	leniency	programme	is	that	when	there	was	not	
a	 very	 clear	 or	 transparent	 process	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 applications	 by	
undertakings	 under	 the	 Leniency	 Notice. 160 	For	 example,	 under	 the	
Commission’s	 1996	 Leniency	 Notice	 there	was	 a	 severe	 lack	 of	 reporting	 and	
most	 of	 the	 cases	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Commission	 were	 identified	 by	 the	 US	
leniency	 programme	 and	 not	 its	 own.161	This	 obviously	 has	 an	 effect	 on	 the	




to	 encourage	 undertakings	 to	 report	 cartel	 behaviour	 to	 the	 Commission,	 as	
well	 as	 deter	 undertakings	 from	 becoming	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 in	 the	 first	
instance	and,	finally,	so	as	to	destablise	any	current	cartels.162	
	
This	 potential	 problem	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 certainty	 within	 the	 operation	 and	
application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 has	 been	 heightened	
recently	when	the	Commission	withdrew	the	conditional	immunity	it	had	given	
to	the	undertaking	Deltafina.163	This	meant	that	Deltafina	received	a	€30	million	
fine	 for	 its	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Commission.	 This	 in	 itself	 could	













their	 conditional	 immunity	 may	 be	 withdrawn	 by	 the	 Commission.	 It	 is,	
however,	worth	us	now	considering	the	facts	of	this	case	to	understand	why	the	
Commission	 withdrew	 Deltafina’s	 immunity	 and	 why	 the	 CJEU	 upheld	 the	
Commission’s	 decision	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 question	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 answered	 is:	
“what	 did	 Deltafina	 do	 that	 amounted	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	
Commission	 –	 which	was	 so	 bad	 that	 it	 resulted	 in	 the	 conditional	 immunity	
being	withdrawn?”	
	
In	 this	 case,	 Deltafina	 informed	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Italian	 Tobacco	
Processors	 of	 its	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Commission	 prior	 to	 the	 Commission	
conducting	 its	 dawn	 raids.	 The	 issue	 here	 was	 that	 the	 Commission	 had	
informed	Deltafina	to	keep	its	leniency	application	secret	so	that	the	dawn	raids	
and	 investigation	would	 be	 as	 fruitful	 for	 the	 Commission	 as	 possible.	 By	 not	
keeping	its	application	for	leniency	a	secret,	as	it	was	required	to	do	so	by	the	
Commission,	 it	 in	 effect	 informed	 other	 members	 of	 the	 cartel	 that	 the	
Commission	would	be	conducting	an	investigation	into	their	cartel.	This	offered	
the	 other	 undertakings	 the	 opportunity	 to	 dispose	 of	 evidence	 and	 conceal	
parts	 of	 the	 cartel.	 The	 Court	 noted	 that	 under	 the	 2002	 Leniency	 Notice	 an	
undertaking	must	‘fully’	cooperate	with	the	Commission	on	a	‘continuous	basis’,	
which	 it	 held	Deltafina	had	not	done	 in	 this	 case,	because	of	 its	disclosure	 to	
other	members	of	 the	cartels.	Thus,	 the	Court	affirmed	the	Commission’s	 first	
ever	 decision	 to	withdraw	 immunity	 from	 fines	 for	 a	 firm	 that	was	 the	 initial	
undertaking	to	bring	evidence	of	a	cartel	to	the	Commission.164	
	
Whilst	 this	 could	 cause	 undertakings	 to	 worry	 about	 the	 potential	 for	 the	












in	 this	 case	 was	 because	 Deltafina	 had	 not	 complied	 with	 the	 requirements	
placed	 on	 it	 by	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	 this	 case	 acts	 more	 as	 a	 timely	
reminder	 to	undertakings	 that	 they	must	continue	 to	 fully	cooperate	with	 the	




as	 effective	 a	 tool	 as	 it	 can	 possibly	 be.	 This	 therefore	 means	 that	 the	
Commission	can	detect	cartels	at	its	most	effective	level.	The	other	options	for	
detecting	 cartels	 –	 market	 inquiries,	 customer	 complaints	 and	 market	
investigations	 –	 never	 result	 in	 the	 same	 cost	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	 as	
leniency	does.	Under	 the	 leniency	programme,	 undertakings	 report	 the	 cartel	
(thus	they	assist	in	its	detection)	and	provide	a	substantial	amount	of	evidence	
to	 the	Commission	 regarding	 the	 cartel,	which	helps	 the	Commission	 save	on	
the	resources	 it	would	have	had	to	use	 in	attempting	 to	 identify	and	detect	a	
cartel.165	Hence,	making	 leniency	 as	 effective	 as	 possible	 via	 adhering	 to	 legal	
certainty	means	that	the	Commission	can	focus	and	utilise	its	resources	better.	
It	has	been	identified	that	by	having	legal	certainty	within	the	leniency	stage	of	
fining	 process	 it	 should	 help	 encourage	 undertakings	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 a	












cartel	 decisions.166	The	 procedure	 itself	 is	 still	 very	 much	 in	 its	 infancy	 but,	
through	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 settling	 cases,	 various	 savings	 are	
made	for	both	parties.	For	example,	it	saves	the	Commission	and	undertakings	
costs	in	the	monetary	sense	as	well	as	in	time	as	they	do	not	need	to	go	through	






Again,	 like	 with	 leniency,	 for	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 settlement	 procedure	 to	 be	





then	 it	 means	 that	 the	 cost	 savings	 and	 efficiencies	 of	 this	 stage	 will	 not	 be	
achieved	to	their	potential	maximum	and,	as	such,	there	will	be	a	deadweight	
loss	to	both	parties.	Additionally,	if	an	undertaking	cannot	understand	how	this	
stage	 in	 the	 fining	procedure	works,	 they	may	not	be	 able	 to	 identify	or	 fully	
understand	the	potential	benefits	of	engaging	with	the	Commission	and	utilising	
this	stage	and,	as	such,	again	an	opportunity	is	missed	simply	owing	to	a	lack	of	
understanding	 of	 the	 procedure.	 Of	 course,	 this	 in	 itself	 can	 be	 remedied	 by	
providing	clarity	within	the	procedure	and	guidance	on	it.	Indeed,	perhaps	this	












–	 more	 generally	 –	 the	 wider	 public	 at	 large	 to	 understand	 why	 certain	
companies	are	treated	differently	to	others,	and	why	in	some	cases	companies	
are	even	rewarded	with	immunity	for	reporting	illegal	behaviour	that	they	have	
partaken	 in.	 This	 is	 key	 as	 it	 helps	 to	 encourage	 good	 business	 behaviour	 by	









As	we	can	see	 from	the	above	discussion,	 it	 is	 imperative	 that	 the	 settlement	









1. Because	 legal	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 are	 fundamental	 legal	
principles	and	hence	are	required	to	be	complied	with;		
2. To	 prevent	 over-deterrence,	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 pro-























topic	 area,	 which	 have	 previously	 not	 been	 effectively	 addressed	 within	 the	
literature.	 These	 contributions	 shall	 now	 be	 identified,	 as	 shall	 the	 main	
conclusions	of	the	chapter.	
	








focused	 their	 attention	 on	 the	 ‘extension’,	 ‘conceptual’,	 ‘flood	 gate’	 and	
‘selective	 rights	 only’	 arguments.	 These	 were	 identified	 as	 the	 standard	
‘categories	of	arguments’	which	were	forwarded	against	corporations	qualifying	
for	rights	protection.	However,	the	flaws	with	these	arguments	were	identified	
and	 illustrated	 to	 the	 reader.	 A	 notable	 criticism	 was	 the	 selective-right	
argument,	 which	 appeared	 to	 lead	 the	 strongest	 claim	 against	 corporations	
qualifying	for	protection.	Nonetheless,	by	using	an	analogy	with	the	TFEU	it	was	




argument	 that	 had	 not	 been	 previous	 seen	 or	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature;	







case	 of	 Yukos	 Oil.	 This	 case	 clearly	 identified	 that	 without	 sufficient	 rights	
protection	at	an	international	level,	serious	rights	abuses	can	occur	which	have	
further	 reaching	 consequences	 than	 just	 to	 the	 firm.	 For	 example,	 the	 local	





questions	 were	 specified	 as	 they	 were.	 This	 section	 begun	 by	 explaining	 the	
importance	of	the	ECHR	in	the	context	of	EU	Competition	Law.	Then,	the	reason	
the	 ECHR	 was	 chosen	 to	 form	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 against	 was	 explained;	 namely,	
because	 it	 is	 has	 a	 well-developed	 body	 of	 jurisprudence	 and	 is	 a	 truly	
independent	body.169	
	
The	 chapter	 concluded	 by	 demonstrating	 why	 there	 is	 a	 necessity	 for	
compliance	with	 rights	protection,	 legal	 certainty	and	equal	 application	 in	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process.	It	was	identified	that	this	was	not	merely	because	
of	 the	 legal	 requirements	 for	 compliance	 but	 for	 other	 additional	 non-legal	




why	 corporations	 need	 rights	 protection	 and	 why	 the	 ECHR	 is	 chosen	 and	 is	
applicable	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 –	 and	 their	






chosen	 rights	 and	 legal	 principles	 and	 apply	 them	 to	 the	 three	 cartel	
enforcement	procedures	of	the	Commission.	First,	Chapter	3	will	consider	legal	
certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 concerns	 alongside	 the	 Commission’s	 current	
fining	policy.	Chapter	4	analyses	disclosure	of	confidential	 leniency	documents	
in	 follow-on	 damage	 cases	 beside	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	
non-disclosure,	the	UK	equitable	doctrine	of	breach	of	confidence	and	the	right	
to	respect	for	private	and	family	 life.	Finally,	Chapter	5	concludes	by	analysing	
the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 and	 the	 US	 system	 of	 plea	
bargaining,	 in	 competition	 law	 cases,	 against	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	 so	 as	 to	













decisions	of	 associations	of	 undertakings	 that	 fix	 prices,	 restrict	 output,	 share	
markets	or	rig	bids.3	An	undertaking	that	violates	this	provision	may	be	liable	for	
fines	 of	 up	 to	 ten	 percent	 of	 its	 annual	 worldwide	 turnover.4	The	 European	
Commission	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 enforces	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and	 has	
the	power	to	 impose	corporate	fines	for	breaches	of	Article	101(1)	TFEU.5	The	
fines	 imposed	by	 the	Commission	have	been	 substantial.	 The	highest	 fine	 the	
Commission	has	imposed	on	an	undertaking	is	over	€896	million	and	the	largest	
fine	imposed	on	a	collective	cartel	is	over	€1.3	billion.6	Given	the	extensiveness	
of	 these	 fines,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	Commission	decides	 and	 imposes	 fines	
under	 a	 clear	 and	 transparent	 process	 that	 is	 applied	 equally	 to	 each	
undertaking.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 general	 principles	 under	 EU	 law	 that	 require	














to	plan	 their	actions	according’.7	On	the	other	hand,	equal	 treatment	 requires	
that	 undertakings	 be	 treated	 'equally	 before	 the	 law'. 8 	Currently,	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 may	 fall	 foul	 of	 these	 requirements	 so	 it	 is	
important	 to	 consider	 whether	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 In	 recent	 years,	 it	 has	 been	
suggested	 that	 fines	 imposed	 on	 undertakings	 have	 been	 increasing, 9 	so	
concerns	 regarding	 a	 clear,	 transparent	 and	 fairly	 applied	 fining	 process	 have	
become	progressively	more	significant.	Indeed,	this	suggestion	of	an	increase	in	
fining	 by	 the	 Commission	 has	 even	 led	 some	 commentators	 to	 question	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	 procedures.10	For	 these	 reasons,	 this	 chapter	 aims	 to	
answer	 the	 questions	 (a)	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	
complies	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty	 and	 (b)	 whether	 the	
Commission	applies	its	fining	policy	equally	to	all	undertakings.	
	
Research	 has	 been	 conducted	 into	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure,	 often	
with	particular	focus	being	given	to	the	optimal	level	of	fines	or	to	the	ways	of	
achieving	 the	 best	 deterrent	 effect.11	Empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	decisions	has	also	been	undertaken	in	the	 literature.	Geradin	and	Henry	



























extent	 to	 which	 deterrence	 is	 used	 in	 the	 setting	 of	 fines.13	In	 more	 recent	
years,	others	have	analysed	cases	under	the	updated	2006	Fining	Guidelines.14	
For	 example,	 Veljanovski	 has	 undertaken	 an	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 twenty-two	
cartel-fining	 decisions	 handed	 down	 by	 the	 Commission.15	He	 identified	 a	
number	 of	 results,	 but	 of	 particular	 relevance	 for	 this	 research	 is	 the	 finding	
that	 the	 Commission’s	 non-confidential	 published	 decisions	 often	 redact	 key	
information	on	the	fining	process.	Connor	has	conducted	research	into	whether	
the	Commission	has	become	more	severe	 in	 its	punishment	of	cartelists	 since	
the	 introduction	of	 the	2006	Fining	Guidelines.16	He	found	that	the	severity	of	
cartel	 fines	 is	 more	 than	 five	 times	 higher	 then	 those	 calculated	 under	 the	
previous	 1998	Guidelines,	 that	 the	 frequency	 and	 size	 of	 recidivism	discounts	
had	increased	under	these	new	Guidelines	and	that	the	Commission	had	been	
inconsistent	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 recidivism	 penalties	 in	 the	 manner	
promised	 in	 its	 2006	 Guidelines.17	Both	 of	 these	 pieces	 of	 research	 highlight	
what	appears	to	be	a	lack	of	transparency	in	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	




















the	 Fining	 Guidelines	 and	 procedure,	 but	 fails	 to	 analyse	 these	 concerns	 in	
detail	 or	 assess	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	 this.	 There	 are,	 however,	 some	
exceptions	to	this.	Torre,	for	example,	has	analysed	each	step	in	the	2006	Fining	
Guidelines	 and	 identified	 that	 non-retrospectivity	 is	 not	 breached	 by	 their	
application	 to	cases	prior	 to	 the	enactment	of	 the	Guidelines.	However,	Torre	
did	not	 consider	other	 legal	 certainty	 and	equal	 treatment	 concerns,	which	 is	
one	 area	 where	 this	 chapter	 shall	 differ.18	Hawk	 and	 Nathalie	 have	 looked	
broadly	at	legal	certainty	concerns	in	relation	to	Article	101	TFEU	but	have	not	
analysed	 the	 fining	 process	 itself.19	David	 has	 discussed	 some	 of	 the	 legal	
certainty	 concerns	 under	 the	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines	 such	 as	 the	 areas	 of	
vagueness	contained	in	parts	of	the	Guidelines,	the	Commission’s	discretion	and	
the	need	to	achieve	deterrence	in	a	particular	case.20	He	has	not	analysed	every	
stage	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 in	 detail,	 nor	 has	 he	 assessed	 whether	 these	
concerns	occur	 in	practice.	 Scordamaglia-Tousis	has	 considered	 legal	 certainty	
(in	 the	 context	 of	 foreseeability),	 non-retroactivity	 and	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 with	
regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines.21	He	 identified	 that	 the	
2006	 Guidelines	 offer	 a	 departure	 from	 the	 old	 system	 of	 ‘transparent	
unpredictability’	 and	 advocates	 that	 the	 Court	 provides	 clearer	 theoretical	
foundation	 for	 predictability.22	He	 also	 found	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 current	



















considering	 specific	 stages	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines,	 the	 ten	
percent	 cap,	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 within	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Guidelines,	and	whether	 the	Guidelines	are	applied	equally	 to	undertakings	 in	
practice.	
	
There	 has	 also	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 analysis	 within	 the	 literature	 of	 the	 concerns	
regarding	 equal	 treatment	 of	 undertakings	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	process.25	This	is	an	important	consideration,	given	that	the	
aforementioned	 literature	 appears	 to	 illustrate	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	
following	 its	 Guidelines	 nor	 being	 very	 transparent	 with	 how	 it	 reaches	 its	
decisions.26	The	opportunity	to	assess	whether	the	Commission	has	applied	 its	
fining	 policy	 equally	 is	 often	 available	 with	 the	 data	 collected	 by	 researchers	
but,	 unfortunately,	 a	 lack	 of	 analysis	 has	 been	 conducted	 into	 whether	 the	
Commission	applies	 its	policy	equally	 to	undertakings.27	Gilliams	has	discussed	
competition	 law	 fines	 and	 the	 requirement	 of	 proportionality,	 which	 in	 parts	
incorporates	 the	 necessity	 for	 equality.28	He	 identified	 the	 problem	 between	
balancing	 the	 need	 for	 proportionality	 with	 deterrence	 within	 fining	
undertakings.29	However,	 there	 have	 been	 some	 studies	 considering	 equality	
within	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure.	Voss	has	examined	the	Commission’s	





















little	 influence’	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 actions.31	This	 chapter	 goes	 further	 and	
considers	 specific	 stages	within	 the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	 to	 identify	
potential	equality	problems.	Meyring	has	analysed	one	of	the	recent	European	
General	 Court’s	 (GC)	 judgments	 and	 identified	 that	 the	 Court	 is	 not	 ensuring	
consistency	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines.32	Thus,	
there	 is	 a	 clear	 gap	 here	 that	 warrants	 investigation.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	
address	 this	 gap	within	 the	 literature	 by	 assessing	whether	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	 process	 complies	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty	 and	 of	 equal	
treatment.	 To	 enable	 this	 research	 question	 to	 be	 answered	 and	 analysed	
effectively,	the	chapter	is	split	into	two	sections.		
	
The	 chapter	 begins	 by	 analysing	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 so	 as	 to	
establish	whether	 it	 complies	with	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 It	 achieves	
this	 analysis	 by	 assessing	 (a)	 the	 use	 of	 non-exhaustive	 lists,	 (b)	 the	 ‘specific	
deterrence’	 stage,	 and	 (c)	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap.	 Alongside	 this	 assessment,	 an	
examination	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 is	 pursued,	 regarding	 what	 the	
benefits	and	problems	with	 this	discretion	are	and	whether	 the	Commission’s	
fining	process	breaches	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	After	the	potential	legal	certainty	
concerns	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 have	 been	 discussed,	 the	
chapter	moves	 on	 to	 assess	 and	 analyse	whether	 the	 Commission	 applies	 its	













As	 established	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 it	 will	 be	 important	 that	 the	
Commission’s	policies	comply	with	the	rights	enshrined	in	the	ECHR,	particularly	
legal	certainty.	This	part	of	 the	chapter	proceeds	 to	analyse	 the	Commission’s	
fining	 process	 to	 identify	 whether	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	




documents	 are	 known	 as	 ‘soft	 law’	 as	 they	 are	 Guidelines	 that	 aid	 the	
Commission	 in	 its	 interpretation	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 The	 Fining	
Guidelines	themselves	lay	down	the	procedure	for	the	fining	process	but	should	
not	be	consulted	alone,	as	they	do	not	cover	all	of	the	Commission’s	policies	in-
depth.33	One	 should	 also	 consult	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 notice,34	direct	





of	 judgments	 by	 the	 EU	 courts	 highlighted	 the	 desirability	 of	 the	 Commission	
making	its	methods	of	calculating	and	enforcing	fines	more	transparent.37	Thus,	




















but	 was	 amended	 in	 2002	 and	 again	 in	 2006	 to	 provide	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
certainty	for	undertakings	in	how	leniency	is	awarded	by	the	Commission.				
	
On	 the	 30	 June	 2008,	 the	 Commission	 introduced	 its	 settlement	 procedure.39	
This	 procedure	 allows	 undertakings	 to	 settle	 their	 case	 with	 the	 Commission	
and	 receive	 a	 reduction	 in	 fine	 for	 doing	 so.	 The	 settlement	 procedure	 helps	
speed	 up	 cases	 and	 reduces	 costs	 for	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 by	
allowing	a	streamlined	approach	to	be	taken.40	
	















































this	 flexibility,	 there	 has	 to	 be	 a	 wider	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 for	 the	
Commission	 in	 the	 Guidelines	 than	 would	 otherwise	 be	 the	 case	 where	 the	
Guidelines	were	more	 restrictive.	The	 important	question	here	 is	whether	 the	
amount	of	discretion	that	the	Commission	has	within	the	fining	process	causes	
enough	 of	 a	 challenge	 to	 legal	 certainty	 to	 raise	 legitimate	 concerns	 under	
Article	7	ECHR.	To	enable	this	analysis	to	be	conducted	effectively,	the	research	
shall	focus	on	three	specific	areas	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process.	First,	the	
use	 of	 non-exhaustive	 lists	 shall	 be	 considered	 and	 assessed.	 Then,	 the	
calculation	of	the	criterion	of	‘specific	deterrence’	will	be	analysed;	and	finally,	
the	 use	 of	 a	 maximum	 ten	 percent	 cap	 is	 considered	 alongside	 the	
Commission’s	discretion	to	impose	a	fine	under	this	cap.		
	
The	 empirical	 analysis	 within	 this	 section	 and	 the	 following	 section	 uses	 a	
variety	 of	 data	 sources.	 The	 data	 is	 predominately	 drawn	 from	 the	 Global	
Competition	 Review's	 (GCR)	 raw	 data	 set,	 'GCR	 EU	 Cartel	 Survey',	 which	
contains	 information	 on	 cartels	 from	 January	 2005	 -	 July	 2012.42	However,	 it	
also	 consults	 the	 Commission's	 non-official	web	 versions	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	
GC	and	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	decisions.	Additionally,	as	Article	7	of	the	
















Non-exhaustive	 lists	 by	 their	 very	 nature	 allow	 other	 factors	 –	which	 are	 not	
listed	–	to	be	considered,	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	list	does	not	contain	all	the	
potential	 factors	 that	 can	be	 considered	by	 the	Commission.	 Therefore,	 these	
lists	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 form	 of	 guidance	 on	 likely	 (aggravating	 or	 mitigating)	
factors	 that	 the	 Commission	 can	 or	 could	 consider	 in	 its	 fining	 decision.	 By	
utilising	a	non-exhaustive	list,	it	allows	the	Commission	a	degree	of	flexibility	in	
its	 fining	 process	 so	 that	 they	 can	 consider	 factors	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	
which	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 if	 these	 lists	 were	 exhaustive.	 This	 flexibility	 is	
important,	 as	 each	 cartel’s	 situation	 and	 circumstances	 can	 be	 very	 different,	
and	 what	 may	 need	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 one	 cartel	 may	 not	 be	 relevant	 or	
important	in	another	cartel	decision.	
	 	
From	 a	 legal	 certainty	 perspective,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 two	 predominant	
concerns	here.	Firstly,	does	a	non-exhaustive	 list	provide	enough	certainty	 for	
an	 undertaking	 so	 as	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty?	
Secondly,	 does	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	 guidance	 on	 how	 much	 the	 increase	 or	
decrease	 in	 fine	will	be	 from	the	aggravating	or	mitigating	 factor	comply	with	
Article	7	of	the	ECHR?						
	
The	 benefits	 to	 the	 Commission	 and	 undertakings	 of	 the	 use	 of	 flexible	 non-
exhaustive	 lists	 were	 highlighted	 above.	 This	 chapter	 shall	 now	 analyse	 the	
concerns	that	arise	out	of	the	utilisation	of	such	lists.	The	flexibility,	which	was	
highly	praised	in	the	above	discussion	as	a	benefit,	may	also	act	as	a	detriment	
in	 allowing	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 factors	 to	 be	 considered.	 This	 means	 that	
undertakings	 cannot	 be	 certain	 of	 what	 factors	 will	 be	 considered	 by	 the	










decisions,	 as	 they	 can	 decide	 to	 consider	 other	 factors,	 as	 the	 lists	 are	 non-







Chamber	 decision	 of	 Kononov	 v	 Latvia,46	the	 Charter	 annexed	 to	 the	 London	
Agreement	was	discussed.47	This	 contained	 a	 ‘non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 violations	
of	 the	 laws	and	customs	of	war’.48	During	 this	 case,	 the	Grand	Chamber	were	
addressing	 concerns	 the	 applicant	 raised	 in	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty;	 yet	 the	
Court	at	no	point	suggested	that	a	non-exhaustive	list	was	insufficient	for	legal	
certainty	 to	 stem	 from	 that	 list.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 UK	 case	 of	Regina	 (Purdy)	 v	
Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	 (Society	 for	 the	 Protection	 of	 Unborn	 Children	






















Based	on	 these	decisions,	 it	 seems	 implicit	 that	 the	Courts	 are	 accepting	 that	
non-exhaustive	lists	provide	–	at	least	in	principle	–	enough	certainty	to	comply	
with	 the	 necessary	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 Therefore,	 it	 seems	
reasonable	 to	 conclude	 that,	 by	merely	 utilising	 a	 non-exhaustive	 list,	 it	 does	
not	 mean	 that	 uncertainty	 will	 ensue	 for	 undertakings.	 Indeed,	 we	 find	
numerous	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 and	 guidance	 which	 do	 in	 fact	 contain	 non-
exhaustive	lists.	Therefore,	the	question	that	needs	to	be	considered	is	one	on	





One	may	 instinctively	believe	 that,	given	 the	 lack	of	 specific	guidance	on	how	
much	 of	 an	 increase/decrease	 in	 the	 fine	 that	 the	 Commission	 may	 impose	
when	 considering	 an	 aggravating/mitigating	 factor,	 that	 it	 means	 that	 the	
process	 is	 uncertain.	 This	 is	 owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	
sure	 which	 factors	 the	 Commission	 will	 consider	 to	 be	 relevant	 for	 fining	
purposes.	Therefore,	it	could	be	argued	–	and	it	would	appear	logical	to	believe	
–	that	the	use	of	non-exhaustive	lists	(specifically	within	the	Commission’s	fining	
process)	 will	 fall	 foul	 of	 Article	 7	 ECHR.52	However,	 this	 is	 too	 superficial	 an	
analysis	 to	base	a	 full	and	thorough	conclusion	on	and,	 therefore,	we	need	to	
consider	 what	 the	 Courts	 have	 said	 when	 considering	 guidance	 and	 legal	
certainty.	
	
To	 begin	 with,	 we	 see	 that	 when	 the	 ECtHR	 discusses	 legal	 certainty	 they	
highlight	that	it	is	not	necessary	for	the	law	to	be	prescribed	in	such	a	way	as	to	







‘with	 sufficient	 precision	 to	 enable	 the	 citizen	 to	 regulate	 his	
conduct:	he	must	be	able	–	if	need	be	with	appropriate	advice	–	
to	 foresee	 to	a	degree	 that	 is	 reasonable	 in	 the	 circumstances,	
the	 consequences	 which	 any	 given	 action	 may	 entail.	 Those	














The	 ECtHR	 has	 also	 acknowledged	 that,	 however	 clearly	 drafted	 a	 legal	
provision	 or	 guidance	 may	 be,	 there	 is	 an	 ‘inevitable	 element	 of	 judicial	
interpretation’.55	In	addition,	the	Court	has	also	stated	that	‘there	will	always	be	
a	 need	 for	 elucidation	 of	 doubtful	 points	 and	 for	 adaptation	 to	 changing	
circumstances’	 by	 the	 Courts.56	Moreover,	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 stated	 that	 the	 fact	
that	a	 legal	provision	can	be	construed	 in	more	 than	one	way	does	not	mean	
‘that	 it	does	not	meet	 the	requirement	 implied	 in	 the	notion	of	prescribed	by	


















Guidelines,	 the	 examples	within	 the	 list	 of	 potential	 aggravating	 or	mitigating	
factors	 helps	 make	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	 less	 unforeseeable,	 as	
undertakings	can	foresee	what	 factors	are	 likely	to	 influence	the	fine	 imposed	
upon	 them.	 	 However,	 they	 cannot	 tell	 exactly	 what	 –	 for	 example	 –	 the	
increase	 in	 fine	 for	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 will	 mean	 for	 them.	 Although,	 the	
undertaking	does	have	an	 indication	of	 likely	 factors	 to	 lead	 to	an	 increase	or	
decrease	in	the	fine,	and	that	the	total	overall	fine	is	 limited	to	ten	percent	of	
the	undertaking’s	previous	year’s	 turnover.	This	 fact,	 alongside	 the	comments	
made	by	the	ECtHR	in	the	Del	Rio	Prada	judgment	–	which	allows	for	an	element	
of	 judicial	 interpretation	 and	 uncertainty	 –	 means	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	
guidance	 on	 how	 much	 of	 an	 increase	 or	 decrease	 in	 fine	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	
sufficient	to	breach	Article	7	ECHR.	
	





reach	 different	 conclusions,	 even	 when	 applying	 the	 same	 laws	 to	 the	 same	
facts,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	 laws	 are	 inaccessible	 or	












certainty	 ‘absolute	 certainty’	 is	 not	necessary.	We	 found	 that	what	 is	 actually	
necessary	 is	 what	 is	 reasonable	 given	 the	 circumstances.	 It	 has	 also	 been	
illustrated	that	when	non-exhaustive	lists	have	been	referenced	in	cases,	courts	
–	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 jurisdictions	 –	 have	 not	 suggested	 that	 they	 are	 legally	
uncertain.	Thus,	based	on	 this	analysis,	one	can	deduce	 that	 the	utilisation	of	
non-exhaustive	 lists	 by	 the	 Commission	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 amount	 to	 a	
breach	of	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	However,	what	has	also	been	seen	is	that	there	
is	room	for	improvement	within	these	two	stages	of	the	Guidelines,	particularly	





The	next	 stage	 in	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process	 that	 is	 assessed	 to	 identify	
whether	the	Commission’s	fining	process	is	in	compliance	with	legal	certainty	is	
the	 sixth	 stage.	 This	 stage	 allows	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	 imposed	 on	
undertakings	for	‘specific	deterrence’	and	has	been	chosen	as	it	builds	upon	the	
issues	 identified	 within	 the	 non-exhaustive	 lists	 stages	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	process,	as	 it	appears	to	allow	the	Commission	an	even	wider	margin	of	
discretion.	 Particularly,	 the	 content	 and	 wording	 of	 this	 stage	 appear	 to	 be	












Therefore,	 it	 appears	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 to	 enter	 the	
Commission’s	fining	decision.	There	appears	to	be	three	key	issues	here.	First,	it	
is	 unclear	what	 is	meant	by	 the	need	 to	ensure	 that	 fines	have	a	 ‘sufficiently	
deterrent	 effect’.	 This	 is	 not	 defined	within	 the	 guidance	 or	 explained	 in	 any	








deter’	 or	 whether	 they	 mean	 something	 different.	 More	 generally,	 there	 is	
much	 debate	 about	 how	 high	 fines	 need	 to	 be	 to	 ‘sufficiently	 deter’	 cartel	
conduct.	In	fact,	some	have	suggested	that	it	would	need	to	be	so	high	that	it	is	
unachievable,	 as	 it	 would	 effectively	 need	 to	 bankrupt	 an	 undertaking;	 they	
have	 therefore	 advocated	 for	 the	 criminalisation	 of	 cartels	 to	 achieve	 this	
‘sufficient	 deterrent’	 effect.63	Wils’	 analysis	 on	 this	 issue	 identified	 that	 the	
minimum	level	of	fines	required	to	achieve	this	deterrent	effect	would	‘be	in	the	
order	 of	 150	 percent	 of	 the	 annual	 turnover	 in	 the	 products	 concerned	
violation.’64	Wils	determines	this	by	assuming	that	a	cartel	increases	the	selling	






of	 detection	 and	 punishment	 of	 that	 firm	 would	 be	 only	 sixteen	 percent.	
However,	 when	 we	 consider	 Connor’s	 2004	 study, 65 	he	 finds	 that	 the	
overcharge	 is	 much	 higher	 than	 what	 Wils	 has	 allocated	 for,66	therefore	
meaning	 that	 the	 fine	would	need	 to	be	even	 greater	 to	 act	 as	 a	 deterrence.	
These	two	studies	illustrate	effectively	the	difficulty	in	determining	a	fine	which	








deter.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 lack	 of	 clarification	 or	 identification	 of	





to	 one	 hundred	 percent,68 	and	 at	 the	 most	 severe	 one-hundred-and-fifty	
















fine,	having	 this	 stage	applied,	will	 lead	 to	 for	an	undertaking,	even	when	we	
consider	Commission	decisions.70		
	
Third,	one	can	ask	what	 is	meant	by	a	 ‘particularly	 large	 turnover	beyond	 the	
sales	of	goods	or	services	to	which	the	 infringement	relates’,	as	again	this	has	
not	 been	 defined.	 ‘Particularly	 large’	 implies	 that	 a	 comparison	 needs	 to	 be	
made	between	undertakings’	turnovers,	but	yet	no	indication	is	given	as	to	how	
this	comparison	will	be	calculated	or	how	it	will	be	conducted.	The	Guidelines	
appear	 to	 imply	 that,	 if	 an	undertaking	 sells	goods	and	services	beyond	 those	
which	 have	 been	 cartelised	 and	 that	 said	 undertaking	 can	 be	 defined	 as	
‘particularly	 large’,	 then	 they	shall	be	 fined	higher	 to	act	as	a	deterrence.	The	
uncertainty	here	stems	from	the	language	used	within	the	guidance	document,	
and	the	lack	of	guidance	given	on	the	actual	application	of	this	‘specific	increase	
for	deterrence’.	 It	may	be	presumed	 that	what	 the	Commission	means	 in	 this	




an	 undertaking	 that	 has	 a	 particularly	 large	 turnover	 as	 compared	 to	
undertakings	with	smaller	turnovers	is	by	no	means	a	unique	characteristic	that	
is	only	found	within	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines.	We	find,	for	example,	
that	 individuals	 who	 are	 wealthier	 are	 often	 given	 larger	 fines	 by	 the	 courts	
when	they	commit	a	breach	of	the	law	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	fines	themselves	
have	 an	 effect	 on	 that	 individual’s	 behaviour	 and	 deter	 them	 from	breaching	
the	 law	 again.	 Indeed,	 it	would	 seem	unfair	 to	 fine	 the	 same	 amount	 to	 two	









Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines.	 This	 stage	 of	 the	 Guidelines	 appears	 to	 only	







undertaking	which	operates	 in	multiple	markets	 and	has	 this	 stage	applied	 to	
them?	Considering	the	Fining	Guidelines,	we	can	see	that	the	first	stage	within	
the	fining	process	takes	into	account	the	amount	of	sales	and	goods	involved	in	
the	 infringement	 and	 latter	 stages	 allow	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	 for	
aggravating	 factors.	 However,	 the	 difficulty	 here	 is	 that	 the	 first	 stage	 in	 the	
fining	procedure	is	capped	at	thirty	percent,	so	although	this	stage	would	reflect	




six	 can	 allow	 for	 a	 much	 greater	 increase	 in	 the	 fine.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	
undertakings	raising	legitimate	questions	about	the	application	of	this	stage	and	




This	 stage	 of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 also	 leads	 to	 a	 further	 intriguing	 issue,	
namely,	 if	an	undertaking	operates	 in	multiple	markets	 it	 is	 likely	 to	have	 this	
stage	included	in	any	fines	it	receives	for	being	involved	in	a	cartel.	This	means	










section,	 the	 case	 law	highlighted	 that	 the	ECtHR	and	 the	EU	Courts	 recognise	
that	 a	 degree	 of	 unforeseeability	 is	 inevitable	 and	 unavoidable.71	One	 of	 the	
questions	 identified	 in	 the	 current	 section	 is	 whether	 this	 stage	 within	 the	
Guidelines	is	encroached	in	terms	that	are	too	vague	and	broad.		
	
The	ECtHR	has	held	 that	 ‘the	 law	must	be	adequately	accessible’	and	 that	 ‘an	
individual	must	have	an	indication	of	the	legal	rules	applicable	in	a	given	case	–	
and	 he	 must	 be	 able	 to	 foresee	 the	 consequences	 of	 his	 actions.’72	The	 EU	
Courts	 have	 also	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 legal	 situation	 being	
‘sufficiently	precise,	clear	and	foreseeable’.73		
	
Taking	 these	statements	at	 face	value	may	 lead	one	 to	believe	 that	 this	 stage	
within	the	Commission’s	Guidelines	would	not	allow	an	undertaking	to	be	able	
to	adequately	 foresee	the	consequences	of	 its	actions;	as	 it	 is	uncertain	when	
this	 stage	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 will	 apply.	 Nonetheless,	 one	
needs	to	remember	that	an	undertaking	is	still	aware	that	the	action	of	being	in	
a	cartel	breaches	Article	101	TFEU	and	that	 the	potential	punishment	 for	 that	
breach	is	a	fine	of	up	to	ten	per	cent	of	its	total	turnover	in	the	previous	year.	
Additionally,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 these	 statements	 should	not	 be	 read	 at	
face	value	and	that	they	should	be	read	alongside	other	case	law.	For	example,	
in	a	recent	appeal	in	the	UK,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	there	was	no	failure	
to	 comply	 with	 the	 European	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty.74	This	 case	 involved	








and	 precise	 so	 as	 to	 allow	 the	 individuals	 to	 ascertain	 their	 rights	 and	
obligations.	 The	 Supreme	Court	 highlighted	 that	 the	 law	does	not	need	 to	be	
clear	beyond	doubt	and	that	the	‘true	test	is	more	flexible	and	[…]	reflective’.75	
This	 case	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 not	 taking	 a	 statement	 from	 the	Court	






‘Afford	 a	 measure	 of	 legal	 protection	 against	 arbitrary	
interferences	 by	 public	 authorities	 […]	 in	 matters	 affecting	
fundamental	 rights	 it	would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
[…]	 for	 a	 legal	 discretion	 granted	 to	 the	 executive	 to	 be	




domestic	 legislation	 –	which	 cannot	 in	 any	 case	 provide	 for	
every	eventuality	–	depends	to	a	considerable	degree	on	the	
content	of	the	instrument	in	question,	the	field	it	is	designed	




wide-ranging	 discretion.77	However,	 the	 ECtHR	 statement	 also	 shows	how	 the	










of	 factors.	When	this	 statement	 is	considered	alongside	 the	sixth	stage	within	
the	Commission’s	fining	process,	which	aims	to	allow	for	sufficient	deterrence	–	
one	of	 the	key	aims	of	 cartel	enforcement	–	 it	 is	 accepted	 that,	 although	 this	
stage	in	the	Guidelines	is	worded	in	vague	terms,	the	ECtHR	would	accept	and	
allow	the	Commission	this	flexibility.	This	is	because	it	permits	for	the	necessary	




questions	 of	 practice’,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 ECtHR	would	 hold	
that,	 although	 the	 language	 is	 vague	 in	 the	 Guidelines,	 it	 is	 still	 sufficient	 to	
comply	with	Article	7	ECHR.	However,	one	needs	to	ask	the	question	as	to	why	
the	 Commission	 would	 wish	 to	 provide	 Guidelines.	 Rather	 self-evidently	
Guidelines	 are	 provided	 to	 offer	 guidance,	 i.e.	 to	 assist	 in	 clarifying	 the	
procedure/process	or	application	of	the	law.	In	this	case	does	the	Commission’s	
Fining	Guidelines	really	achieve	this	aim?	The	sixth	stage	in	the	fining	process	is	
defined	with	 incredible	 ambiguity,	with	 there	being	no	explanation	of	what	 it	
means	 to	 ‘sufficiently	deter’	an	undertaking	or	how	 this	 stage	will	be	applied,	
when	it	will	be	applied	or	even	how	it	is	to	be	calculated.	Therefore,	one	has	to	
ask	why	half-hearted	and	indeed	unclear	Guidelines	are	being	provided	by	the	
Commission.	 There	 is	 ample	 room	here	 for	 improvement	of	 these	Guidelines,	
particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 this	 stage	 so	 as	 to	 remove	 some	 of	 these	









Both	of	 the	preceding	parts	 of	 this	 section	have	discussed	 legal	 certainty	 and	
the	Commission’s	fining	process.	This	part	has	highlighted	that	even	Guidelines	
that	are	drafted	in	vague	terms	can	still	allow	for	sufficient	certainty	to	occur	for	
compliance	 with	 Article	 7	 ECHR	 to	 ensue.	 What	 is	 important	 is	 that	 the	










as	 the	 undertaking	 will	 know	 that	 any	 fine	 imposed	 on	 itself	 for	 a	 cartel	
infringement	 cannot	exceed	 ten	percent	of	 the	 firm’s	 total	 turnover	 from	 the	




There	are,	however,	 two	areas	of	 concern	with	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty	 that	
could	be	raised	here.	Firstly,	how	an	undertaking	is	defined	can	affect	the	size	of	
the	 fine	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 as	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	 applies	 to	 the	
undertaking’s	 total	 turnover.	 Secondly,	 the	 discretion	 the	 Commission	 has	










of	 the	 subsidiary	 there	 is	 a	 rebuttable	 presumption	 that	 it	 exercises	 ‘decisive	
influence’	 over	 its	 subsidiary.82	This	 creates	 a	 problem	 for	 certainty	 for	 an	
undertaking	if	it	has	a	parent	company.	This	is	because	the	ten	percent	cap	on	
the	 fine	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 relates	 to	 the	 total	 turnover;	 if	 this	
turnover	were	to	be	that	of	a	parent	company	 it	would	be	much	greater	than	
that	of	just	the	subsidiary.	If	an	undertaking	cannot	be	sure	of	whether	the	cap	






small	 subsidiary	 companies,	which	means	 that	 it	 is	 very	 active	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
markets	and	 thus	has	a	very	 large	overall	 turnover.	 Let	us	also	assume	that	 it	




annual	 turnover	 of	 the	 parent	 company,	 this	will	mean	 that	 the	 fines	 can	 be	
much	 larger	 than	 they	 would	 be	 for	 another	 undertaking	 in	 the	 cartelised	
market	which	was	not	a	 subsidiary	company	of	a	 larger	parent	company.	This	
could	 lead	 to	 one	 questioning	 whether	 the	 fines	 are	 proportionate,	 fair,	
reflective	 and	 based	 on	 the	 infringement	 as	 the	 parent	 company	 was	 not	
involved	in	the	infringement,	and	yet	its	much	greater	annual	turnover	is	being	
considered	 to	 increase	 the	 cap	 on	 the	 fine.	 This	 could	 even	 lead	 to	 some	
wishing	 to	 question	 whether	 the	 fines	 in	 this	 case	 are	 just	 being	 used	 as	 a	














could	 raise	 the	 fine	 above	 the	 ten	 percent	 annual	 turnover	 of	 the	 subsidiary	
company,	 but	 as	 the	 Commission	 is	 using	 the	 parent	 company’s	 turnover	 it	
would	 not	 be	 over	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap.	 Therefore,	 as	 the	 upper	 cap	 is	much	
greater	it	means	that	the	fine	can	be	much	higher	than	it	would	be	for	the	other	




practice	 it	 will	 be	 necessary	 for	 a	 parent	 company	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	 carefully	
monitors	 its	 subsidiary	 company	 to	 ensure	 that	 it	 is	 complying	with	 the	 legal	
requirements	of	Article	101	TFEU.	
	
The	 significance	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 parent	 and	 subsidiary	 control	 is	 becoming	
increasingly	 important	 as,	more	 recently,	 the	 issue	 of	 ‘decisive	 influence’	 has	
been	 raised	 in	 cartel	 cases	 involving	 joint	 ventures.	 Indeed,	 where	 a	 joint	
venture	 undertaking	 engages	 in	 a	 collusive	 practice,	 it	 now	 appears	 that	 the	
Commission	 is	 prepared	 to	 attribute	 liability	 to	 the	 controlling	 parent	
firms.83	This	 means	 that,	 in	 future	 cartel	 fining	 decisions	 that	 involve	 parent	
company	liability,	we	may	find	appeals	going	to	the	European	Courts	based	on	
this	 problem	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 certainty	 here.	 With	 regards	 to	 legal	 certainty,	










of	discretion	 in	 the	setting	of	a	 fine.	 Indeed,	 the	Fining	Guidelines	 themselves	
clearly	state	that	‘in	exercising	its	power	to	impose	such	fines,	the	Commission	
enjoys	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	 discretion	 within	 the	 limits	 set	 by	 Regulation	 No	
1/2003.'84	This	 chapter	has	 identified	 reasons	as	 to	why	 it	 is	beneficial	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 have	 this	 discretion,	 but	 has	 also	 highlighted	 the	 ‘costs’	 of	
allowing	 the	 Commission	 to	 retain	 this	 discretion	 with	 specific	 regards	 to	
certainty	for	undertakings.	The	key	question	is	whether	the	discretion	that	the	
Commission	retains	under	the	ten	percent	cap	to	fine	an	undertaking	however	
it	 decides,	 is	 too	 uncertain	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 legal	 certainty	 requirements	
protected	 by	 Article	 7	 ECHR.	 The	 European	 Courts	 have	 stated	 that	 the	
Commission,	 by	 adopting	 and	 implementing	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines,	 has	





‘The	 law	 must	 indicate	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 such	 discretion	
conferred	 on	 the	 competent	 authorities	 and	 the	manner	 of	
its	 exercise	 with	 sufficient	 clarity	 to	 give	 the	 individual	
adequate	protection	against	arbitrary	interference.’		
	 	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 UK	 case	 of	 Regina	 (Purdy)	 v	 Director	 of	 Public	 Prosecutions	
(Society	 for	 the	Protection	of	Unborn	Children	 intervening)87	it	was	highlighted	












taking	 is	arbitrary’.89	Without	 this	guidance,	 it	 is	difficult	 for	 the	Court	 to	hold	









This	 case	 and	 analysis	 therein	 highlights	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 wide	 ranging	




The	 EU	 Courts	 have	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 Guidelines	 were	 adopted	 by	 the	
Commission	 to	 help	 increase	 legal	 certainty	 for	 undertakings.92	Although,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	the	ECJ	has	held	that	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	are	
not	 to	be	 taken	as	 ‘rules	of	 law’	 that	must	be	 followed	by	 the	Commission	 in	
every	given	 instance.93	Therefore,	we	must	 remember	 that	Guidelines	are	 just	
that,	a	guide,	and	that	by	having	Guidelines	it	does	not	mean	that	this	is	exactly	









Guidelines	 are	 at	 least	 consulted	 and	 that	 they	 are	 representative	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	decision	process	as,	 if	they	are	ignored	or	not	followed	all	
of	 the	time	or	are	not	representative,	 then	there	would	be	 little	point	 in	their	
existence.	Indeed,	the	ECJ	has	stated	that	the	Commission	must	not	depart	from	
the	Guidelines	without	giving	reasons	that	are	compatible	with	the	principle	of	




The	 EU	Courts	 have	 stated	 that	 the	 Commission’s	Guidelines	 do	 not	 bind	 the	
Court	 and	 that	 they	 are	 free	 to	 consider	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 fine	 and	 make	
adjustments	 where	 necessary	 as	 they	 have	 ‘unlimited	 jurisdiction’. 95 	The	
importance	and	necessity	of	the	Courts	to	actually	consider	all	parts	of	the	fine	
and	 to	 conduct	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 can	 be	 highlighted	 by	 the	 recent	 opinion	
(26th	September	2013)	of	Advocate	General	Wathelet’s	on	the	appeal	brought	
by	 Telefonica	 against	 the	 GC	 judgment.96	Here,	 Advocate	 General	 Wathelet	
opined	that	the	case	should	be	referred	back	to	the	General	Court	for	its	failure	





the	 fine	 itself.98	This	 decision	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Commission	needs	 to	 assess	 a	wide	 range	of	 considerations	 and,	 therefore,	 a	
degree	 of	 discretion	 within	 the	 fining	 procedure	 is	 needed.	 Hence,	 it	 is	










have	 acknowledged	 themselves.99	From	 a	 competition	 law	 point	 of	 view	 we	
would	not	want	 the	 fines	 to	be	completely	 foreseeable,	as	 some	ambiguity	 in	
the	calculation	of	the	fine	is	important	to	ensure	the	necessary	deterrent	effect.	
Again,	 the	 issue	we	are	observing	here	 is	one	of	balancing	 the	 two	conflicting	




What	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 that	 the	 Commission’s	
discretion	 is	 predominantly	 limited	 by	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	 on	 fines	 under	
Regulation	 No1/2003.100	This	 ten	 percent	 cap	 may	 enable	 the	 Commission’s	
fining	procedure	to	comply	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR,	but	this	can	still	leave	a	
lot	to	be	desired	from	an	undertaking’s	and	citizen’s	perspective.	Indeed,	what	
has	 been	 identified	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 that	 there	 are	 many	 areas	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 Fining	 Guidelines	 that	 are	 unclear	 and	 ambiguous.	 This	 is	
something,	 which	 the	 author	 believes	 needs	 addressing,	 as	 Guidelines	 are	
designed	 to	 clarify	 the	 procedures	 and	 rules	 and	 should	 not	 cause	 further	
confusion	or	unnecessary	uncertainty.	By	reducing	the	Commission’s	discretion	
further,	 clarity	 could	be	enhanced	 in	 the	 fining	procedure,	which	would	bring	
additional	benefits	alongside	 improved	certainty	 for	an	undertaking	whilst	still	




3.2.4	 So	 how	 could	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 be	 limited	 to	 allow	 these	
potential	benefits	to	be	realised?	








guidance,	undertakings	would	understand	why	 the	 fine	was	 imposed	on	 them	




Commission	 to	 retain	 its	 wide	 range	 of	 discretion;	 for	 example,	 it	 could	 be	
justified	 to	 enable	 the	 Commission	 to	 have	 flexibility	 in	 the	 application	 of	 its	
fines.	However,	what	has	to	be	remembered	is	that	the	Guidelines	do	not	bind	
the	Commission,102	they	provide	guidance	and	the	Commission	can	depart	from	
them	where	 it	 is	 reasonable	 and	 necessary	 to	 do	 so.	 Therefore,	 by	 providing	




When	 one	 considers	 the	 fourth	 and	 fifth	 stages	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process,	 certainty	 could	 be	 further	 enhanced	 if	 the	 Commission	were	 to	 give	
examples	 of	 how	 much	 the	 likely	 increase	 or	 decrease	 in	 fine	 might	 be.	
Currently	 an	 undertaking	 cannot	 be	 sure	what	 sort	 of	 percentage	 increase	 or	
decrease	it	will	receive	for	an	aggravating	or	mitigating	factor.103	By	doing	this	it	




to	 increase	 or	 decrease	 the	 percentage	 fine	 it	 awards.	 It	 is	 acknowledged,	
however,	that	the	Fining	Guidelines	are	not	binding	on	the	Commission	so	they	
may	 award	 higher	 or	 lower	 percentage	 fines	 based	 on	 the	 specific	











was	 identified	 that	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 guidance	 on	 what	 constituted	 a	
‘sufficiently	 deterrent	 effect’	 and	 ‘a	 particularly	 large	 turnover’.	 Therefore,	
guidance	 such	 as	 examples	 on	 what	 constitutes	 each	 of	 these	 would	 allow	
undertakings	 to	 identify	 in	which	 situations	 this	 stage	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 is	
likely	 to	 apply	 to	 them.	 Alongside	 this,	 illustrations	 of	 the	 likely	 percentage	
increase	 in	 the	 fines	 could	 be	 given	 for	 this	 stage,	 as	 currently	 there	 is	 no	
information	 available	 regarding	 the	 possible	 increase.	 By	 providing	 this	
guidance	 it	 would	 also	 offer	 transparency	 so	 that	 ‘outsiders’	 do	 not	 see	 the	




a	 minimum	 amount,	 a	 threshold	 (if	 you	 will),	 to	 which	 the	 Commission	 will	
apply	 this	 stage	 in	 the	 fining	 procedure.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 when	 an	
undertaking	has	a	certain	market	share	and	if	turnover	in	other	markets	outside	
the	effected	market	of	the	cartel	are	over-and-above	the	set	market	share	and	
turnover,	 then	 the	undertaking	will	automatically	have	 this	 stage	of	 the	 fining	
procedure	 applied	 to	 it.105	This	 would	 reduce	 uncertainty	 because	 it	 would	
clearly	 set	 out	 when	 this	 stage	 would	 apply	 and,	 as	 it	 is	 automatic,	 it	 would	
mean	 concerns	 regarding	 equal	 treatment	 between	 undertakings	 should	 not	
arise	 (unless	 there	 are	 differences	 in	 the	 chosen	 percentage	 increases	 in	 the	









claims	 of	 favouritism	 and	 the	 potential	 issues	 of	 unequal	 application	 of	 this	
stage.			
	
However,	 there	are	some	 issues	with	adopting	 this	approach.	This	would	 limit	
the	Commission’s	discretion	in	the	application	of	this	stage,	as	the	stage	would	
become	automatic	when	a	 certain	 threshold	 is	met,	meaning	 the	Commission	
would	be	more	restrained	as	to	when	it	has	to	apply	it.	Although,	from	a	legal	
certainty	perspective,	surely	this	 is	positive,	as	 it	 removes	the	potential	claims	
of	arbitrary	application	of	the	stage	and	in	any	case,	this	stage	should	be	applied	
in	 circumstances	 that	 are	 similar	 in	 each	 of	 the	 fining	 decisions	 anyway,	 i.e.	
when	 an	 undertaking	 has	 certain	 market	 shares	 and	 turnover	 outside	 of	 the	
cartelised	market.	 One	 concern	with	 this	 is	 at	what	 percentage	market	 share	
outside	of	the	cartelised	market	and	turnover	should	this	stage	be	set	at.	Even	
once	 this	 is	 decided	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 appeals	 to	 the	 court	where	undertakings	
argue	that	the	Commission	has	in	fact	assessed	their	market	shares	incorrectly	
and	thus	this	stage	of	 the	 fining	procedure	should	not	be	applied	to	them.	To	
effectively	 attempt	 to	 calculate	 at	 what	 level	 this	 threshold	 could	 be	 set	 is	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research	 and	 would	 require	 specialist	 economic	























sufficient	 rather	 than	 absolute	 certainty’.108	Thus,	when	 considering	 the	 fining	
process	 itself,	 the	 undertaking	 may	 not	 have	 absolute	 certainty	 but	 they	 do	
appear	 to	 have	 sufficient	 certainty	 when	 the	 Guidelines	 are	 considered	 as	 a	
whole	 entity.	 Therefore,	 the	 current	 Commission	 Fining	 Guidelines	 are	
compliant	with	Article	7	of	the	ECHR.	However,	as	advocated	in	the	discussion	
above,	 with	 improvements	 certainty	 could	 be	 further	 enhanced	 for	
undertakings	without	the	loss	of	the	Commission’s	flexibility.		
	
3.2.5	 Conclusions	 on	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 policy’s	 compliance	with	 legal	
certainty		
In	 this	 section	 of	 the	 chapter,	 various	 stages	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
process	have	been	analysed.	It	has	been	shown,	through	the	case	law	–	of	the	
EU	courts,	the	ECtHR	and	national	courts	–	and	the	application	and	analysis	of	
that	 case	 law	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 does	 comply	 with	 the	
requirement	 of	 Article	 7	 ECHR.	 Yet,	what	 has	 also	 been	 identified	 is	 that	 the	
Commission	 has	 a	 very	 wide	 range	 of	 discretion	 under	 the	 ten	 percent	 cap	
when	 it	 applies	 its	 policy,	 and	 therefore	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	 limit	 its	
discretion	 further	 –	 through	 more	 restrictive	 guidance	 –	 this	 should	 enable	









allows	 for	 the	 observance	 of	 fairer	 enforcement	 of	 the	 law.	 Given	 the	






3.3	 Equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
Fining	Guidelines?	
	
Now	 that	 the	 previous	 section	 has	 identified	 and	 analysed	 the	 legal	 certainty	
concerns	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 the	 chapter	 can	 proceed	 to	
analyse	whether	the	Commission	applies	its	Fining	Guidelines	equally	between	
undertakings.	Equal	treatment	becomes	a	particular	issue	at	a	variety	of	stages	
in	 the	 fining	 process.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 in	 the	 instances	 of:	 the	 ITP,	 the	





the	 fining	 process	 where	 an	 undertaking’s	 ITP	 may	 be	 considered	 at	 the	
Commission’s	 discretion.	 Until	 Joaquin	 Almunia	 acceded	 to	 role	 of	 European	
Competition	 Commissioner,	 the	 Commission	 had	 taken	 a	 very	 strict	 line	with	
the	 ITP,	whereby	former	Commissioner	Neelie	Kroes	had	advocated	for	a	zero	
tolerance	 policy	 against	 cartels.110	In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 current	 economic	 crisis	
Commissioner	 Almunia	 has	 taken	 a	 softer	 approach	 towards	 the	 ITP	 of	 an	
undertaking.111		
	
So	 why	 should	 it	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 Commission	worries	 if	 an	 undertaking	
becomes	 insolvent?	 Generally	 speaking,	 the	 consequences	 of	 an	 undertaking	
experiencing	bankruptcy	can	be	far	worse	for	the	industry	–	and	moreover	the	
economy	–	than	when	compared	with	offering	a	reduction	in	fine	to	allow	the	











broadly	 into	 four	 categories.112	The	 first	 is	 that	 the	 anticompetitive	 industry	
becomes	 even	 more	 concentrated	 by	 the	 subsequent	 departure	 of	 an	
undertaking	from	the	market,	which	means	that	there	is	even	less	competitive	
pressure	within	the	market	and,	thus,	an	increased	likelihood	of	collusion	in	the	
future.	Secondly,	 the	social	and	economic	costs	 that	emanate	 from	forcing	an	
undertaking	into	bankruptcy	can	be	exceedingly	high.	For	example,	bankruptcy	
may	 lead	 to	a	 loss	of	 jobs,	 skills	 and	assets	of	material	economic	and	 societal	
worth.	Thirdly,	it	makes	it	harder	for	third	parties	who	purchase	goods	from	the	
undertaking	 to	 claim	 damages	 from	 the	 cartel,	 as	 the	 undertaking	 no	 longer	
exists	in	the	wake	of	its	bankruptcy.	Fourthly,	bankrupting	undertakings	is	likely	
to	 lead	 to	 large	 political	 pressure	 being	 placed	 on	 the	 Commission	 from	
business	 lobbying.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 potential	 issues	 and	 costs	 associated	with	
bankrupting	an	undertaking,	one	can	infer	strong	evidence	to	support	the	claim	
that	it	is	disproportionate	to	bankrupt	an	undertaking	when	the	alternative	–	a	
reduction	 in	 fine	–	will	mean	 the	undertaking	 can	 still	 compete	 in	 the	market	
and,	yet,	also	be	punished	for	its	infringement.	
	
Now	that	 the	Commission	takes	a	softer	approach	to	 the	consideration	of	 the	
ITP,	 it	 leads	 to	 greater	 concerns	 about	 equality	 in	 the	 fining	process,	 because	
undertakings	may	receive	discounts	in	their	fines	simply	based	on	their	financial	








a	 member	 throughout	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 cartel	 and	 has	




joined	 the	 cartel	 midway	 through	 and	 was	 coerced	 into	
joining	 by	 Firm	 A.	 Firm	 C	 has	 been	 a	member	 throughout	
the	cartel	with	Firm	A,	but	has	not	coerced	other	members	
to	join	or	been	the	ringleader.	The	Commission	detects	the	
cartel	 and	 issues	 fines	 against	 all	 of	 the	 firms.	 Firm	 A	 is	
facing	 potential	 insolvency	 by	 the	 fines,	 and	 thus	 the	
Commission	 grant	 them	an	 ITP	 discount	 on	 their	 fine.	 The	
discount	 Firm	 A	 receives	 –	 because	 it	 is	 in	 such	 poor	
financial	 standing	–	 is	 70%	off	 the	original	 fine,	which	was	
set	 by	 the	 Commission	 at	 5%.	 Therefore,	 Firm	 A’s	 overall	
fine	equates	to	1.5%	of	 its	total	turnover.	Firm	B	was	fined	
considerably	 beneath	 the	 10%	 turnover	 cap	 as	 it	 had	





simply	 because	 Firm	 A	 is	 currently	 in	 a	 poor	 financial	
situation.						
	
This	 hypothetical	 scenario	 raises	 the	 internal	 problems	 relating	 to	 equal	
treatment,	namely	that	undertakings	are	treated	differently	solely	on	the	basis	
of	their	financial	stability.	Firm	B	and	Firm	C	would	rightfully	be	questioning	the	
logic	behind	 the	Commission’s	decision	 to	 fine	 them	more	 than	Firm	A,	 given	
that	Firm	A	was	the	most	delinquent	undertaking.	At	no	stage	did	Firm	A’s	final	
plight	detract	 from	 its	ability	 to	engage	 in	 the	cartel	and	yet	 it	 is	 this	 that	has	
determined	its	eventual	fine.	This	problem	is	amplified	here	because	of	the	lack	
of	guidance	given	by	the	Commission	that	clearly	explains	how	these	decisions	






have	 had	 severe	 financial	 problems.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 objectively	 justifiable	 to	
allow	for	an	ITP	reduction	to	prevent	the	bankruptcy	of	an	undertaking	and	the	
negative	consequences	which	would	stem	from	this,	such	as	the	exiting	of	the	
firm	 from	 the	 market	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 jobs.	 However,	 one	 has	 to	 consider	
whether	 Firm	 A	 is	 actually	 just	 an	 inefficient	 firm	 and	 by	 it	 being	 awarded	 a	
reduction	 in	 fine	 it	 is	 actually	 allowing	 an	 uneconomical	 firm	 to	 stay	 in	 the	
market	and	gain	a	potentially	unfair	competitive	advantage	over	Firms	B	and	C.	
Indeed,	in	practice	this	is	something	the	EU	courts	have	noted	and	thus,114	have	
held	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	 required	 to	 take	 account	 of	 an	 undertakings	
poor	financial	standing	in	the	calculation	of	the	fine.	
	
It	 is	 imperative	 that	 there	 is	 equality	 in	 the	 application	 of	 this	 stage	 when	
























In	 relation	 to	 considering	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context’	 of	 the	
undertaking’s	 ITP,	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 is	 a	 concern	 that	 has	 been	 raised	 before	
under	 the	 now	 obsolete	 1998	 Fining	 Guidelines.116	Stephan	 noted	 that	 this	
consideration	would	 require	a	 thorough	 review	of	 the	wider	policies	 specified	
under	the	Treaty,	including	those	relating	employment	and	social	protection.117	
This	would	allow	the	Commission	to	consider	a	much	broader	range	of	criteria	
and	 provides	 limited	 clarity	 for	 us	 to	 assess	whether	 the	 ITP	 is	 being	 applied	
equally	 to	 all	 undertakings,	 as	 it	 can	 be	 difficult	 to	 determine	 what	 the	
Commission	 is	 considering	 in	 its	 decision	 making	 process.118	Indeed,	 little	
clarification	is	offered	under	the	2006	Guidelines.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	2006	
Guidelines	amend	the	criteria	from	a	‘specific	social	context’	to	a	‘specific	social	
and	economic	 context’	 this	does	 little	 to	alleviate	 the	ambiguities	 surrounding	
when	the	Commission	will	grant	an	ITP	reduction.	In	fact,	this	could	actually	be	
seen	to	have	the	effect	of	widening	the	scope	of	 the	criteria	 that	Commission	
can	 consider.119	The	 EU	 courts	 however,	 can	 offer	 us	 some	 limited	 guidance	
through	their	case	law	here	on	part	of	the	criteria.	In	the	Tokai	Carbon	case	the	
Court	 stated	 that	 the	 criterion	 of	 the	 ‘specific	 social	 context’	 consists	 of	















the	 undertaking’	 criterion,	 the	 wording	 within	 the	 Commission’s	 guidance	












When	 the	 Commission	 considers	 the	 criterion	 of	 whether	 the	 fine	 will	
‘irretrievably	 jeopardise	the	economic	viability	of	the	undertaking’	 it	will	make	
this	 assessment	 based	 on	 a	 number	 of	 indicators	 derived	 from	 the	Altman	 Z-
score	 test.123	The	 Commission	 will	 give	 more	 emphasis	 to	 the	 solvency	 and	















Commission	 will	 interpret	 these	 criteria	 broadly. 125 	Similarly,	 with	 the	
requirement	that	assets	have	to	 lose	 ‘all	of	 their	value’	 the	Note	explains	that	
the	 Commission	will	 take	 a	 wider	 approach	 and	 not	 interpret	 this	 literally.126	




of	 an	 ITP	 discount,	 it	 leaves	 a	 lot	 of	 ambiguity	 and	 potential	 for	 unequal	
treatment	to	occur	in	this	stage.	For	example,	how,	and	what	assessments	will	
the	 Commission	 make	 with	 the	 future	 financial	 data	 they	 assess?	 The	
information	provided	within	the	Note	does	little	to	assist	in	understanding	with	
clarity	 what	 will	 suffice	 to	 meet	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 	 ‘specific	 social	 and	
economic	 context’,	 especially	 as	 the	 Commission	 is	 interpreting	 this	 broadly.	
Equally,	 the	 Note	 seems	 to	 make	 a	 somewhat	 arbitrary	 distinction	 in	 the	
consideration	 of	 the	 ‘significantly	 loses	 value’	 interpretation;	 between	 where	
assets	are	sold	off,	jobs	are	lost	and	the	undertaking	goes	bankrupt,	compared	
to	where	another	undertaking	 is	 set	 to	purchase	 these	assets	and	employ	 the	
staff.	Why	should	the	Commission	make	this	distinction	here?	What	if	the	other	
undertaking	 purchases	 the	 assets	 and	 then	 sells	 them	 off	 or	 still	 closes	 the	
business	 and	 jobs	 are	 lost?	 The	 Note	 ignores	 these	 potential	 questions	
completely.	 Additionally,	 the	 Note	 provides	 no	 information	 on	 the	 likely	 or	
possible	reduction	that	would	be	awarded.	Finally,	it	is	questionable	as	to	what	
importance	 and	 value	 one	 can	 attribute	 to	 an	 Information	 Note.	 If	 it	 should	
form	part	of	the	guidance	for	the	method	of	calculating	and	awarding	an	ITP	it	
seems	 more	 coherent	 for	 this	 information	 to	 be	 contained	 within	 the	 main	








So	where	does	 this	 leave	 the	application	of	 the	 ITP	provision	 in	practice?	 In	a	
recent	 case,	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (CJEU)	 dismissed	 an	
appeal	 by	 Ziegler	 SA	 that	 was	 partially	 based	 on	 an	 alleged	 breach	 of	 the	
principle	of	equal	 treatment	 in	 relation	 to	an	 ITP	 request.128	Ziegler	 submitted	
an	 ITP	request	 to	the	Commission	after	 receiving	a	 fine	of	3.76%	of	 its	annual	
turnover	 imposed. 129 	The	 Commission	 refused	 Ziegler’s	 request	 but	 then	
proceeded	to	grant	an	ITP	reduction	of	70	percent	to	Interdean	NV,	which	was	a	
fellow	member	of	the	cartel.130	Ziegler	appealed	to	the	GC	on	the	grounds	that	
the	 Commission	 had	 failed	 to	 consider	 its	 specific	 social	 and	 economic	
circumstances,	 in	 accordance	 with	 paragraph	 35	 of	 the	 2006	 Fining	
Guidelines.131	Ziegler	 believed	 that	 its	 financial	 circumstances	 were	 similar	 to	
that	 of	 Interdean	 that	 had	 received	 the	 ITP	 discount.	 Despite	 confirming	 that	
the	Commission	had	failed	to	afford	consideration	to	Ziegler’s	specific	social	and	




to	 consider	 Ziegler’s	 specific	 social	 and	 economic	 context	 –	 the	GC	 could	 not	
legitimately	conclude	that	Interdean	was	entitled	to	an	ITP	discount	when	it	did	
not	 assess	 Ziegler’s	 own	 ITP	 request	 on	 the	 same	 basis.	 Ziegler	 argued	 that	
reaching	such	a	conclusion	would	infringe	the	principle	of	equal	treatment.133		
	



















pay	 its	 fine.	 As	 such,	 the	 CJEU	 ruled	 that	 Ziegler’s	 allegation	 that	 the	GC	 had	
applied	unequal	treatment	was	unfounded.135	
	
This	 case	 is	 interesting	 because	 of	 the	 confidentiality	 behind	 the	 awarding	 of	
Interdean’s	ITP	discount.	In	this	case,	the	CJEU	reiterated	that	‘the	principle	of	
equal	 treatment	 requires,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 comparable	 situations	 must	 not	 be	
treated	differently,	unless	such	treatment	is	objectively	justified.’136	However,	if	
something	 is	 objectively	 justified	 on	 grounds	 which	 are	 kept	 confidential	 to	
other	cartel	members	and	the	general	public	at	 large,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	us	to	
say	whether	it	 is	objectively	justifiable	or	not.	Moreover,	how	can	one	see	the	
application	of	equal	treatment	when	it	appears	to	all	those	outside,	that	are	not	
privy	 to	 the	 information,	 that	 this	 is	 unequal	 treatment.	 It	 is	 hoped	 that	 the	
Commission’s	policy	 in	this	case	has	been	applied	fairly	and	equally.	However,	
because	we	are	not	privy	 to	all	 the	 information	we	cannot	be	sure	 that	 it	has	




to	 pay	 legal	 costs	 and	 no	 real	 explanation	 as	 to	why	 it	was	 not	 the	 victim	 of	
unequal	treatment	here.		Admittedly	there	are	issues	if	too	much	information	is	
shared	by	 the	Commission,137	such	as	 the	prospect	of	undertakings	 relying	on	
information	in	an	attempt	to	align	itself	into	a	position	where	the	Commission	is	
likely	to	award	it	an	ITP.	However,	it	is	important	that	the	Commission	divulges	









The	next	 important	 consideration	with	 regards	 to	 ITPs	and	equal	 treatment	 is	
how	much	 discount	 the	 Commission	will	 afford	 an	 undertaking.	 There	 is	 very	
little	 clarity	 as	 to	how	 the	Commission	decides	 the	 size	of	 a	discount	offered.	
Indeed,	 one	 can	 see	 the	 Guidelines	 make	 no	 mention	 as	 to	 the	 size	 of	 the	
discount	and,	as	such,	an	analysis	of	whether	the	Commission	applies	its	policy	
equally	is	difficult.	Consequently,	we	must	turn	to	the	Commission’s	decisions	to	



































the	same	cartel.	Given	 the	 flexibility	 that	 the	Commission	has	exercised	when	
awarding	discounts	in	the	past,	some	undertakings	may	be	expectant	of	 larger	




One	can	see	within	 the	 ITP	provision	 that	 there	 is	 such	a	degree	of	discretion	
attributed	 to	 the	Commission	 that	unequal	 treatment	seems	 likely	 to	occur	 in	
practice	or	at	least	has	the	potential	to	do	so.	Indeed,	from	the	data	we	can	see	
that	undertakings	in	similar	financial	circumstances	have	been	offered	a	diverse	
range	 of	 discounts.	 However,	 because	 of	 the	 arbitrary	 nature	 and	 the	
confidential	 way	 in	 which	 the	 Commission	 decides	 to	 offer	 an	 ITP,	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 say	 for	 certain	 that	 there	 is	 unequal	 treatment.	However,	what	
one	can	 say	 for	 certain	 is	 that	 the	Commission	 is	prepared	 to	be	very	 flexible	
with	the	discounts	they	offer	undertakings	for	ITPs,	and	this	flexibility	is	so	great	
unequal	 application	 is	 a	 real	 probability.	 This	 means	 that	 this	 stage	 in	 the	













more	 transparency.	With	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 Information	 Note,	 the	
information	contained	within	this	does	offer	partial	guidance,	but	 it	 is	unclear	
as	 to	 the	 relevance	 and	 indeed	 importance	 of	 this	 information	 now	 that	 the	
Competition	Commissioner	has	changed.	If	these	practices	are	to	be	followed	in	
the	 future	 it	would	be	beneficial	–	 for	clarity	and	completeness	purposes	–	 to	
incorporate	 the	 information	 in	 the	 Information	 Note	 into	 the	 Commission’s	
main	 Guidelines	 for	 the	 method	 of	 setting	 the	 fine.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 still	
important	 to	 ensure	 that	 this	 stage	 is	 not	made	unduly	 or	 overly	 transparent	
because	of	the	potential	concern	that	an	undertaking	may	attempt	to	align	itself	
and	represent	 its	 financial	position	 in	a	way	 that	will	enable	 it	 to	qualify	 for	a	
reduction	in	fine,	which	would	mean	some	of	the	deterrence	effect	of	the	fine	






of	 an	 undertaking’s	 nationality.	 This	 part	 will	 assess	 and	 analyse	 whether	 an	













Commission.	 Specifically,	 this	 section	 shall	 focus	 on	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	
treatment	 of	 an	 undertaking	 of	 non-EU	 nationality	 against	 those	 of	 an	 EU	
nationality.	To	be	clear,	in	this	context	when	the	nationality	of	an	undertaking	is	





data	 set,147	with	 the	percentage	 fines	 imposed	against	 the	undertakings	being	
consulted.	These	percentage	fines	are	based	on	the	worldwide	market	turnover	
of	 the	 undertakings.	 This	 data	 was	 chosen	 to	 be	 utilised	 as	 it	 allows	 a	
straightforward	and	direct	comparison	to	be	made	of	the	fines	within	a	specific	
cartel	 and	 the	 percentage	 fines	 imposed	 in	 other	 separate	 cartels	 on	
undertakings.	
	
There	 are	 three	 possible	 approaches	 the	 Commission	 could	 adopt	 in	 the	
application	of	its	fining	policy	with	regards	to	an	undertaking’s	nationality.	First,	
the	Commission	could	apply	its	fining	policy	in	the	same	way	to	all	undertakings	
no	 matter	 what	 their	 nationality.	 Second,	 they	 could	 apply	 favourable	
treatment	 to	 an	 undertaking	 based	 on	 their	 nationality	 or,	 finally,	 they	 could	
apply	less	favourable	treatment	to	an	undertaking	based	on	their	nationality.	
	











favourable	 treatment	 towards	 EU	 undertakings	 and	 therefore	 be	 harsher	 on	
undertakings,	which	are	of	a	non-EU	nationality.	The	benefit	of	the	Commission	
adopting	such	an	approach	for	EU	national	undertakings	 is	that	they	would	be	
better	 off	 than	 non-EU	undertakings	 as	 the	 fines	would	 be	 less	 for	 them	and	
therefore	 they	may	be	able	 to	gain	a	 competitive	advantage,	 as	 the	 fine	 they	
receive	is	less.	Additionally,	the	higher	the	fines	the	greater	the	benefits	for	the	
EU	as	the	fines	are	absorbed	into	the	EU’s	budget.	However,	it	could	be	that	the	
Commission	 wishes	 to	 make	 an	 example	 of	 a	 non-EU	 undertaking,	 which	
commits	a	competition	 law	breach,	 so	as	 to	deter	other	non-EU	national	 (and	
EU)	 undertakings	 from	 committing	 similar	 competition	 law	 breaches	 and,	
therefore,	the	Commission	imposes	larger	fines	on	those	undertakings.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 the	 Commission	 wishes	 to	 show	 that	 EU	
undertakings	do	not	get	preferential	treatment	over	non-EU	undertakings	and,	
thus,	 they	 seek	 to	 redress	 this	 notion	 by	 positively	 discriminating	 against	 EU	
undertakings.	
	
Given	 these	 different	 approaches	 the	 Commission	 could	 adopt	 to	 the	
consideration	of	an	undertaking’s	nationality	and	the	wide-ranging	discretion	it	
has	in	its	application	of	the	fining	process,	this	chapter	proceeds	to	analyse	the	
empirical	data	 to	discover	whether	 the	Commission’s	 fining	process	 is	applied	
equally	based	on	the	nationality	of	an	undertaking.		
	
Of	 the	 forty-three	 cartels	 reported	 in	 the	 GCR	 data	 set,	 thirty-four	 of	 these	
contained	 non-EU	 national	 undertakings.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 non-EU	 firms	




information	 that	 has	 been	 disclosed	 is	 that	 there	 was	 a	 wide	 variety	 in	 the	
percentage	of	fines	imposed	on	undertakings	of	both	EU	nationality	and	of	non-
	160	
EU	 nationality.	 In	 some	 instances,	 EU	 undertakings	 received	 the	 lowest	 fines,	
and	in	others	the	highest.	
	
For	 example,	 in	 the	 ‘MCAA’	 cartel,148	‘PO	 Thread’	 cartel,149	‘Butadiene	Rubber	
and	 Emulsion	 Styrene	 Butadiene	 Rubber’	 cartel	 and, 150 	the	 ‘International	
Removal	 Services’	 cartels,151	the	 percentage	 fines	 given	 to	 non-EU	 national	
undertakings	were	lower	than	that	given	to	the	EU	national	undertakings	within	
the	same	cartel.152	In	contrast,	the	decisions	in	the	‘Rubber	Chemicals’	cartel,153	
‘Flat	 Glass’ 154 	and	 ‘Consumer	 Detergents’	 cartels, 155 	saw	 the	 Commission	
attribute	a	higher	percentage	fine	to	non-EU	national	undertakings	than	the	EU	
national	 undertakings	 in	 the	 same	 cartel.	We	 also	 find	 that,	 within	 the	 same	
cartel,	 some	non-EU	undertakings	receive	the	 lowest	 fines	whereas,	 in	others,	
they	 receive	higher	 fines;	 for	 example	 this	was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 ‘Gas	 Insulated	
Switchgear’156	and	 ‘Elevators	and	Escalators	 (Belgium)’	 cartel.157	Owing	 to	 this	
range	 in	 fining,	 all	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 Commission	 decisions	 highlight	 the	




to	 ensure	 this	 procedure	 is	 applied	 fairly	 in	 practice.	 It	 begins	 by	 considering	
three	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions,	 then	 it	 examines	 two	 of	 these	 in	 great	
detail.	These	decisions	were	chosen	as	they	are	a	representative	sample	of	the	
























in	 this	 cartel	 received	 a	 substantially	 lower	 percentage	 fines.	 The	majority	 of	
these	 percentage	 fines	 were	 under	 0.24%,	 with	 only	 one	 non-EU	 national	
undertaking	receiving	a	higher	percentage	fine	than	0.24%:	Hynix.160	This	is	true	




involved	 six	 undertakings,	 four	 of	 which	 were	 of	 non-EU	 nationality.	 In	 this	
cartel,	 Bayer	 –	 an	 undertaking	 from	Germany	 –	 received	 complete	 immunity,	




















The	next	 two	Commission	 fining	decisions	 to	be	discussed	shall	consider	all	of	
the	stages	of	 the	Commission’s	 fining	procedure	to	help	 identify	and	 illustrate	




The	 ‘RAW	 Tobacco	 Italy’	 cartel	 involved	 six	 undertakings,164	three	 of	 whom	
were	of	EU	nationality	and	three	who	were	of	non-EU	nationality.	In	this	cartel,	






being	 disclosed.	 The	 Commission	 began	 by	 assessing	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	
infringement	and	noted	that	the	production	of	raw	tobacco	 in	 Italy	accounted	
for	 38%	 of	 the	 Community	 in-quota	 production.166	It	 was	 also	 noted	 that	 the	
processors’	 infringement	 was	 considered	 very	 serious	 as	 they	 fixed	 purchase	
prices	and	shared	purchased	quantities.167		
	
As	 Deltafina	 appeared	 to	 be	 the	 biggest	 purchaser,	 the	 Commission	 felt	 the	
starting	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 to	 be	 imposed	on	 this	 undertaking	 should	 be	 the	
highest.	 Equally,	 as	 Transcatab,	 Dimon	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 had	 smaller	
market	shares,	the	Commission	felt	they	should	be	grouped	together	and	given	
the	same	size	starting	amount.168	It	was	held	that	merely	reflecting	the	market	
position	would	 not	 be	 sufficient,	 thus	 a	 1.5	multiplying	 factor	was	 applied	 to	










as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €37,500,000,	 Transcatab	 €12,500,000,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	
€12,500,000	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 €10,000,000.	 The	 infringement	 lasted	 six	
years	 and	 four	 months	 for	 Deltafina,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	 and	 Transcatab,	 so	 the	
Commission	 increased	 the	 fines	 by	 60%.170	Romana	 Tabacchi	 was	 involved	 in	
the	infringement	for	two	years	and	eight	months	and,	as	such,	the	Commission	
decided	 that	 the	 fine	 should	 be	 increased	 by	 25%.171	This	 meant	 the	 basic	
amounts	 of	 the	 fines	 were	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €60,000,000,	 Transcatab	
€20,000,000,	Dimon	(Mindo)	€20,000,000	and	Romana	Tabacchi	€12,500,000.	
	
The	 Commission	 next	 considered	 attenuating	 circumstances.	 As	 Romana	
Tabacchi	 did	 not	 take	 part	 in	 certain	 aspects	 of	 the	 cartel,	 had	 disrupted	 the	
purpose	of	 the	cartel	and	had	a	weak	market	 share,	 the	Commission	 reduced	
the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	by	30%.172		Deltafina	was	the	first	undertaking	to	
apply	 for	 leniency	 and	 had	 substantially	 contributed	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation	by	coordinating	the	submission	of	evidence	to	the	Commission,	so	
the	Commission	felt	the	basic	amount	should	be	reduced	by	50%.173	Therefore,	
the	 fines	 were	 amended	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €30,000,000,	 Transcatab	
€20,000,000,	 Dimon	 (Mindo)	 €20,000,000	 and	 Romana	 Tabacchi	 €8,750,000.	
The	 fines	were	then	assessed	to	ensure	that	 they	complied	with	the	10%	cap.	
Romana	 Tabacchi’s	 fine	 had	 to	 be	 reduced	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 cap. 174	
Additionally,	as	Mindo	was	originally	part	of	the	Dimon	group,	it	was	felt	that	it	
should	be	apportioned	within	the	10%	of	its	turnover	in	its	most	recent	business	
year.175	Thus,	 the	 final	 fines	 imposed	 were	 as	 follows:	 Deltafina	 €30,000,000,	















By	 looking	at	the	reasons	why	the	Commission	 imposed	the	fines	 it	did	 in	this	
case,	we	can	see	that	the	Commission	did	not	treat	the	three	US	undertakings	
prejudicially	and	that	the	percentage	fines	which	were	awarded	throughout	the	
various	 stages	 of	 the	 fining	 process	 were	 based	 on	 legitimate	 factors	 and	
considerations.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that,	although	Romana	Tabacchi	 (an	
EU	undertaking)	received	the	highest	percentage	fine,	it	actually	received	one	of	




The	 final	Commission	decision	to	be	examined	 is	 the	 ‘Professional	Videotapes’	
cartel.176	This	 cartel	 is	 analysed	 in	 detail,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 rather	 unique	 decision,	
because	 it	 was	 comprised	 entirely	 of	 non-EU	 undertakings.	 There	 were	 only	
three	undertakings	 involved	 in	this	cartel:	Sony,	Fuji	and	Maxwell,	all	of	which	
were	 of	 Japanese	 nationality.	 Interestingly	 not	 one	 of	 the	 undertakings	 was	
granted	complete	immunity,	owing	to	the	fact	that	the	Commission	started	the	
investigation	 on	 its	 own	 initiative.177	The	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	
this	case	are	typical	when	compared	to	the	fines	imposed	by	the	Commission	in	
other	 cartels.	 Indeed,	 the	 fines	were	no	higher	 or	 lower	 than	 in	 other	 cartels	
from	 the	 data	 set.	 This	 helps	 illustrate	 an	 impartial	 approach	 to	 the	 fining	 of	
undertakings	based	on	their	nationality	by	the	Commission.	We	shall	now	look	












the	 cartel	 conduct	 in	 this	 case	was	 horizontal	 price-fixing	which	 is	 one	of	 the	
most	 harmful	 restrictions	 on	 competition.180	Additionally,	 it	 noted	 that	 the	
three	 undertakings	 in	 this	 cartel	 had	 a	 combined	market	 share	 of	more	 than	
85%,181	that	the	cartel’s	geographic	scope	included	at	least	the	EEA,182	and	that	
the	 infringement	 was	 generally	 implemented.183	Because	 of	 these	 factors	 the	
Commission	decided	to	set	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	at	18%	of	the	value	of	
sales.184	The	 next	 stage	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process	 required	 it	 to	
consider	the	duration	of	the	infringement.	As	the	cartel	lasted	at	least	two	years	
and	 eight	 months,	 the	 Commission	 decided	 a	 multiplier	 of	 three	 was	 to	 be	
used.185		Finally,	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	required	the	consideration	of	an	
additional	 deterrence	 amount.	 Here,	 the	 Commission	 felt	 that	 having	
considered:		
	
‘the	various	 factors	discussed	 in	 recitals	 (206)	 to	 (209),	particularly	 the	
nature,	 	 the	 combined	market	 share	 and	 the	 geographic	 scope	 of	 the	
infringement,	 that	 an	 additional	 17%	 of	 the	 value	 of	 sales	 would	 be	
appropriate.’186		
	
This	 meant	 that	 the	 basic	 fines	 on	 the	 undertakings	 were	 as	 follows:	 Sony	
€33,000,000,	 Fuji	 €22,000,000	 and	Maxell	 €18,000,000.	 The	 Commission	 then	
had	to	consider	whether	there	were	any	aggravating	or	mitigating	factors	in	the	










refused	 to	 answer	 oral	 questions	 and	 that	 one	 employee	 had	 shredded	
documents	 from	a	 file	 labeled	“Competitors	Pricing”.187	Therefore,	 it	was	held	














business	year.	The	ceiling	was	not	attained	 in	 this	case,	which	meant	 that	 the	
basic	 fines	 on	 the	 undertakings	 were:	 €47,190,000	 for	 Sony,	 €22,000,000	 for	
Fuji	and	€18,000,000	for	Maxell.	The	Commission	next	considered	the	potential	
reductions	 for	 leniency	applications.	 The	Commission	granted	Fuji	 a	 reduction	
of	 40%	 and	 Maxell	 20%	 of	 the	 fine	 for	 the	 information	 and	 assistance	 they	
provided	in	the	case.192	There	were	no	settlements	or	considerations	of	ITPs	in	













What	 this	 decision	 illustrates	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 imposed	 the	 same	
percentage	 fine	 on	 all	 undertakings	 in	 this	 cartel	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	 The	
difference	 in	percentage	 fines	occurred	when	the	aggravating,	deterrence	and	
leniency	 factors	 were	 considered.	 There	 were	 legitimate	 reasons	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 treat	 the	 undertakings	 differently	 here;	 namely,	 owing	 to	 the	
differences	 between	 the	 undertakings’	 behaviour	 and	 conduct.	 When	 we	
consider	this	case	broadly	among	the	other	fining	decisions	from	the	GCR	data	
set,	we	see	that	the	basic	amount	of	the	fine	is	relative	to	what	the	basic	fines	
of	other	undertakings	were	 set	at;	 the	majority	 in	 these	 cases	being	between	
16-19%.193	This	case	is	 important	as	if	unequal	treatment	were	to	occur	within	
the	Commission’s	fining	procedure,	this	would	have	been	the	ideal	case	for	it	to	
occur	 in	as	all	of	 the	undertakings	were	of	a	non-EU	nationality.	 Yet	what	we	
find	 is	 no	 departure	 from	 the	 standard	 norm	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure.	 This	 is	 the	 case	 throughout	 the	 whole	 fining	 procedure	 decision,	
with	none	of	the	stages	being	applied	differently	to	how	they	are	in	other	cartel	
fining	decisions	by	the	Commission.	Again	this	case	strengthens	the	belief	that	
the	 Commission	 does	 not	 discriminate	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 an	 undertaking’s	
nationality.	
	
From	 the	 empirical	 data	 that	 is	 available	 to	 be	 analsyed	 and	 the	 comparison	
undertaken	 above,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 the	 Commission	
applying	 favorable	 treatment	 to	 an	 EU	 or	 a	 non-EU	 national	 undertaking.	
Indeed,	from	the	above	analysis,	one	can	see	that	the	Commission	is	applying	its	
fining	 policy	 fairly	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 consideration	 of	 an	 undertaking’s	
nationality.		
	
What	 has	 been	 illustrated	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 takes	 a	 very	 much	 ‘mixed	
approach’	 to	 the	 fining	of	undertakings	with	 regards	 to	 their	 nationality;	with	







fined	 more	 leniently	 or	 harshly.	 When	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	
starting	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that,	 across	 multiple	 cartels,	 the	
starting	 point	 is	 always	 around	 the	 16%	 figure,	 and	 this	 is	 irrespective	 of	 the	





undertakings	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 nationality.	 Indeed,	 when	 considering	 the	
calculation	 of	 the	 fine	 by	 the	 Commission,	 we	 see	 that	 it	 applies	 similar	
percentage	 fines	 to	 undertakings	 in	 analogous	 circumstances	 with	 very	 few	
deviations	 from	 the	 norm.196	Whenever	 these	 deviations	 do	 occur,	 there	 are	
legitimate	 reasons	 for	why	 the	 Commission	 has	 departed	 from	 the	 norm;	 for	
example,	because	the	conduct	of	the	undertaking	involved	necessitates	it.197		
	
Additionally	 we	 can	 see	 that	 when	 the	 Commission	 imposes	 fines	 on	
undertakings,	 it	 follows	 the	 fining	procedures	 laid	down	 in	 the	Guidelines	and	
determines	a	fine	for	an	undertaking	 in	 line	with	these	procedures.	Further	to	
this,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 awarding	 of	 leniency	 by	 the	 Commission,	
particularly	the	awarding	of	full	immunity,	we	find	from	the	empirical	data	that	
the	Commission	is	willing	to	grant	non-EU	national	undertakings	leniency	as	well	

















Owing	 to	 this	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 discussion,	 it	 is	 forwarded	 that	 the	
nationality	of	an	undertaking	 is	not	a	 factor	 that	 the	Commission	considers	 in	
the	calculation	of	an	undertaking’s	fine	or	in	the	awarding	of	leniency.	Because	
of	 this,	 what	 we	 see	 is	 that,	 out	 of	 the	 three	 suggested	 hypotheses	 at	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 section	 on	 the	 way	 the	 Commission	 could	 apply	 its	 fining	
policy,	we	find	that	Option	One	is	the	one	that	occurs	 in	practice,	 i.e.	that	the	














or	 finally,	 they	 are	 treated	 more	 leniently	 in	 comparison	 with	 other	 cartel	
members	that	are	not	NCs.	
	









to	 make	 an	 example	 of	 the	 NC	 to	 help	 deter	 other	 undertakings	 from	
committing	competition	law	breaches.	Indeed,	because	the	undertaking	is	likely	
to	be	 larger	and	more	 important	within	the	product	market,	making	a	specific	
example	 of	 them	 may	 reduce	 the	 risks	 of	 other	 undertakings	 committing	





fining	 them	could	be	detrimental	 for	 the	product	market	and	may	have	other	
social	and	economic	implications,	such	as	an	effect	on	employment.		
	




Of	 the	 forty-three	 cartels	 reported,	 twenty-five	of	 these	 involved	at	 least	one	
NC.	 In	 many	 of	 the	 cartels,	 one	 of	 the	 NCs	 received	 complete	 immunity.201	




one	 receiving	 complete	 immunity.	 In	 the	 ‘Bitumen	Spain’	 cartel,203	there	were	
five	undertakings	 involved,	with	 four	of	 them	being	NCs.	One	of	 the	NCs	was	










‘Methacrylates’	 cartel	 contained	 two	 NCs; 204 	one	 was	 granted	 complete	
leniency	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 other	 received	 a	 substantially	 lower	
percentage	 fine	 than	 the	 other	 nearest	 cartel	 participant’s	 lowest	 percentage	
cartel	fine	(0.15	to	1.08	percent).205		
	
There	were	many	other	 instances	of	 lower	percentage	fines	being	 imposed	on	
NCs	 than	 non-NCs.	 However,	 there	 were	 two	 cartels	 where	 the	 Commission	
fined	NCs	more	harshly	than	non-NCs.	The	first	of	these	was	the	‘Gas	Insulated	
Switchgear’	 cartel.206	This	 cartel	 had	 five	 NCs;	 one	 of	 which	 gained	 complete	
immunity,	and	another	which	was	given	the	joint	 lowest	percentage	fine	(with	
another	 non-NC).	 The	 other	 three	 NCs	 were	 attributed	 some	 of	 the	 highest	
percentage	 fines	 in	 this	 cartel.	 The	 second	 cartel	 –	which	 bucks	 the	 trend	 of	
lower	 fines	 being	 given	 to	 NCs	 –	was	 the	 ‘Power	 Transformers’	 cartel.207	This	
cartel	had	 three	NCs;	 again,	one	of	 the	NCs	was	awarded	 complete	 immunity	
with	the	other	two	receiving	the	highest	fines	within	the	cartel.				
	
What	 the	 empirical	 data	 appears	 to	 show	 is	 that	 the	 Commission,	 in	 many	
instances,	 offers	 favourable	 treatment	 to	 an	NC	over	 that	 of	 a	 non-NC	 in	 the	
same	cartel.	This	would	appear	to	be	unequal	treatment	as	the	undertakings	in	
question	 are	 in	 the	 same	 position,	 apart	 from	 one	 being	 classified	 as	 an	 NC.	
Indeed,	 as	 is	 evident	 from	 some	 of	 the	 cases	 above,	 the	 discrepancy	 of	 fines	
between	NCs	and	non-NCs	 in	some	instances	 is	 far	 from	negligible,	with	some	
having	 around	 a	 four	 percent	 difference.	 However,	 one	may	 wish	 to	 suggest	












of	 reasons	 which	 shall	 now	 be	 explained.	 Firstly,	 the	 cap	 on	 the	 fine	 is	 ten	
percent	of	 the	worldwide	annual	 turnover	of	 the	undertaking	 in	question,	not	
the	affected	product	market.	Therefore,	the	fine	can	be	significantly	higher	than	
of	 just	 including	 the	 affected	 market.	 Secondly,	 the	 Commission’s	 Fining	
Guidelines	specifically	attempt	to	address	this	problem	via	the	sixth	stage	where	
an	 undertaking,	 which	 is	 considered	 to	 have	 a	 significantly	 large	 turnover	













unequal	 treatment	 –	 to	 a	 select	 group	 of	 undertakings;	 namely,	 NCs.	 On	 the	
face	 of	 it,	 the	 Commission	 could	 also	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 applying	 a	 universal	
protectionist	policy	to	all	NCs,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	NCs	within	the	EU	
or	outside	of	it.	One	would,	however,	question	the	motives	of	the	Commission	












has	 a	 wide-ranging	 discretion	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 application	 of	 its	 fining	
policy	to	undertakings.	However,	the	empirical	data	clearly	shows	that	–	in	the	
twenty-five	 cartels	 that	 involved	NCs	 –	 only	 two	of	 these	 resulted	 in	 the	NCs	
receiving	 the	 highest	 percentage	 fines	 in	 the	 cartel.	 This	 would	 appear	 to	
suggest	unequal	treatment	in	the	application	of	the	Commission’s	fining	process	






concerns	 with	 regards	 to	 three	 factors	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 process.	
Firstly,	 ITP	discounts	were	analysed	and	we	 see	 that	because	of	 the	 secretive	
nature	of	 the	way	 they	are	awarded	 it	 is	difficult	 to	determine	whether	equal	
treatment	is	occurring.	However,	from	an	‘outsider’s	view’,	 it	appears	that	the	
calculations	 are	 not	 necessarily	 applied	 equally,211	and	because	 of	 the	 flexible	
and	 wide-ranging	 reductions	 in	 fines,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	 they	 are	 being	
applied	 unequally.	 Secondly,	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 undertakings	 and	 the	
percentage	of	fine	they	received	were	assessed.	We	see	that	the	empirical	data	
shows	that	 the	Commission’s	policy	seems	to	be	being	applied	 fairly	and	non-
discriminatory	with	 regards	 to	 an	 undertaking’s	 nationality.	 Thirdly,	NCs	were	
discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 percentage	 fine	 they	 received	 compared	 to	 non-
NCs.	What	the	data	shows	in	most	instances	is	that	an	NC	receives	a	lower	fine	
than	a	non-NC	in	the	same	cartel.	Therefore,	in	this	instance,	there	appears	to	
be	 unequal	 treatment	 afoot.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	
transparency	 within	 Commission	 decisions	 would	 be	 beneficial	 to	 prevent	
unequal	treatment.	It	is	believed	that	by	being	more	transparent,	it	would	help	
prevent	 unequal	 treatment	 or	 the	 perception	 of	 it	 as	 it	 would	 be	 easier	 to	




tool	 for	 preventing	 unequal	 treatment.	 	 As	 was	 noted	 above	 in	 the	
Commission’s	differential	treatment	of	Ziegler	to	Interdean	in	the	application	of	
the	ITP	discount,	 it	seems	hard	to	justify	this	differential	treatment	of	the	two	








equally	 to	 undertakings.	 This	 chapter	 analysed	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure	to	ensure	that	it	complies	with	the	requirements	of	legal	certainty.	It	
achieved	 this	 by	 assessing	 the	 potential	 legal	 certainty	 concerns	 within	 the	
Commission’s	 fining	process	 in	relation	to	three	areas.	 It	was	shown	that	non-
exhaustive	 lists	 comply	with	Article	 7	 ECHR	 as	 does	 the	 Commission	 having	 a	
stage	 within	 the	 fining	 process	 which	 allows	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	
specifically	 for	deterrence	purposes.	 	What	was	 found	 from	the	application	of	
the	relevant	ECtHR	and	EU	case	 law	was	that	by	the	Commission	having	a	ten	
percent	cap	imposed	on	them	–	and	the	fact	that	they	produce	a	set	of	Fining	
Guidelines	 –	 that	 the	 process	 meets	 the	 required	 legal	 standard	 of	 certainty	
under	Article	7	ECHR.	What	was	also	noted	 in	 this	 section	of	analysis	was	 the	
amount	 of	 discretion	 the	 Commission	 has	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 fining	
process.	The	benefits	of	this	discretion	were	considered	alongside	the	potential	
advantages	of	 further	 limiting	 this	discretion	 through	guidance.	As	was	 stated	
above,	 it	was	felt	that	the	Commission’s	 fining	process	complies	with	Article	7	
ECHR.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 was	 also	 proposed	 that	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	
provide	further	guidance	–	and	limit	its	discretion	further	through	this	guidance	
–	this	would	be	more	beneficial	for	certainty	in	its	fining	procedure	and	produce	
much	needed	guidance.	 Indeed,	examples	of	 factors	 considered	 for	mitigating	
and	aggravating	circumstances,	and	increases	and	decreases	in	the	fines	can	be	
provided	for	within	the	Commission’s	Guidelines.	Additionally,	further	guidance	









for	 certain	 how	 the	 Commission	 is	 applying	 this	 policy.	 It	 was	 noted	 that	 it	
seemed	 likely	 –	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 and	 such	 wide-ranging	




lower	percentage	 fine	 than	 that	 of	 non-NCs	 in	 the	 same	 cartel.	 This	 indicates	
that	the	Commission	may	be	applying	its	fining	policy	preferentially	to	NCs.	The	




application	 of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 –	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 anyone	 outside	 the	
Commission	to	ascertain	how	the	policy	is	actually	being	applied.	Owing	to	this,	
the	chapter	 identified	 that	more	 transparency	and	clarity	 in	 the	Commission’s	






fairly.	 Currently,	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 policy	 appears	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
necessary	 legal	 requirements	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 It	 is,	 however,	 difficult	 to	
ascertain	 whether	 the	 fining	 procedure	 is	 being	 applied	 equally	 and	 fairly.	
Nevertheless,	it	does	appear	in	some	instances	that	the	fining	policy	is	not	being	
applied	 equally	 and	 fairly.	 The	 difficulty	 here	 is	 balancing	 certainty	 and	
transparency	within	the	Commission’s	Fining	Guidelines	and	its	application,	on	
the	 one	 hand,	 with	 effective	 deterrence	 and	 enforcement	 (which	 requires	 a	
degree	of	uncertainty)	on	the	other.	Certainty	for	undertakings	could	be	further	
improved	 by	 providing	 more	 detailed	 guidance,	 examples,	 and	 limiting	 the	






















the	 Commission	 to	 detect	 and	 penetrate	 secretive	 cartels.	 As	 we	 noted	 in	
Chapter	 2	 there	 are	 other	 options	 for	 detecting	 cartels,	 such	 as,	 market	
































other	 competition	 authorities	 it	 has	 applied	 to,10	and	 finally	 other	 evidence	
related	 to	 the	 alleged	 cartel.11	There	 are	 also	 additional	 requirements	 placed	
upon	an	undertaking	that	they	must	comply	with	for	a	reduction	in	fine.12	
	
In	 recent	 years	 there	 has	 been	 a	 line	 of	 cases	 developed	 through	 various	 EU	
Member	 States’	 national	 courts	 where	 private	 parties	 who	 are	 suing	 for	
damages	 against	 a	 cartel	 have	 sought	 access	 to	 the	 leniency	 documentation	
held	by	 the	Commission	 and	national	 competition	 authorities	 (NCAs)	 to	 assist	
with	their	damage	claim.13	This	documentation	can	assist	third	parties,	to	help	
demonstrate	 that	 the	cartel	existed	and	also	aid	 in	 the	calculation	of	 financial	
harm	and	 loss	caused	to	them	by	the	cartel.	However,	 if	 these	documents	are	
disclosed,	 it	may	discourage	undertakings	from	reporting	the	cartel	 in	the	first	



















the	one	hand,	and	 the	enforcement	of	private	competition	 law,	on	 the	other.	
Access	 to	 leniency	 documents	 is	 important	 for	 third	 party	 claimants	 trying	 to	
sue	for	damages	but	unlimited	disclosure	of	these	confidential	documents	may	
deter	 and	 scare	 undertakings	 from	 applying	 for	 leniency	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	
which	is	central	for	detecting	cartels.	A	recent	development	within	this	debate	
has	 been	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Damages	 Directive.14	Contained	 within	 the	
Directive	–	under	Article	6(6)(a)	–	it	 is	stipulated	that	leniency	documents	may	
not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 in	 any	 circumstances.15	This	 technically	 now	
means	that	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	cannot	happen	in	future	once	all	
Member	 States	 have	 implemented	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 Directive. 16		
However,	this	sits	in	complete	contradiction	to	what	the	European	courts	have	
repeatedly	 stated	 and	 held	 in	 its	 decisions.	 Therefore,	 given	 the	 European	
court’s	 views	 regarding	 the	 need	 for	 a	 case-by-case	 balancing	 act	 when	
disclosure	of	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	is	mooted,17	and	the	Damages	
Directive,18	taking	 the	 diametrically	 opposing	 view;	 this	 chapter	 takes	 the	
unique	opportunity	to	consider	(a)	whether	the	blanket	ban	is	necessary	(from	
the	prospective	of	 the	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	 rights)	and;	 (b)	whether	
the	 Directive	 has	 struck	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	 protection	 of	 a	 third	
parties	rights	and	the	undertakings	rights,	and	whether	there	may	be	a	better	
balance	 to	 be	 had.	 In	 answering	 (a)	 the	 chapter	 considers	 potential	 rights	
challenges	 that	 an	 undertaking	 could	 seek	 to	 make	 if	 confidential	 leniency	















disclosure.	 Here	 the	 legislation,	 guidelines	 and	 assurances	 given	 by	 the	
Commission	against	disclosure	are	examined	to	identify	if	a	potential	claim	of	a	
breach	 of	 this	 principle	 can	 be	 made.	 Second	 (ii)	 an	 undertaking’s	 right	 to	
privacy	under	Article	8	of	the	ECHR	is	explored.	Third,	(iii)	the	unique	possibility	
of	 whether	 there	 could	 be	 a	 breach	 of	 an	 undertakings	 confidence	 is	





Most	 of	 the	 literature	 that	 has	 considered	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
programme	 focuses	 on	 determining	 its	 ‘optimal’	 design	 and	 structure.19	That	
said,	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 human	 rights	 concerns	 within	 the	 leniency	
programme	(in	relation	to	Article	6	of	the	ECHR)	have	been	considered.20	There	
is	 also	 significant	 literature	 discussing	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 leniency	
documents,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 decision	 in	 Pfleiderer	 and	 the	



























the	Commission’s	 leniency	documentation	 is	disclosed.	Therefore,	 the	analysis	




in	the	context	of	 inspections;	particularly,	he	has	 looked	at	 inspections	carried	
out	on	‘business	premises’	and	‘non-business	premises’.23	However,	he	has	not	
considered	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 ECHR	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	




As	 to	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 superior	 way	 to	 manage	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents	–	prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	Damages	Directive	–	consideration	
has	 been	 had.	 Comparisons	 have	 been	 conducted	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 US	




























–	 to	solve	 the	problem.26	Whereas,	Petit	has	suggested	 four	alternate	ways	of	
managing	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 information.27	This	 literature	 shall	 be	
considered	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 section	 5	 of	 the	 chapter.	 Because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	
analysis	of	these	issues	this	chapter	has	the	unique	opportunity	to	discuss	and	
























this	 case	 that	 private	 damage	 actions	 help	 maintain	 ‘effective	 competition	
within	the	Community’	and,	thus	they	have	an	important	role	to	play	alongside	
the	 public	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law.29	This	 principle	 (of	 the	 right	 to	
damages	 for	 harm	 suffered	 by	 a	 cartel)	 has	 subsequently	 been	 confirmed	 in	
latter	 decisions	 by	 the	 court.30	Indeed,	 the	 court	 noted	 in	 the	 Manfredi	
judgment	 that	 it	 is	 the	 duty	 of	 a	 Member	 State	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 an	
effective	 regime	 of	 private	 damage	 claims	 in	 cases	 of	 competition	 law	
infringements.31	
	
Whilst	 these	cases	set	out	 the	general	principle	 that	an	 individual	who	suffers	
harm	because	of	the	actions	of	a	cartel	has	a	right	to	damages	from	the	cartel,	it	
was	not	until	the	Pfleiderer	case	that	we	saw	a	significant	development	of	the	
law	 to	 potentially	 facilitate	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents	 for	 third	 parties	
bringing	follow-on	damage	claims.32	The	Pfleiderer	case	arose	in	Germany	from	








sought	 full	 access	 to	 the	 leniency	 documents	 from	 the	 Bundeskartellamt	 of	 a	
2008	 cartel	 decision	 on	 three	manufactures	 of	 decor	 paper.	 Pfleiderer	 was	 a	
customer	of	the	undertakings	that	had	formed	a	cartel	and	was	seeking	to	bring	




to	 the	 reference,	 the	 ECJ	held	 that	 EU	 law	did	not	 prohibit	 third	parties	 from	
accessing	leniency	documents	when	they	are	seeking	damages,	and	that	it	is	up	
to	 national	 courts	 to	 decide	 whether	 access	 should	 be	 granted	 according	 to	
their	 national	 law.33	The	 ECJ	 specified	 that	 access	must	 be	 decided	 upon	 by	
weighing	 up	 the	 interests	 in	 favour	 and	 against	 disclosing	 the	 documents	 in	
each	 given	 instance	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.	 The	 ECJ	 did	 however	 also	
acknowledge	 in	 response	 to	 the	Article	 267	 reference	 that	 granting	 access	 to	
leniency	documents	could	be	harmful	to	leniency	programmes,	but	that	this	in	
itself	could	not	prevent	an	individual’s	rights	to	bring	a	claim	for	damages.	Thus,	




performed	 a	 balancing	 act	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents.34	
The	 High	 Court	 held	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 disclose	 selective	 parts	 of	 the	
leniency	 documents,	 as	 certain	 parts	 of	 the	 documents	 were	 relevant	 to	 the	
claimant’s	 case.	 As	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 documents	 were	 considered	 not	 to	 be	
relevant	 to	 the	 claimant’s	 case	 the	 High	 Court	 would	 not	 disclose	 them.	 To	
perform	this	balancing	act,	 the	court	used	the	principle	of	proportionality	and	








a	 blanket	 restriction	 on	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents	would	 not	 be	 fair,	 but	
equally	complete	disclosure	of	documents	in	each	and	every	case	would	not	be	
appropriate.	 Thus,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 High	 Court	 went	 through	 the	 leniency	
documentation,	 paragraph-by-paragraph,	 and	 decided	 what	 the	 relevant	 and	






developed.	 In	 the	Hydrogene	 Peroxide	 case	 it	 was	 held	 that	 the	 Commission	
may	 also	 have	 to	 disclose	 leniency	 documents, 36 	and	 that	 leniency	 and	





law	proceedings	was	 not	 compatible	with	 EU	 law.38	The	Court	 confirmed	 that	
when	 deciding	 whether	 to	 disclose	 leniency	 documents	 or	 not	 the	 national	
courts	were	 required	 to	weigh	 up	 the	 interests	 in	 favour	 of	 disclosure	 of	 the	
information	 and	 in	 support	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 that	 information.39	The	 Court	
stated	 that	 the	 weighing-up	 is	 necessary	 as	 any	 rule	 that	 completely	 bans	
disclosure	 is	 liable	 to	 undermine	 the	 effective	 application	 of	Article	 101	 TFEU	
and	the	rights	that	this	confers	to	individuals.	Similarly,	in	the	Kone	case	it	was	













precludes	 the	 legislation	 enacted	 by	 a	 Member	 State	 which	 categorically	
excludes,	any	civil	liability	of	undertakings	belonging	to	a	cartel	for	loss	resulting	
from	the	fact	that	an	undertaking	not	party	to	the	cartel,	having	regard	to	the	
practices	 of	 the	 cartel,	 set	 its	 prices	 higher	 than	would	 otherwise	 have	 been	
expected	under	competitive	conditions.40	
	
Now	we	 have	 considered	 the	 developed	 case	 law	 on	 disclosure,	 the	 benefits	
and	 potential	 issues	 with	 this	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 needs	
examining.		
	
By	a	 third	party	being	granted	access	 to	confidential	 leniency	documents,	 it	 is	
likely	to	make	it	easier	for	them	to	bring	follow-on	damage	actions,	as	they	will	
have	access	 to	 information	 they	would	be	unlikely	 to	obtain	any	other	way.41	
For	 example,	 they	may	 gain	 access	 to	 detailed	 information	 on	 the	 cartel,	 the	
markets	affected	by	the	cartel,	the	artificial	price	rise	caused	by	the	cartel	and	
the	 crucial	 documents	 pertaining	 to	 the	 cartel’s	 activity.	 This	will	 help	 enable	
the	claimant	 to	prove	 the	existence	and	harm	caused	by	 the	cartel.	Thus,	 this	
can	be	seen	as	being	beneficial	and	fairer	for	claimants,	because	it	enables	them	
financial	retribution	for	the	harm	that	the	cartel	caused	them.	In	addition,	it	 is	
likely	 to	 save	claimants	money,	as	once	 they	gain	access	 to	 the	 information	 it	
should	make	their	case	easier	to	prove,	thus	resulting	 in	 lower	 litigation	costs.	
Finally,	 it	 is	 possible	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 greater	 deterrent	 effect	 on	 cartelists	














access	 to	 leniency	documents	 it	 causes	high	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 for	 leniency	
applicants,	as	they	may	find	that	confidential	documents	they	have	submitted	–	
to	gain	 leniency	–	are	given	 to	 third	parties.	The	uncertainty	here	 stems	 from	
the	fact	that	the	decision	on	whether	to	grant	access	or	not	to	these	documents	
is	made	by	a	court	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	Therefore,	a	leniency	applicant	can	
never	 be	 certain	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 documentation	 they	 provide	 will	 be	
disclosed	 to	 a	 third	 party	 at	 a	 later	 date.	 This	 could	 effect	 the	 reporting,	 and	
thus	detection,	of	cartels	as	undertakings	may	not	be	willing	to	come	forward	to	
report	a	cartel,	which	could	be	damaging	for	the	EU	cartel	enforcement	regime	
as	 a	 whole.	 This	 knock-on-effect	 could	 occur,	 because	 there	 would	 be	 a	
substantial	 reduction	 in	 the	 benefit	 of	 being	 the	 first	 undertaking	 to	 come	
forward	 to	 report	 the	 cartel	 and	 gain	 the	 immunity	 prize;	 as,	 although	 the	
undertaking	 may	 be	 immune	 from	 damages	 from	 the	 competition	 authority,	




This	problem	 is	 further	exacerbated	by	 the	 fact	 that	an	undertaking	 that	does	
not	apply	for	 immunity	or	provide	documents	would	be	harder	for	the	private	
claimant	 to	 sue	 than	 the	 undertaking	 that	 has	 provided	 the	 documents.	
Therefore,	we	see	a	strange	situation	occur	that	means,	although	the	reporting	
undertaking	 is	 in	 a	 better	 position	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation,	 it	 is	 in	 a	 significantly	 disadvantaged	 position	 in	 relation	 to	
potential	follow-on	private	damage	claims	–	when	compared	with	undertakings	




potential	 fines	 are	 so	 high	 undertakings	would	 still	 apply	 for	 leniency,	 as	 the	
possible	 damage	 suits	 would	 be	 counteracted	 by	 the	 reduction	 in	 fine	 they	
	190	
would	 receive	 for	 a	 leniency	 application.	 Yet	 this	 argument	 assumes	 that	 the	
threat	 that	 the	 cartel	 would	 have	 been	 uncovered	 and	 detected	 without	
leniency	 is	 sufficient	 to	 encourage	 an	 undertaking	 to	 report	 the	 cartel	 even	
though	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 of	 significant	 damages	 claims.	 As	 we	 noted	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 chapter	 it	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 case	 as	 the	 probability	 of	
detection	outside	of	the	 leniency	programme	is	notably	 low.	Nonetheless,	this	
argument	can	be	refuted	as	many	cartels	cross	numerous	legal	jurisdictions	and	




The	 final	 issue	considered	with	granting	access	 to	 leniency	documents	 is	 that,	
because	 this	 decision	 is	 done	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 a	
patchwork	 approach	 developing	 across	 the	 EU,	 where	 some	 Member	 State	
courts	are	more	willing	to	grant	access	to	documents	than	others.	The	European	
Competition	Network	(ECN)	are	aware	of	this	potential	problem	and	the	other	
concerns	 that	 the	 decision	 in	 Pfleiderer	 has	 raised,	 and	 as	 such	 provided	
guidance	on	 this	matter	 through	a	Resolution,43	to	explain	 the	position	of	 the	
ECN	competition	authorities	on	this	matter.	
	
What	we	can	 identify	 from	the	aforementioned	discussion	–	of	 the	cases,	and	
the	benefits	and	detriments	of	disclosing	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	–	
is	 that	 a	 balancing	 act	 needs	 to	 be	 performed	 between	 private	 and	 public	
enforcement.	Whilst	public	enforcement	of	competition	 law	 is	of	 fundamental	
importance,	it	is	also	imperative	that	individuals	who	have	suffered	harm	from	a	
cartel	 can	 bring	 effective	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 to	 readdress	 this	 harm.	
However,	 private	 enforcement	 must	 not	 occur	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 public	








must	also	not	be	discouraged	because	of	 the	key	 role	 it	plays	 in	 readdressing	
harm	suffered	to	victims.	
	
To	 address	 the	 identified	 concerns	with	 the	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	




The	aim	of	the	Directive	 is	 to	 ‘remove	practical	obstacles	to	compensation	for	
all	victims	of	infringements	of	EU	antitrust	law	and	to	optimise	the	relationship	
between	 private	 enforcement	 of	 EU	 antitrust	 rules	 through	 damages	 actions	
and	 public	 enforcement	 by	 the	 Commission	 and	 NCAs.’47	The	 Directive	 fell	
squarely	on	the	side	of	protecting	the	public	enforcement	of	competition	 law,	
because	of	the	view	that	the	leniency	programme	was	crucial	to	the	success	of	
public	 enforcement.	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 Directive	 sets	 out	 the	 requirements	
regarding	 the	 disclosure	 of	 evidence.48	However,	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 Directive	
discusses	the	limits	on	the	disclosure	of	evidence	from	the	file	of	a	competition	




As	we	can	see,	 this	 is	 the	diametrically	opposing	view	to	the	position	that	 the	

















have	 repeatedly	 advocated	 for	 a	 balancing	 act	 to	 be	 performed	 in	 each	 case,	
stating	 that	 a	 blanket	 ban	 would	 breach	 EU	 law.51	This	 itself	 leads	 to	 an	
interesting	 question,	 because	 the	 Courts	 have	 been	 interpreting	 the	 TFEU	




it	 is	possible	the	courts	may	hold	that	the	Damages	Directive	 is	usurped	by	 its	
own	interpretation	of	the	TFEU.	However,	examination	of	this	interesting	point	
is	outside	the	scope	of	this	chapter	and	therefore	the	potential	 implications	of	
this	 cannot	 be	 examined.	 Thus,	 this	 chapter	 will	 now	 assess	 if	 the	 Damages	














A	 legitimate	 expectation	 is	 where	 a	 constraint	 is	 placed	 on	 a	 public	 body	 –	
particularly	 when	 changing	 policies	 –	 by	 a	 legal	 duty	 to	 be	 fair.52	This	 can	
therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 natural	 justice.53	Legitimate	
expectations	 ‘is	 one	of	 the	most	 oft-invoked	 general	 principles	 of	 Community	
law’.54	However,	 a	 legitimate	 expectation	 may	 only	 be	 invoked	 when	 the	
Commission	or	Community	creates	a	 situation	which	gives	 rise	 to	a	 legitimate	
expectation.55	This	 expectation	 can	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 conduct	
itself,56	or	legislation.57	Thus,	the	first	thing	that	we	need	to	establish	is	whether	
a	 legitimate	expectation	has	 arisen.	 To	achieve	 this,	we	need	 to	 identify	 if	 an	






‘The	 Commission	 is	 aware	 that	 this	 notice	 will	 create	













What	we	can	 identify	 immediately	from	considering	paragraph	(38)	 is	that	the	
Commission	 is	 acknowledging	 that	 its	 Leniency	 Notice	 creates	 a	 legitimate	
expectation	 that	 undertakings	may	 rely	 on.	 Yet,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Notice	
provides	no	information	as	to	what	this	legitimate	expectation	or	expectations	
may	be.	Presumably	one	of	these	expectations	would	be	a	reduction	in	fine	or	
complete	 immunity	 where	 the	 undertaking	 cooperates	 and	 provides	 the	
Commission	 with	 all	 the	 necessary	 information	 on	 the	 cartel	 as	 that	 is	 the	
premise	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice.	 But,	 can	 we	 also	 validly	 claim	 that	 an	





private	where	possible	 because	of	 the	nature	of	 the	 information.59	Therefore,	
perhaps	an	undertaking	would	have	a	legitimate	right	to	believe	and	expect	that	
the	 Commission	 would	 not	 disclose	 these	 documents	 to	 third	 parties.	 Let	 us	
now	consider	the	Leniency	Notice	itself	again	to	delve	deeper	into	the	possible	
foundation	 of	 this	 potential	 belief	 and	 expectation.	We	 can	 see	 at	 paragraph	
(40)	that:60	
	
‘The	 Commission	 considers	 that	 normally	 public	
disclosure	 of	 documents	 and	 written	 or	 recorded	
statements	received	in	the	context	of	this	notice	would	
undermine	 certain	 public	 or	 private	 interest,	 for	
example	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 inspections	










‘Access	 to	 corporate	 statements	 is	 only	 granted	 to	 the	
addresses	of	a	statement	of	objections	[…]	other	parties	such	




only	 be	 transmitted	 to	 the	 competition	 authorities	 of	 the	
Member	 States	 […]	 provided	 that	 the	 level	 of	 protection	
against	 disclosure	 awarded	 by	 the	 receiving	 competition	
authority	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 one	 conferred	 by	 the	
Commission.’62	
	
What	we	 recognise	 from	 examining	 these	 paragraphs	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	
quite	 clearly	 give,	 or	 at	 the	 very	 least	 provide	 the	 impression	 that,	 it	will	 not	
disclose	 these	 documents	 to	 other	 parties.	 Indeed,	 reading	 the	 discussed	
paragraphs	 seems	 to	 highlight	 the	 Commission’s	 concern	 of	 disclosing	 any	
confidential	business	information.63	The	Commission	even	goes	so	far	as	to	note	
how	 the	 leniency	documents	will	 only	be	 shared	with	 competition	authorities	
that	 have	 at	 least	 the	 same	 level	 of	 protection	 against	 disclosure	 as	 the	
Commission	 themselves. 64 	Therefore,	 one	 can	 justifiably	 assume	 that	 the	
Commission	 values	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 non-disclosure	 of	 these	 documents.	
From	 examining	 the	 assurances	 given	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 Leniency	
Notice,	 it	 seems	 logical	 that	 an	 undertaking	 would	 reasonably	 believe,	 and	
therefore	 legitimately	 expect,	 that	 documents	 and	 information	 provided	 in	 a	
leniency	application	would	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	to	help	facilitate	the	










There	 are	 two	 crucial	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 here,	 Article	 339	 of	 the	 TFEU	 and	
Articles	27	and	28	of	Council	Regulation	No	1/2003/EC.65	Article	339	of	the	TFEU	
provides	 against	 disclosure	 of	 information	 by	 the	 members	 of	 the	 EU	
institutions,	committees	and	officials,	even	after	their	duties	have	ceased.	With	
particular	 protection	 being	 afforded	 here	 to	 the	 ‘information	 about	
undertakings,	their	business	relations	[and]	their	cost	components’.66	Article	27	
of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 –	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 hearing	 of	 the	 parties,	
complainants	and	others	–	states	that:67	
	
‘2.	 […]	 They	 [other	 undertakings]	 shall	 be	 entitled	 to	 have	
access	 to	 the	 Commission's	 file,	 subject	 to	 the	 legitimate	
interest	 of	 undertakings	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 business	
secrets.	 The	 right	 of	 access	 to	 the	 file	 shall	 not	 extend	 to	
confidential	 information	 and	 internal	 documents	 of	 the	





Article	 28	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003	 (which	 regards	 professional	 secrecy)	
advocates:68		
	
‘1.	 [...]	 Information	 collected	 […]	 shall	 be	 used	 only	 for	 the	
purpose	for	which	it	was	acquired.	







information	 foreseen	 in	 […]	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
competition	 authorities	 of	 the	Member	 States	 […]	 shall	 not	
disclose	 information	 acquired	 or	 exchanged	 by	 them	





by	 it	 to	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	when	we	 consider	 these	 aforementioned	
pieces	 of	 legislation	 one	 can	 clearly	 see	 that	 the	 TFEU	offers	 protection	 from	
disclosure	of	business	secrets	to	third	parties.	 Indeed,	even	Regulation	1/2003	
Article	 27	 provides	 for	 this	 protection,	 noting	 undertakings	 will	 have	 a	
legitimate	interest	in	this	information’s	protection.	Though	the	Regulation	does	
not	 expressly	mention	 an	 undertaking	 forming	 a	 legitimate	 expectation,	 as	 it	
refers	to	a	legitimate	interest,	one	could	reasonably	infer	–	in	this	context	–	that	
a	 legitimate	expectation	can	be	formed.	This	 is	because	the	undertaking	has	a	
legitimate	 interest	 in	 protecting	 its	 business	 secrets.	 Article	 28	 of	 Regulation	
1/2003	goes	further	than	this	though,	by	stating	that	the	information	will	only	
be	 used	 for	 the	 purposes	 it	 was	 collected	 for.	 If	 one	 considers	 why	 the	
Commission	collects	leniency	documentation,	we	can	identify	that	it	is	collected	
to	help	prove	the	existence	of	a	cartel	and	enable	the	Commission	to	prosecute	
that	 cartel. 69 	The	 Leniency	 Notice	 nowhere	 expressly	 mentions	 that	 the	
information	garnered	from	a	leniency	applicant	will	be	provided	to	third	parties	
for	 use	 in	 follow	 on	 damage	 actions.	 Indeed,	 nowhere	 in	 any	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 documentation	 does	 it	 state	 this.	 In	 fact	 it	 states	 that	 the	
information	will	be	protected	and	not	disclosed.	Indeed,	Article	28	of	Regulation	
1/2003	 expressly	 states	 again	 that	 it	 will	 protect	 the	 information	 covered	 by	







rely	 upon	 when	 the	 legislation	 requires	 a	 Community	 institute	 to	 take	 into	
account	 a	 specific,	 well-defined	 interest, 70 	known	 as	 a	 ‘specific	 interest’	
legitimate	 expectation. 71 	In	 this	 case	 the	 well-defined	 interest	 that	 the	
legislation	 clearly	 sets	 out	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 shall	 protect	 confidential	
business	 information	 from	 disclosure. 72 	Therefore,	 if	 the	 courts	 or	 the	





is	 a	 breach	 of	 this	 legitimate	 expectation.	 However,	 a	 breach	 can	 only	 be	
pleaded	 when	 the	 Commission	 has	 frustrated	 the	 legitimate	 expectation	 in	
question.73	The	case	where	the	Commission	discloses	an	undertaking’s	leniency	
application	 documentation	 (particularly	 the	 confidential	 information)	 to	 third	
parties	will	lead	to	the	legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	being	frustrated	





When	 one	 considers	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 we	 see	 that	 a	
balancing	problem	arises.	On	the	one	hand	we	have	the	public	enforcement	of	
competition	law	–	which	seeks	to	prevent	and	deter	cartels	–	and	on	the	other,	
we	 have	 the	 private	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law,	 which	 seeks	 to	 allow	
those	 harmed	 to	 recover	 losses	 for	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 a	 cartel.	 It	 is	 very	
difficult	to	know	which	side	a	court	would	come	down	on	in	this	matter;	as	it	is	








suffered,75	yet	 it	 is	also	 important	to	ensure	that	undertakings	are	encouraged	
to	provide	 leniency	 information	 so	 that	 the	Commission	 can	detect	 and	deter	
cartels.76	The	question	is	which	would	and	should	be	prioritised?	
	




when	 they	 are	 caught.	 This	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 question	 to	 answer	 but	 when	 we	
consider	 the	 legislation,	 Leniency	 Notice	 and	 the	 cases	 –	 that	 have	 come	
through	the	courts	so	far	–	it	seems	that	the	EU	Court’s	support	a	balancing	of	
these	 two	 approaches	 and	 would	 only	 advocate	 for	 the	 provision	 of	
documentation	 when	 it	 is	 necessary. 77 	This	 means	 that	 although	 an	
undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 may	 be	 breached	 by	 the	 Commission	
disclosing	documents	–	there	is	potentially	a	public	interest	which	may	override	
this	 depending	 on	 how	 a	 court	 balances	 and	 priorities	 public	 and	 private	







This	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 has	 asked	 whether	 an	 undertaking	 can	 have	 a	
legitimate	 expectation	 of	 non-disclosure	 of	 the	 information	 it	 provides	 to	 the	
Commission	in	exchange	for	immunity.	From	the	consideration	of	the	Leniency	
Notice,	 TFEU	 and	 Regulation	 1/2003	 we	 can	 see	 that	 it	 is	 reasonable	 for	 an	







disclose	 its	 confidential	 leniency	 information.	 This	 therefore	 means	 that	 the	
Commission	 in	 disclosing	 this	 information	 to	 third	 parties	 is	 breaching	 this	
legitimate	expectation.	However,	what	is	harder	to	know	is	how	a	court	would	
deal	with	 a	 case	where	 it	was	 claimed	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 frustration	 of	 a	
legitimate	 expectation	 by	 the	 Commission,	 because	 of	 the	 potential	 public	
interest	defence	that	can	override	the	frustration	of	a	legitimate	interest.	What	
one	can	say	though,	is	that	the	Commission	wishes	to	protect	this	 information	






This	 section	 moves	 on	 to	 consider	 the	 second	 potential	 procedural	 rights	




Article	 8	 is	 a	 ‘qualified	 right’;	 therefore,	 it	 is	 important	we	 establish	 how	 the	
disclosure	of	confidential	Commission	leniency	documents	to	third	parties	could	
engage	this	right.	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	(ECtHR)	has	developed	
what	 is	known	as	 the	 ‘standard	approach’	 for	dealing	with	cases	 that	assert	a	
breach	of	Articles	8	–	11	of	the	Convention.79	This	process	involves	five	stages,	











‘1.	 Everyone	has	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	his	private	and	 family	
life,	his	home	and	his	correspondence’.	
	








thus,	 this	 content	 could	 potentially	 fall	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 materials	
protected	 by	 Article	 8	 if	 it	 were	 to	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties.	 The	 ECtHR	
interprets	Article	8	widely.80	Indeed,	we	see	that	the	Court	has	held	that	Article	
8	includes	protection	for,	legal	persons,81	business	premises	and,82	a	company’s	
registered	 office,	 branch	 or	 other	 premises.83	We	 can	 also	 identify	 that	 the	
Court	has	 interpreted	‘private	and	family	 life’	widely.	For	example,	 it	has	been	
held	 that	 there	 is	 a	 positive	 obligation	 on	 the	 State	 to	 provide	 information	
concerning	the	fate	of	a	newborn	baby	that	was	taken	into	hospital	care	and,84	
public	information	which	is	systematically	collected	and	stored	in	files	–	held	by	
the	 public	 bodies	 of	 the	 State	 –	 also	 falls	 within	 the	 ambit	 of	 Article	 8.85	




The	 second	 stage	 requires	 that	 there	 was	 an	 “interference”	 with	 the	 right.87	
‘Any	 “formality”,	 “condition”,	 “restriction”	 or	 “penalty”	 constitutes	 an	
interference.’88 	When	 we	 consider	 an	 undertaking	 giving	 the	 Commission	
confidential	 information	 we	 find	 that	 under	 the	 Commission’s	 Leniency	
Notice,89 	an	 undertaking	 must	 meet	 a	 variety	 of	 requirements,	 including	

















relating	 to	 the	 alleged	 cartel.91	Therefore,	 it	 is	 probable	 that	 this	would	meet	
the	low	threshold	requirements	for	an	“interference”	with	this	right.	
The	third	stage	in	the	standard	approach	requires	identification	of	whether	the	
“interference”	 was	 based	 on	 –	 authorised	 or	 prescribed	 by	 –	 “law”.	 This	 in	
essence	requires	that	there	is	a	specific	legal	rule	or	regime	that	authorises	the	
interfering	act	that	is	sought	to	be	justified.92	Since	the	decision	in	Pfleiderer,93	
where	the	ECJ	stated	that	access	 to	 leniency	documents	by	 third	parties	must	
be	decided	upon	by	weighing	up	the	 interests	 in	 favour	and	against	disclosing	
the	 confidential	 documents	 in	 each	 given	 case	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 there	
has	 been	 the	 legal	 potential	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 documents	 to	 be	
disclosed	to	third	parties.94	We	have	also	seen	further	cases	since	the	Pfleiderer	
judgment	that	have	illustrated	how	the	balancing	act	for	disclosure	versus	non-
disclosure	 can	 be	 conducted. 95 	Because	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 is	
authorised	 and	 has	 been	 prescribed	 by	 the	 EU	 courts	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	
ECtHR	would	likely	see	this	interference	as	being	prescribed	by	law.	
	
The	 fourth	 stage	 requires	 the	 consideration	 of	 whether	 ‘the	 interference	
pursued	a	“legitimate	aim”?’	The	legitimate	aims	for	Article	8	ECHR	are	set	out	
in	 the	 second	 paragraph	 of	 Article	 8,	 and	 include:	 ‘national	 security,	 public	
safety,	 economic	 well-being	 of	 the	 country,	 prevention	 of	 disorder	 or	 crime,	
protection	 of	 health	 or	 morals,	 or	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 of	
others’.	 The	 ECtHR	 interprets	 these	 very	 widely.96	Therefore,	 helping	 ensure	
that	victims	of	a	cartel	can	recover	damages	from	the	perpetrators	should	fall	
under	 a	 legitimate	 aim	 of	 Article	 8,	 namely;	 the	 protection	 of	 rights	 and	
freedoms	of	others.	 Indeed,	when	we	consider	 that	 the	Commission	has	been	










this	 when	 making	 its	 determination	 of	 whether	 the	 interference	 pursued	 a	
legitimate	aim.	
The	 fifth	 stage	 within	 this	 approach	 is	 split	 into	 two	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 (a)	
requires	 that	 the	 interference	 was	 “necessary	 in	 a	 democratic	 society”	 to	
achieve	 the	 legitimate	 aim	 in	 question	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 and	
“proportionate”	 to	 that	aim,	 taking	 into	account	 the	 “margin	of	 appreciation”	
accorded	to	the	State	 in	question.	The	second	part	(b)	asks	whether	there	are	
appropriate	 and	 effective	 procedural	 guarantees	 against	 abuse?	 Part	 (b)	 will	
form	 part	 of	 the	 examination	 under	 the	 proportionately	 analysis.	 Let	 us	





‘The	 notion	 of	 necessity	 implies	 that	 an	 interference	 corresponds	 to	 a	
pressing	 social	 need	 and,	 in	 particular,	 that	 it	 is	 proportionate	 to	 the	
legitimate	aim’	
	
In	our	analysis	 the	argument	would	be	that	 there	 is	a	pressing	social	need	for	
the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 leniency	 documents	 so	 that	 third	 parties	 can	 bring	
effective	damages	claims.	As	we	established	early	 in	 the	chapter,	 it	 is	difficult	
for	 undertakings	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	 claims	 without	 access	 to	 this	
information,	because	proving	the	harm	suffered	and	identifying	the	‘cost’	of	this	










Next,	 consideration	 needs	 to	 be	 had	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 interference	 was	





our	 analysis	 we	 therefore	 have	 to	 assess	 and	 balance	 the	 protection	 of	
confidential	 leniency	 documents	 –	 and	 the	 right	 to	 an	 undertaking’s	 privacy,	
against	the	right	of	third	parties	to	receive	redress	and	restitution	(in	the	form	
of	damages)	 for	 the	harm	caused	by	 the	cartel.	We	can	see	 that	by	disclosing	
confidential	 documents	 this	 would	 involve	 an	 interference	 with	 Article	 8.	
However,	as	the	disclosure	involves	company	documents	and	information,	and	
not	an	individual’s	personal	data	the	Court	will	award	the	State	greater	latitude	
when	 assessing	 the	 interference.103	Therefore,	 it	 is	 possible	 the	 court	 would	
accept	that	the	interference	is	proportionate	here.	
		























pursue	 the	 legitimate	 aim.105	A	 good	 example	 of	 the	 application	 of	 this	 stage	
was	 in	the	Campbell	case.106	Here,	 it	was	held	that	a	blanket	measure	to	open	
all	 of	 the	 prisoners	mail	 was	 disproportionate.	 It	 was	 held	 that	 opening	 only	
those	 letters	 reasonably	 considered	 to	 contain	 contraband	 would	 be	
proportionate.	 Thus,	 if	we	apply	 this	 to	 the	 consideration	of	 the	disclosure	of	
leniency	 documents,	 we	 can	 identify	 that	 the	 approach	 currently	 used	 is	
proportionate	as	disclosure	 is	examined	on	a	case-by-case	basis	and	it	 is	not	a	




that	 the	 current	 approach	 is	 not	 proportionate	 as	 there	 is	 a	 less	 restrictive	
alternative	that	is	still	equally	effective	to	pursue	the	legitimate	aim.	
	
(iv)	 Finally,	 are	 there	 any	 effective	 safeguards	 or	 judicial	 controls	 over	 the	
measure?	This	stage	requires	a	consideration	of	the	legal	remedies	of	affected	
measures.107	In	the	case	of	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents	the	protection	 in	
place	 centers	 around	 the	 court	 as	 it	 is	 conducts	 the	 analysis	 itself	 and	has	 to	





(or	 in	 our	 case	 the	 Commission)	 has	 performed	 a	 balancing	 act	 between	 the	















As	 we	 can	 identify	 from	 the	 above	 analysis	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess	 what	 the	
ECtHR	would	decide	regarding	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	However,	
the	various	stages	have	been	examined	and	areas	where	problems	or	challenges	
may	 occur	 have	 been	 highlighted.	 This	 section	 of	 the	 Chapter	 has	 assessed	
whether	an	undertaking	could	bring	a	potential	challenge	under	Article	8	of	the	
ECHR	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 leniency	 documents.	 From	 considering	
the	 five	 stages	of	 the	standard	approach	we	have	 identified	 that	 it	 is	possible	
that	 the	ECtHR	would	hold	 that	 there	 is	no	breach	of	Article	8	when	 leniency	
documents	are	disclosed,	assuming	the	disclosure	is	achieved	proportionally	by	
a	 case-by-case	analysis.	However,	 there	 is	a	 less	 restrictive	way	 to	pursue	 the	
legitimate	 aim	of	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 conversely	 possible	
that	 the	 Court	 would	 require	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 to	 follow	 this	










The	 final	 potential	 procedural	 right	 challenge	 deliberated	 is	 the	 UK	wrong	 of	
breach	of	confidence.	Breach	of	confidence	is	an	equitable	doctrine	that	allows	
for	 an	 action	 when	 an	 individual’s	 confidence	 has	 been	 breached.	 A	 duty	 of	
confidence	occurs	where	confidential	information	comes	to	the	knowledge	of	a	
person	in	circumstances	where	it	would	be	unfair	if	it	were	then	to	be	disclosed	
to	others.	 This	 ‘commonly	arises	 in	 circumstances	where	 there	 is	or	has	been	
some	relationship	or	transaction	between	the	parties’.111		
	
For	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 to	 occur	 three	 key	 elements	 are	 required,	 which	
were	set	forth	in	the	seminal	case	of	Coco	v	AN	Clark	by	Magarry	J.112	First,	the	
information	must	have	the	necessary	element	of	confidence	about	it,	namely,	it	
must	not	be	 in	 the	public	domain.113	Second,	 the	 information	must	have	been	
imparted	in	circumstances	where	"an	obligation	of	confidence"	arises.114	Third,	




of	 the	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	 Commission	 leniency	 documents	 to	 third	
parties,	seeking	to	bring	a	damage	claim	against	the	undertaking	that	provided	
the	 leniency	 information	 to	 the	 Commission.	 To	 conduct	 this	 examination	we	
shall	 utilise	 a	 hypothetical	 scenario	 involving	 a	 company	 called	 Widgets	 PLC	
(hereafter,	 ‘Widgets’).	 Widgets	 are	 a	 member	 of	 a	 cartel	 facing	 possible	
investigation	 by	 the	 Commission.	 It	 pre-empts	 any	 possible	 enforcement	 by	
applying	 for	 leniency	 under	 the	 Commission’s	 Leniency	 Notice.	 Widgets	 is	









had	 already	 begun	 investigation	 proceedings	 and	 Widgets	 was	 actually	 the	
second	undertaking	to	come	forward	and	report	the	cartel.	It	therefore	receives	
a	 fine	 for	 its	 competition	 law	 infringement	 with	 a	 50	 percent	 reduction	 for	
assisting	 the	 Commission.	 Widgets	 believed	 this	 was	 the	 end	 of	 the	 matter.	
However,	 one	 of	 its	 customers	 –	 Buyers	 of	 Widgets	 PLC	 (hereafter,	 ‘BW’)	 is	
seeking	to	bring	a	damage	claim	for	the	harm	it	suffered	because	of	the	cartel.	
To	prove	the	harm	suffered,	BW	has	sought	access	to	the	Commission’s	leniency	
file.	 A	 court	 ordered	 disclosure	 of	Widgets	 leniency	 documents,	 and	BW	now	






the	 Commission	 obliges	 them	 to	 deliver	 business	 information	 that	 is	
confidential.	 This	 information	 will	 include	 details	 such	 as,	 product	 and	
geographic	scope,	market	share	and	data	on	employees	who	were	 involved	 in	
the	 infringement. 116 	This	 data	 and	 information	 is	 not	 typically	 publically	
available,	which	is	why	the	Commission	seeks	leniency	applications		–	to	detect	
cartels	 and	 have	 access	 to	 the	 information	 necessary	 to	 establish	 an	





arise	 expressly	 or	 by	 implication	 of	 law	 from	 either	 the	 circumstances	 or	 the	
relationship.	 Indeed,	 an	 obligation	 of	 confidence	 will	 arise	 here	 as	 the	
Commission	expressly	notes	within	the	Leniency	Notice	that	it	will	not	disclose	







the	guarantees	that	the	 information	 it	provides	 is	only	used	for	the	purpose	 it	
was	 collected	 for.120	Thus,	 again	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 court	would	hold	 that	 the	
second	stage	of	the	Coco	test	is	fulfilled.	
	
The	 third	 requirement	 for	 Widgets	 claim	 to	 succeed	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	
“unauthorised	use”	of	the	information	that	it	provided	to	the	Commission	and	
that	 it	 is	 to	Widgets	detriment.	 “Unauthorised	use”	 in	 this	 context	 essentially	
means	 that	 it	 is	 effectively	 disclosed	 without	 Widgets’	 consent.	 Let	 us	
disassemble	 this	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 our	 case.	 Widgets	 provides	 the	 confidential	
information	 to	 the	 Commission	 in	 exchange	 for	 immunity,	 but	 what	 can	 the	
Commission	use	this	information	for?	When	we	consider	the	Leniency	Notice	it	
makes	 it	clear	 that	 the	 information	provided	to	 the	Commission,	 in	a	 leniency	
application,	 is	 provided	 to	 enable	 it	 to	 investigate	 a	 cartel	 and,	 then	 initiate	
legal	 proceedings	 against	 the	 cartel	 members,	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	
TFEU.121	The	Leniency	Notice	does	not	provide	for	the	information	to	be	used	in	
any	 other	 way,	 in	 fact,	 as	 we	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 section’s	 discussion,	 the	
Leniency	 Notice	 provides	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 information	 garnered	
through	 the	 leniency	 programme.122	Widgets	 would	 not	 give	 consent	 for	 the	
information	provided	in	its	leniency	application	to	be	disclosed	to	third	parties	
as	 it	 would	 mean	 a	 third	 party	 would	 gain	 access	 to	 confidential	 business	
information.	 In	 fact,	 if	 this	were	 to	 occur	 it	 could	 actually	 place	Widgets	 in	 a	
worse	position	(with	regards	to	a	follow-on	damages	claim)	than	an	undertaking	
that	did	not	apply	for	 leniency.	This	 is	because	the	third	party	would	not	have	














Subsequently,	 we	 need	 to	 identify	 whether	 this	 disclosure	 would	 be	 to	 the	
detriment	of	Widgets,	as	it	provided	the	information	to	the	Commission.	If	BW	
then	 uses	 the	 information	 disclosed	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	





What	 we	 therefore	 see	 is	 that	 the	 three	 crucial	 elements	 for	 a	 breach	 of	
confidence	 action	 appear	 to	 be	 met.	 However,	 there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 other	





















the	 rights	 of	 confidentiality	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 public	 interest.124	First,	 the	
principle	 of	 confidentiality	 only	 applies	 to	 information	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	
confidential.125	This	 therefore	 means	 anything	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
documentation	 that	 is	 not	 confidential	 could	 be	 disclosed	 without	 breaching	
confidence.	 Second,	 the	 duty	 of	 confidence	 applies	 to	 neither	 useless	
information	 nor	 trivia.126	Third	 –	 and	 the	most	 important	 for	 our	 analysis	 –	 is	
that	 though	 there	 is	 a	 public	 interest	 that	 the	 law	 protects	 confidences,	 this	
public	 interest	 may	 be	 outweighed	 by	 other	 countervailing	 public	 interests,	
which	favour	disclosure.	This	principle	requires	the	court	to	perform	a	balancing	
act	 weighing	 up	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 maintaining	 confidence	 against	 the	
counter	public	 interest	 in	favour	of	disclosure.	This	means	that	BW	could	seek	
for	the	court	to	hold	that	there	would	not	be	a	breach	of	confidence	as	it	would	
be	 in	 the	 public	 interest	 for	 these	 documents	 to	 be	 disclosed.	 However,	 the	
court	 in	practice	appears	 to	permit	a	public	 interest	 in	 cases	where	 there	 is	a	
large	 proportion	 of	 the	 public	 that	 may	 be	 affected.	 For	 example,	 in	 Lion	




evidence	 used	 in	 many	 prosecutions	 of	 ‘drunk	 drivers’.128	Nonetheless,	 the	
Court	 may	 also	 utilise	 the	 public	 interest	 defence	 in	 cases	 where	 a	 limited	
number	of	the	public	could	be	affected,	even	if	there	is	not	an	imminent	risk	to	
an	 identifiable	 third	party.129	Thus,	 the	key	determinants	 in	whether	 the	court	
holds	there	to	be	a	public	 interest	 in	disclosure	that	overrides	confidentially	 is	















in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 documents	 divulged.	 Thus,	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 is	
technically	not	occurring,	as	the	third	stage	of	the	test	is	not	being	met,	because	
it	 is	 an	 authorised	 disclosure	 and	 not	 an	 unauthorised	 one,	 as	 the	 court	 is	














court	would	 then	 need	 to	 decide	 if	Widgets	 has	 come	with	 clean	 hands.	 It	 is	
likely	 the	 court	 would	 find	 that	 Widgets	 had	 not	 come	 before	 it	 with	 clean	
hands.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 had	 committed	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 and	
although	 it	 has	 reported	 this	 and	 assisted	 the	 Commission,	 it	 has	 still	 been	
involved	 in	 a	 cartel.	 Indeed,	 the	 court	 may	 question	 the	 true	 motives	 and	
incentives	behind	Widgets’	 leniency	application.130	In	addition,	 it	 is	 also	worth	
noting	the	Court’s	comments	in	Gartside	v	Outram	regarding	its	view	that	there	






the	 documents	 in	 question	 relate	 to	 that	 infringement	 that	 these	 cannot	 be	
protected.	Conversely,	 it	 is	possible	because	 this	 information	was	provided	 to	
assist	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	 investigation	 and	 as	 Widgets	 is	 not	 seeking	 to	
conceal	its	illegal	activity	that	this	is	not	a	case	of	iniquity.	
	
By	utilising	 the	 illustrative	example	of	Widgets	and	BW	we	have	been	able	 to	
consider	whether	an	undertaking	could	bring	a	claim	for	breach	of	confidence.	
Whilst	 it	 appeared	 that	 the	 three	 stages	 required	 for	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	
were	met,	we	identified	a	variety	of	reasons	as	to	why	Widgets	claim	would	not	
succeed.	 First,	 the	 court	 orders	 disclosure	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	
documents,	 not	 the	 Commission.	 Therefore,	 a	 breach	 of	 confidence	 is	 not	
occurring	by	 the	Commission,	 it	 is	 the	Court	 choosing	 to	disclose	 them.	 If	 the	
Commission	were	to	disclose	the	documents	this	may	lead	to	a	different	result,	
but	this	is	not	the	case.	Second,	Widgets	does	not	come	with	‘clean	hands’	as	it	
has	 committed	 a	 breach	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU	 and	 therefore	 is	 unlikely	 to	
succeed	 in	 its	 equitable	 claim.	 Third,	 there	 may	 be	 a	 public	 interest	 in	 the	
disclosure	of	this	information	to	affected	parties,	although	the	court	appears	to	











undertaking’s	 rights	 and	 a	 third	 party’s	 rights.	 This	 shall	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	
consideration	 of	 four	 potential	 options	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	
leniency	documents	to	third	parties.	The	first	option	examined	is	the	approach,	
which	the	Damages	Directive	currently	adopts,	that	is	to	say,	where	a	complete	
blanket	 ban	 is	 placed	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents.	 Option	 2	
considers	 the	 approach	 that	 the	 European	 Courts	 had	 previously	 promoted,	
where	the	court	has	to	perform	a	balancing	act	on	a	case-by-case	basis	of	which	









been	 proposed	 by	 other	 academics.	 Canenbley	 and	 Steivorth	 have	 asked	
whether	the	EU	needs	a	one-step	approach	–	namely,	a	single	procedure	to	deal	
with	fines	and	damages	–	to	solve	this	problem.132	Whilst	 in	theory	this	would	









a	 result,	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 work	 in	 practice	 and	 would	 require	 a	 significant	
amendment	of	 the	Commission	 current	procedures,	 practices	 and	 focus	of	 its	
work.	Petit	has	suggested	four	alternate	ways	of	managing	the	disclosure	of	this	
information:133	(1)	Judges	could	decide	on	a	case-by-case	basis;	(2)	competition	





on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 forms	 part	 of	 the	 options	 considered	 within	 this	
Chapter,	 and	 shall	 therefore	 be	 examined	 in	 our	 later	 analysis.	 There	 are	
potential	 issues	with	Options	2-4,	 in	regard	to	the	 identification	of	the	type	of	
information	 that	 would	 qualify	 for	 disclosure	 or	 what	 situations	 would	 be	
covered.	 Additionally,	 these	 options	 would	 still	 potentially	 allow	 for	 a	




The	 first	 option	 that	 could	 be	 utilised	 is	 the	 approach	 that	 the	 Damages	






in	 any	 circumstances.	 Indeed,	 the	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 documents	 shall	
remain	completely	confidential	and	can	only	ever	be	disclosed	to	NCAs	who	are	







ensures	 that	 leniency	 applications	 are	 not	 dissuaded	 from	 reporting	 cartels	
because	there	is	no	potential	for	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	
	
Whilst	 this	 approach	 adequately	 protects	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	 rights	 this	
method	leaves	a	 lot	wanting	for	the	undertaking	or	 individuals	that	have	been	
harmed	by	 the	cartel	and	wish	 to	bring	damages	claim.	With	a	blanket	ban	 in	
place	 third	parties	are	not	able	 to	gain	access	 to	 the	 leniency	documentation,	
which	provides	them	with	crucial	information	to	establish	their	claim	and,	assist	
in	the	calculation	of	the	harm	they	have	suffered	because	of	a	cartel.	Thus,	their	
right	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 effectively	 is	 impacted	 upon.	 Owing	 to	 this	 we	 shall	





The	 second	 option	 considered	 is	 the	 method	 that	 the	 European	 Courts	
repeatedly	 held	 was	 the	 approach	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 adopted	 –	 until	 the	
Damages	Directive	was	enacted.	Here,	national	 courts	 conduct	an	assessment	
on	a	case-by-case	basis	to	decide	whether	leniency	documents,	and	particularly	
which	 specific	 parts	 should	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 to	 assist	 with	 their	








parties	 involved,	 because	 they	 are	unsure	 as	 to	when	 the	 information	will	 be	
disclosed.	 There	 is	 no	 clarity	 for	 either	 party	 here,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 down	 to	 the	
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court’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 third	 parties	 are	
granted	access	to	parts	of	 the	 leniency	documents.	Additionally,	 it	can	 lead	to	
arbitrary	 factors	 being	 considered	 in	 a	 given	 case	 and	 a	 patchwork	 approach	
developing	 across	 the	Member	 States	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents;	where	
some	 courts	 –	 which	 favour	 disclosure	 –	 may	 be	 more	 willing	 to	 grant	
unfettered	access	to	these	documents.	Alongside	these	concerns	this	approach	
would	also	fall	foul	of	an	undertakings	legitimate	expectation	of	non-disclosure	
of	 these	documents.	However,	 one	 could	 attempt	 to	 address	 this	 problem	by	
informing	undertakings	 clearly	 that	 the	 information	 that	 they	provide	may	be	
utilised	by	third	parties	bringing	follow	on	damage	actions.	Nonetheless,	this	is	
unlikely	 to	adequately	 incentivise	undertakings	 to	apply	 for	 leniency,	and	thus	
may	 lead	 to	 fewer	 leniency	 applications	 or	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 being	
provided	 by	 undertakings	 in	 applications	 deteriorating,	 which	 could	 have	 a	
knock-on	effect	for	cartel	enforcement	and	deterrence	within	the	EU.	The	final	
factor	 worth	 noting	 here	 is	 that	 this	 approach	 means	 that	 the	 Court	 has	 to	
review	all	of	the	leniency	documentation	to	decide	which	parts	are	relevant	to	






Option	 3	 addresses	 –	 in	 certain	 regards	 –	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 identified	 with	
Option	 2.	 This	 approach	 sees	 the	 NCA	 or	 Commission	 (depending	 on	 whose	
leniency	documentation	the	third	party	is	seeking	access	to)	deciding	on	a	case-
by-case	basis	whether	 to	disclose	 relevant	parts	of	 the	 leniency	application	 to	
(a)	the	third	parties	or	(b)	the	national	court.	Consequently,	this	approach	can	
be	broken	down	in	to	two	further	options	(a)	and	(b),	which	shall	each	now	be	
considered.	 By	 the	 NCA	 or	 Commission	 deciding	 whether	 to	 disclose	 the	
documents	to	third	parties	it	removes	the	issue	identified	earlier	regarding	the	
court	 having	 resource	 and	 cost	 implications	 with	 needing	 to	 examine	 the	
leniency	 documentation	 to	 decide	what	 to	 disclose.	 However,	 it	 actually	 only	
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moves	 or	 shifts	 this	 cost	 onto	 the	 NCA	 or	 the	 Commission	 as	 they	 are	 now	
required	to	conduct	this	assessment.		
	
This	 option	 would	 prevent	 the	 concerns	 raised	 about	 a	 patchwork	 approach	
occurring	 at	 the	 court	 level	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	








cannot	 still	 be	 sure	 which	 parts	 (if	 any)	 of	 their	 leniency	 application	 will	 be	
disclosed	to	the	Court.	Whilst	Option	3(b)	is	clearly	preferable	to	Option	3(a)	–	
from	an	undertakings	and	a	procedural	right	protection	point	of	view	–	it	is	still	
questionable	 what	 information,	 how	 and	 if	 the	 Commission	 and	 NCAs	 would	
disclose	the	relevant	leniency	documentation.	Indeed,	we	can	see	the	ECN	were	
so	concerned	about	 the	potential	 for	disclosure	prior	 to	 the	enactment	of	 the	
Damages	Directive	that	they	produced	a	Resolution	stating	that:135	
	
‘as	 far	 as	 possible	 under	 the	 applicable	 laws	 in	 their	
respective	 jurisdictions	 and	 without	 unduly	 restricting	 the	
right	to	civil	damages,	Competition	Authorities	take	the	joint	














Option	 4	 sees	 the	 national	 court	 being	 given	 access	 to	 all	 of	 the	 leniency	
documentation	 from	 the	 Commission	 or	 the	 NCA	 so	 it	 can	 utilise	 this	 in	 its	
assessment	of	the	damages	action	(and	if	need	be	the	calculation	of	damages	to	
be	 awarded).	 This	means	 that	 leniency	documentation	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 the	
third	parties,	thus	protecting	the	leniency	applicant’s	rights.	Consequently,	this	
approach	 appears	 to	 offer	 the	 best	 balance	 between	 the	 protections	 of	 both	
parties’	 rights.	 The	 courts	 gain	 access	 to	 the	 information	 they	 need	 to	
effectively	assess	the	damages	claim	–	meaning	that	the	affected	third	party	can	
receive	 compensation	 for	 the	 harm	 suffered	 by	 the	 cartel	 –	 and	 the	 leniency	
applicant	does	not	have	its	confidential	business	information	disclosed	to	third	
parties.	 Whilst	 of	 course,	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 would	 wish	 to	 minimise	 its	
exposure	 to	damage	actions,	 this	 approach	does	 at	 least	offer	 the	assurances	
that	 confidential	 information	 will	 not	 be	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties	 and	 the	
















have	 negative	 connotations	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 competition	 law.	
Nonetheless,	certainty	is	achieved	for	both	parties	as	they	know	the	documents	
will	 only	 be	 disclosed	 to	 the	 court	 and	 used	 in	 its	 analysis	 of	 the	 damages	
actions	and	that	no	information	will	be	given	to	third	parties.	
	
This	 option	 may	 also	 have	 the	 effect	 of	 dissuading	 potential	 future	 leniency	
applications	 because	 the	 information	 the	 applicant	 provides	 could	 then	 be	
utilised	 by	 judges	 in	 calculating	 a	 damages	 action	 against	 them.	 However,	 an	
undertaking	 that	 has	 been	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 will	 still	 have	 a	 significant	
incentive	to	seek	leniency,	as	if	the	cartel	is	detected	and	the	undertaking	does	
not	 receive	 complete	 (or	 partial	 immunity)	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 fines	 the	
resulting	 costs	 are	 likely	 to	be	 significantly	higher	 than	any	 follow-on	damage	
actions.136	Nonetheless,	it	is	difficult	to	discern	if	the	risk	of	detection	will	still	be	
sufficient	 to	 ensure	 that	 undertakings	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 will	 continue	 to	
report	 cartels.	 This	 approach	 does	 offer	 protection	 to	 a	 leniency	 applicant’s	
confidential	 business	 information.	 In	 addition,	 by	 allowing	 effective	 follow-on	
damage	 actions	 to	 be	 brought	 by	 third	 parties	 there	 could	 be	 an	 increase	 in	
deterrence,	as	an	undertaking	will	now	need	to	include	in	its	‘costing	analysis’	–	
of	joining	a	cartel	–	the	potential	expense	of	follow-on	actions	(which	could	be	







to	 qualify	 for	 immunity.	 However,	 this	 potential	 concern	 could	 be	 seen	 as	





to	 the	 Commission	 in	 order	 to	 quality	 for	 immunity.	 In	 addition,	 if	 the	
Commission	 were	 to	 feel	 (or	 identify)	 that	 an	 undertaking	 was	 not	 fully	
cooperating,	 then	 they	 do	 not	 need	 to	 offer	 the	 undertaking	 partial	 (or	
complete)	 immunity,	 as	 they	would	be	 in	breach	of	 their	 requirements	under	
the	leniency	programme.137	
	









current	 approach	where	 the	 leniency	 documentation	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 third	
parties	or	 courts	 so	 it	 cannot	be	utilised	 in	 the	calculation	of	damage	actions.	
Except,	 this	 does	 not	 balance	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	 and	 the	 cartel	 victim’s	
rights	 effectively	 or	 fairly.	 This	 Chapter	 therefore	 recommends	 that	 the	
Damages	 Directive	 be	 altered	 to	 include	 this	 change.	 In	 addition,	 the	
Commission	should	amend	its	Guidelines	and	documentation	to	recognise	that	










The	 Leniency	 Notice	 is	 an	 important	 weapon	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 arsenal	
against	 cartels.	However,	with	 the	 recent	developments	 in	European	case	 law	
on	follow-on	damage	actions	concerns	were	raised	from	various	sides	about	the	
potential	 effects	 that	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 could	 have	 on	 the	
Commission’s	main	 tool	 against	 cartels.	 Consequently,	we	 saw	 that	 a	 delicate	
balancing	 act	 is	 required	 between	 the	 protection	 of	 public	 enforcement	 of	
competition	 law,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 private	 enforcement,	 on	 the	 other.	
However,	 because	 of	 the	 various	 concerns	 to	 the	 public	 enforcement	 of	
competition	 law,	the	Damages	Directive	provided	for	the	complete	blanket	on	
the	disclosure	of	 leniency	documents.	Whilst	 this	may	protect	 the	benefits	 of	
the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme,	 this	 chapter	 has	 sought	 to	 identify	
whether	allowing	disclosure	 could	have	 led	 to	 (i)	 a	breach	of	 an	undertakings	
rights	and,	(ii)	whether	a	better	balance	can	be	had	between	the	protection	of	




The	 first	 of	 these	 was	 the	 potential	 breach	 of	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	
expectation.	 It	was	identified	that	 if	the	Commission’s	 leniency	documents	are	
disclosed	this	could	 lead	to	a	breach	of	an	undertakings	legitimate	expectation	
of	 non-disclosure	 (because	 of	 the	 various	 assurances	 given	 throughout	 the	
Commission’s	 documentation).	 However,	 it	 was	 not	 clear	 whether	 in	 these	
circumstances	 the	 court	 would	 allow	 the	 overriding	 of	 the	 frustration	 of	 the	
legitimate	expectation	because	of	the	potential	public	interest	defence	–	which	
is	wide	and	could	allow	 for	disclosure	–	 so	as	 to	permit	 for	 the	 rights	of	 third	
parties	to	be	adequately	protected.	
	
Next,	 the	 possible	Article	 8	 challenge	 that	 an	 undertaking	 could	 bring	 against	
disclosure	 was	 assessed.	 The	 five	 stages	 of	 the	 standard	 approach	 were	
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considered	and	 led	 to	 two	possible	conclusions:	 (1)	 that	 it	 is	possible	 that	 the	
ECtHR	would	hold	that	there	is	no	breach	of	Article	8	because	the	disclosure	of	
the	 documents	 is	 achieved	 proportionally	 owing	 to	 the	 case-by-case	
consideration	of	disclosure;	 (2)	 that	 there	 is	a	breach	of	Article	8	as	 there	 is	a	
less	restrictive	way	to	pursue	the	follow-on	damage	actions	–	by	disclosing	the	
documents	only	to	the	courts	and	not	the	third	parties.	This	achieves	the	aim	of	
enabling	 third	parties	 to	be	able	 to	bring	 follow-on	damage	actions,	 and	 is	 as	










are	 potential	 rights	 arguments	 an	 undertaking	 could	 make	 and,	 thus,	 the	
Damages	 Directive	 is	 correct	 in	 seeking	 to	 protect	 the	 leniency	 applicant’s	
rights.	However,	this	blanket	ban	means	that	a	cartel	victim	finds	it	much	harder	





for	 the	 fairer	and	more	balanced	protection	of	both	 sets	of	 rights.	Whilst	 this	
approach	balances	 rights	more	 fairly	 it	 should	also	prevent	a	drop	 in	 leniency	





confidential	 information	 is	 not	 disclosed	 to	 third	 parties,	 there	 are	 no	 rights	
concerns	or	fears	that	confidential	business	information	is	released.		
	
This	 chapter	advocates	 that	 the	Damages	Directive	 is	 amended	accordingly	 to	
allow	 for	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	 documents	 to	 the	 courts	 in	 follow-on	
damage	 claims.	 This	will	 enable	 effective	 private	 enforcement	 of	 competition	














Since	 2008,	 the	 European	 Commission	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 Commission’)	 has	
operated	 a	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 for	 cases	 involving	 cartels. 2 	This	
procedure	 may	 be	 utilised	 when	 parties	 to	 the	 proceedings	 are	 prepared	 to	
acknowledge	their	participation	in	a	cartel	and	their	liability	for	an	infringement	
of	Article	101	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	(TFEU).3	
In	exchange,	 the	undertaking	benefits	 from	a	 ten	percent	 reduction	 in	 its	 fine	
and	an	expedited	and	simplified	procedure.4		
	
The	 settlement	procedure	was	 implemented	 to	 allow	 the	Commission	 to	deal	
with	cartel	cases	more	efficiently	and	so	its	finite	resources	could	be	used	more	
effectively.5	Indeed,	given	the	current	financial	climate	it	has	been	seen	as	a	key	

















the	 Commission	 issues	 a	 shorter	 streamlined	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 to	 the	
parties,	 gives	 a	 shorter	 final	 decision,	 and	 offers	 undertakings	 only	 restricted	
access	to	the	file.		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 uptake	 and	 use	 of	 the	 EU	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 has	
been	slow.	As	of	March	2015,	the	procedure	had	been	in	place	seven	years	yet	
the	Commission	had	concluded	a	mere	seventeen	cartel	cases	under	it.6	In	stark	
contrast,	 the	 US	 operates	 a	 highly	 developed,	 effective	 and	 efficient	 plea	





be	 a	 bargaining	 system	 but,9	rather,	 one	 that	 operates	 a	 fixed	 ten	 percent	
reduction	in	fine	for	cooperation.10	The	various	differences	between	the	EU	and	
US	 approaches	may	 account	 for	 the	 disparities	 in	 efficiency	 and	 effectiveness	
between	 the	 two	 systems.11	In	 light	 of	 this,	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 answer	 the	
question	of	what	the	EU	direct	settlement	procedure	can	 learn	from	the	well-
established	US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 to	 help	 improve	 its	 utilisation,	 success	






















of	 the	 areas	 which	 differentiates	 this	 chapter	 and	 makes	 it	 unique	 from	 the	
previous	 research	 into	 the	Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	procedure	 and	 the	
Department	 of	 Justice’s	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	 DOJ’)	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 The	
chapter	 will	 also	 take	 this	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 consider	 the	 potential	 of	
implementing	 a	US-style	 plea	 bargaining	 system	within	 the	 EU	 for	Article	 101	
TFEU	cases.	
	
Research	 has	 been	 conducted	 generally	 in	 to	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure,12	
and	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system,13	however,	 there	 is	 little	 literature	 that	






































the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 Macchi	 di	 Cellere	 and	 Mezzapesa	 have	
conducted	 a	 broad	 comparison	 between	 the	 two	 systems,	 just	 after	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 was	 implemented	 in	 the	 EU.15	At	 this	 time	 there	 was	








the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	 –	 prior	 to	 any	 cases	 having	 being	
settled	 under	 it.	 Moreover,	 there	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 discussion	 as	 to	 how	 each	
procedure	 maybe	 improved.	 Finally,	 Stephan	 has	 conducted	 a	 comparative	
analysis	 between	 the	 two	 systems	 to	 identify	 how	 they	 fare	 at	 enhancing	
efficiency	and	deterrence,	whilst	also	maintaining	transparency.17	He	notes	that	
the	 two	systems	are	different	 in	a	variety	of	 regards,	but	 that	 in	a	number	of	
respects	 the	 US	 settlement	 system	 achieves	 greater	 gains	 with	 regards	 to	
administrative	efficiency.18		
	


















regarding	 this	 are	 three	 separate	 works	 by	 Laina	 and	 Laurinen,	 Laina	 and	
Bogdanov	 and	 Dunne.	 Laina	 and	 Laurinen	 conducted	 an	 analysis	 of	 all	 the	
Commission’s	settlement	decisions	in	2013	and	claimed	that	as	the	Commission	
had	begun	settling	more	cases	it	was	building	up	a	‘solid	experience’	in	utilising	
the	 direct	 settlement	 procedure.20	They	 also	 asserted	 that	 the	 efficiencies,	
‘which	 were	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 Commission	 when	 introducing	 the	 [settlement]	
system	have	been	achieved’.21	This	work	was	 built	 upon	 and	updated	 in	 2014	
when	 Laina	 and	 Bogdanov	 conducted	 another	 assessment	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure,	 considering	 all	 fourteen	 cases	 that	 had	 been	 settled	 by	 the	
Commission,	at	the	time.22	They	identified	that	the	procedure	was	now	a	‘well-
oiled	 instrument’,	 and	 that	 the	pace	of	 settling	 had	 accelerated	 in	 the	period	
between	2013-2014.23	Furthermore,	they	noted	that	the	system	had	produced	
procedural	 efficiencies	 by	 reducing	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 procedure	 by	 two	
years.24	However,	one	has	to	take	into	account	that	this	study	was	conducted	by	
the	 head	 of	 the	 cartel	 settlement	 unit	 at	 the	 Commission,	 and	 whether	
intentional	or	not,	this	could	bias	his	opinion	regarding	the	efficiency	gains	the	





















improving	 the	 current	 system	 against	 this	 backdrop.	 Dunne	 identified	 that	 in	
order	to	salvage	the	efficiency	gains	of	operating	the	procedure	the	Commission	
needs	 to	 remodel	 the	 framework	 of	 settling	 so	 as	 to	 place	 emphasis	 on	 the	
voluntariness	of	the	consensus	reached	and	individual	targeted	settlements.	
	
As	we	can	see	 from	the	 literature,	 there	has	been	a	comparison	between	 the	
two	different	settlement	systems.	However,	 these	comparisons	were	all	made	
prior	 to	 the	Commission	 settling	 any	 cases	under	 the	procedure.	Additionally,	
there	has	been	no	analysis	of	what	the	EU	procedure	could	learn	or	take	from	
the	US	experience,	or	whether	a	US-style	settlement	system	could	be	beneficial	






as	 follows.	 First,	 it	 begins	 by	 outlining	 the	 current	 EU	 and	 US	 settlement	
procedures	so	that	the	differences	between	the	two	procedures	and	areas	for	




question	 of	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 ECHR	 and	
particularly	 Article	 6.	 The	 chapter	 conducts	 this	 assessment	 by	 considering	
various	 decisions	 by	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (hereafter,	 ‘the	
ECtHR’)	 involving	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial.	 Whilst	 this	 analysis	 ensues,	 the	
procedural	concerns	and	benefits	of	plea	bargaining	will	be	addressed	through	a	








implementing	 such	 a	 system	 within	 the	 EU	 to	 help	 improve	 the	 procedural	
efficiency	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 settlement	 procedure.	 This	 part	 of	 the	
chapter	 will	 have	 wider	 implications	 than	 just	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	
settlement	 procedure,	 as	 it	 will	 identify	 the	 necessary	 requirements	 that	 a	
signatory	party	to	the	ECHR	will	need	to	ensure	are	met	to	implement	or	utilise	
a	plea	bargaining	 system	 that	 remains	 compatible	with	Article	 6	of	 the	ECHR.	
After	 this	 assessment	 is	 completed	 other	 potential	 amendments	 to	 the	 EU	
settlement	 procedure	 will	 be	 considered.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 concludes	 by	
identifying	 the	 most	 effective	 and	 efficient	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 direct	







a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 but	 that	 it	 would	 require	 a	 radical	 overhauling	 of	
procedures.	Owing	to	this,	there	are	four	recommendations	made	that	could	be	







Before	 we	 can	 begin	 identifying	 ways	 of	 improving	 the	 EU	 direct	 settlement	
procedure	it	is	necessary	for	us	to	understand	how	the	current	procedure	works	
in	practice.	Consequently,	this	section	shall	outline	how	the	Commission’s	direct	
settlement	 procedure	 operates	 in	 its	 current	 guise.	 Then,	 the	 DOJ’s	 plea	








Prior	 to	 identifying	 how	 the	 EU	 settlement	 procedure	 and	US	plea	 bargaining	
systems	operate	there	are	a	couple	of	matters	that	need	to	be	discussed.	The	
first	 of	 these	 concerns	 commitment	 decisions.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 this	
chapter	will	only	consider	the	Commission	and	DOJs’	settlement	procedures.	It	
will	 not	 reflect	 upon	 commitment	 decisions.	 It	 is	 important	 however	 that	we	
identify	 the	 differences	 between	 commitment	 decisions	 and	 settlement	
decisions	 to	 clarify	 why	 these	 are	 not	 discussed.	 Commitment	 decisions	 fall	
under	 Article	 9	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003, 27 	and	 allow	 undertakings	 to	 offer	
commitments	 to	 address	 competition	 concerns	 that	 the	 Commission	 has	
identified.	 They	 do	 not	 result	 in	 a	 finding	 of	 infringement	 nor	 a	 fine	 being	










settlement	 procedure	 are	 tools	 which	 serve	 very	 different	 purposes.	 The	
leniency	 programme	 is	 designed	 to	 be	 an	 investigative	 tool	 to	 help	 assist	 the	
Commission	 in	 detecting	 and	 uncovering	 cartels.28	Here	 undertakings	 disclose	




speed	 up	 the	 procedure	 for	 adoption	 of	 cartel	 decisions.	 It	 simplifies	 and	
shortens	 the	 formal	 procedure	 to	 enable	 this	 and	 allows	 the	 Commission	 to	
invest	 resources	 in	 other	 cartel	 investigations	 and	 cases	which	 in	 turn	 should	
increase	the	deterrence	effect	of	enforcement.29	
	
The	 US	 similarly	 operates	 two	 programmes	 that	 have	 differing	 aims.	 The	
amnesty	programme	provides	immunity	to	the	first	company	to	come	forward	
and	 report	 a	 cartel.	 However,	 only	 one	 company	 can	 get	 immunity,	 all	 other	
companies	can	only	get	a	 reduction	 in	 fines	by	engaging	 in	plea	bargains	with	
the	DOJ.	 This	means	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 incentive	 for	 companies	 to	ensure	 they	
engage	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	 DOJ.	 The	 DOJ	 operate	 a	 plea	 bargaining	

















market	 investigations	 or	 leniency	 applications.	 The	 Commission	 then	 assesses	
whether	 this	 infringement	 is	 suitable	 for	 settlement.	 When	 making	 this	
assessment	 the	 Commission	 considers	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 criteria,	 such	 as,	 the	
probability	 of	 reaching	 a	 common	 understanding	 regarding	 the	 scope	 of	
potential	objections	within	a	reasonable	timeframe.31	It	is	worth	noting	that	an	
undertaking	 has	 no	 automatic	 right	 to	 settle	 with	 the	 Commission.32	This	
decision	 rests	 entirely	 with	 the	 Commission	 and	 indeed	 it	 should.33 	The	
Commission	 then	 sends	 letters	 to	 undertakings	 informing	 them	 that	 they	 are	





Then	 settlement	 discussions	 begin	 between	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	
undertakings.	 The	 Commission	 determines	 the	 order	 and	 sequences	 of	 the	
bilateral	agreements	and	when	to	disclose	information	that	 is	 in	the	file,35	and	
upon	request	by	a	party,	 the	Commission	will	grant	 the	undertaking	access	 to	
non-confidential	versions	of	any	specified	accessible	document	listed	in	the	case	
file. 36 	Once	 the	 parties	 and	 the	 Commission	 have	 reached	 a	 ‘common	
understanding’	 regarding	the	scope	of	potential	objections	and	the	estimation	
of	 the	 range	 of	 likely	 fines	 to	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 undertaking	 –	 and	 the	
Commission	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 the	 procedural	 efficiencies	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
achieved	 –	 the	 Commission	 can	 grant	 a	 final	 time-limit	 of	 at	 least	 fifteen	
















settlement	 procedure;	 the	 acknowledgement	 that	 they	 have	 been	 sufficiently	
informed	 of	 the	 objections	 the	 Commission	 is	 seeking	 to	 raise	 against	 them;	
that	 they	 have	 had	 sufficient	 opportunity	 to	 raise	 their	 views	 before	 the	
Commission;	and,	 finally	 that	 the	parties	do	not	envisage	requesting	access	 to	




The	 Commission	 should	 then	 consider	 the	 parties’	 settlement	 submissions	 so	
that	their	rights	of	defence	can	be	exercised	effectively	and	taken	into	account	
in	the	preliminary	analysis,	where	appropriate.40	These	can	then	be	considered	
whilst	 the	 Commission	 is	 drafting	 the	 Statement	 of	 Objections. 41 	If	 the	
streamlined	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 reflects	 the	 parties’	 settlement	
submissions	 the	 parties	 should	 (within	 two	 weeks)	 reply	 by	 confirming	 the	
Statement	 of	 Objections	 corresponds	 to	 the	 contents	 of	 their	 settlement.42	It	
should	be	noted	here	that	the	Commission	can	adopt	a	Statement	of	Objections	
that	does	not	 reflect	 the	parties	 settlement	 submission,	 and	 this	would	mean	
that	the	parties	settlement	submissions	would	be	deemed	to	be	withdrawn	and	















The	 final	 points	 to	 note	 before	we	 leave	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 EU	 settlement	
procedure	 are	 the	 procedural	 protections	 that	 are	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 that	 an	
undertaking’s	 rights	 are	 not	 unduly	 interfered	with.	 First,	 an	 undertaking	 still	
has	the	right	to	appeal	the	settlement	decision	to	the	EU	court	(just	like	under	
the	standard	procedure)	if	it	is	has	any	concerns	regarding	part	of	the	decision.	
Second,	 although	 the	 parties	 waive	 certain	 procedural	 rights	 to	 engage	 in	
settlements,	if	at	any	point	they	have	any	apprehensions	regarding	due	process	
they	 may	 call	 upon	 the	 Hearing	 Officer.44	The	 Hearing	 Officer’s	 role	 is	 to	
guarantee	 that	 the	effective	exercise	of	 the	undertaking’s	 rights	of	defence	 is	
respected.45	This	 includes	 inter	alia,	ensuring	that	the	undertakings	right	to	be	
heard	 and	 the	 right	 to	 access	 to	 the	 file	 are	 respected.46	Additionally,	 the	
Hearing	Officer	ensures	the	protection	of	an	undertaking’s	rights	(such	as	legal	




























for	 doing	 this,	 the	 company	 is	 granted	 concessions	 by	 the	 DOJ.	 These	
concessions	 lead	 to	 a	 lesser	 offence	 or	 reduced	 sanction.	 In	 antitrust	 cases	









































Type	 B	 agreements	 recommend,49	that	 a	 particular	 sentence	 or	 sentencing	
range	is	appropriate	or	that	a	particular	provision	of	the	Sentencing	Guidelines,	
or	 policy	 statement,	 or	 sentencing	 factor	 does	 or	 does	 not	 apply	 (noting	 that	
such	a	request	or	recommendation	does	not	bind	the	court).50	Finally,	there	are	
Type	 C	 agreements	 where	 a	 specific	 sentence	 or	 sentencing	 range	 is	 the	
appropriate	 disposition	 of	 the	 case,	 or	 that	 a	 particular	 provision	 of	 the	
Sentencing	Guidelines,	or	policy	 statement,	or	 sentencing	 factor	does	or	does	
not	 apply	 (and	 such	 a	 recommendation	 or	 request	 binds	 the	 court	 once	 the	
court	accepts	the	plea	agreement).51			
	
Owing	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 bargains,	 Type	 B	 agreements	 are	 the	 most	
commonly	entered	into	by	the	DOJ	in	antitrust	cases.	This	is	because	the	courts	




however,	 as	 the	 methods	 of	 negotiating	 are	 extremely	 subjective	 it	 is	 only	
possible	 to	 make	 broad	 remarks	 based	 on	 how	 the	 procedure	 ‘typically’	
operates	in	practice.53	To	begin,	the	DOJ	initiates	an	antitrust	investigation.	This	
may	 arise	 from	 concerns	 that	 the	DOJ	 has	within	 the	market,	 but	more	 than	









DOJ	 themselves	may	 start	discussions	with	 the	defendant	 company.	Next,	 the	
DOJ	approves	the	commencement	of	negotiations	with	the	company.	Then,	the	
DOJ	 internally	 discusses	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 potential	 agreement.	 	 This	
discussion	will	 include	the	consideration	of	factors	such	as:	the	provisions	that	
should	be	considered	as	non-negotiable,	the	provisions	that	are	negotiable	and	
the	 likely	 range	 of	 the	 fine.	 Next,	 the	 DOJ	 will	 provide	 the	 company	 with	 a	
proposed	 draft	 agreement	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 further	 discussions.	 Then,	 the	
company	 and	 DOJ	 will	 engage	 in	 negotiations	 over	 various	 parts	 of	 the	
agreement.	Once	 an	 agreement	 is	 reached	 the	DOJ	 and	 company	will	 sign	 it.	
Finally,	 the	 plea	 agreement	 will	 go	 before	 a	 court,	 where	 it	 will	 assess	 the	
agreement.	 If	 the	agreement	 is	of	Type	A	or	C	 the	court	may	 then	accept	 the	

























procedure	 is	 the	 safety	 mechanisms	 that	 the	 US	 has	 in	 place	 to	 ensure	 that	





and	 not	 as	 the	 result	 of	 force,	 threats,	 assurances,	
promises	 or	 representations	 which	 are	 not	 contained	
within	the	plea	agreement.’58	
	
However,	 the	 main	 guarantor	 of	 these	 protections	 is	 a	 US	 court.	 Under	 the	
FRCPR	11	section	(b)	there	are	a	variety	of	rights	that	the	court	needs	to	ensure	
that	 company	understands	 it	 has.	 Rather	 than	 list	 these	 in	 their	 entirety	 only	
the	most	pertinent	shall	be	noted:	 the	 right	 to	plead	not	guilty;	 the	 right	 to	a	
jury	 trial;	 the	 right	 to	 be	 represented	 by	 counsel;	 the	 right	 to	 confront	 and	
cross-examine	 adverse	 witnesses;	 and,	 that	 if	 the	 company’s	 guilty	 plea	 is	
accepted	 it	 waives	 these	 rights.59		 The	 court	 also	 has	 to	 ensure	 the	 plea	 is	
voluntary	and	did	not	result	from	force,	threats	or	promises	(other	than	those	
contained	 within	 the	 plea	 agreement)	 before	 accepting	 the	 plea	 bargain.60	
Finally,	the	court	must	ensure	that	there	is	a	factual	basis	for	the	plea.61		
	
These	protections	are	discussed	 in	greater	depth	when	 the	potential	 for	 a	EU	
plea	bargaining	system	is	muted.	These	protections	will	be	 important	as	many	












Now	that	 the	procedural	processes	of	 the	EU	and	US	 settlement	programmes	
have	been	explained	we	can	explore	the	cases	that	have	been	settled	under	the	
current	 EU	 procedure	 to	 help	 identify	 the	 areas	 where	 procedural	
improvements	could	be	made	and	challenges	that	the	Commission’s	settlement	
procedure	presently	faces.	What	will	be	identified	from	the	empirical	analysis	in	
this	 section	 is	 that	 there	 are	 two	 key	 areas	where	 further	 improvements	 and	
enhancements	 can	 be	 made	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure.	 The	
first	of	these	is	the	length	of	time	that	the	Commission’s	decisions	take,	owing	
to	 the	 investigation	 and	 settlement	 negotiations	 periods,	 respectively.	 The	
second	area	 relates	 to	hybrid	 cases,	 particularly	 the	 resources	 it	 costs	 for	 the	
Commission	to	run	dual	procedures	and	the	continuing	growth	in	hybrid	cases	
of	this	nature.	The	dataset	for	this	analysis	was	compiled	by	the	author	from	the	
Commission’s	 published	 non-confidential	 decisions,	 summary	 decisions	 and	
press	releases.	It	was	last	updated	on	the	30	March	2015.		
	





US	 utilising	 criminal	 sanctions	 and	 sanctions	 against	 individuals,	 and	 the	 fact	
that	it	is	a	proven	settlement	procedure.	Nonetheless,	accepting	the	limitations	
to	 this	 comparison,	what	we	 can	derive	 from	contrasting	 these	 figures	 is	 that	
there	 is	 significant	 room	 for	 the	Commission	 to	 increase	 the	utilisation	of	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 to	 conclude	 cases.	 Table	 5.4	 below	 catalogues	 the	




















































































































































































app)	 €	315,200,000	 N/A	 10	months	
4	 19.10.2011	
COMP/39.605	




















app)	 €	141,791,000	 N/A	 10	months	
8	 04.12.2013	
AT.39861	

























Exchanges	 2	 2	 €	5,979,000	 N/A	 9	months	
12	 19.03.2014	
AT.39922	






















Infringement		 4	 4	 €	32,355,000	 N/A	 15	months	
17	 11.12.2014	
AT.39780	




parties	 varies	 quite	 significantly.	 The	 highest	 fines	 imposed	were	 in	 the	 EIRD	







19th	May	 2010.65	There	 are	many	 elements	 of	 this	 settlement	 that	 are	 quite	
notable.	First,	although	it	was	the	Commission’s	first	ever	settlement	it	actually	
has	been	one	of	its	quickest.	As	will	be	shown	later	this	settlement	falls	straight	
within	 the	median	 for	 the	period	of	 time	 it	 typically	 takes	 the	Commission	 to	
adopt	 a	 decision	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 settlement	 to	 the	 final	 decision.	
Second,	 this	 case	 has	 had	 the	 most	 parties	 with	 which	 the	 Commission	 has	





















In	 this	 case,	 all	 parties	were	originally	 engaged	 in	 settlement	discussions	with	
the	 Commission.	 However,	 when	 the	 Commission	 provided	 the	 undertakings	
with	 all	 the	 information	 regarding	 the	elements	of	 the	 case,	 the	 scope	of	 the	
infringement	and	the	range	of	the	fine	Compagnie	Financière	et	de	Participation	











































begun	 settlement	 discussions	 in	 decisions	 8,	 9	 and	 10	 (YIRD,	 EIRD	 and	
Polyurethane	 Foam	 decisions).72	Thus,	 the	 graph	 does	 not	 provide	 data	 for	
these	decisions.	From	the	other	14	decisions	we	can	extrapolate	that	the	mean	
length	of	time	from	the	beginning	of	settlement	decisions	to	the	adoption	of	a	




































can	 identify	 is	 that	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 average	 around	 13.3	 months.	
However,	this	figure	is	actually	very	deceptive,	as	it	does	not	take	into	account	
the	often	long,	protracted	and	drawn	out	investigation	prior	to	the	beginning	of	
the	 settlement	 discussions.	 For	 example,	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 Consumer	
Detergents	 settlement	 decision	 we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 Commission	 launched	
inspections	 in	 June	 2008,73	but	 did	 not	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 until	 late	




until	 January	 2014,	 when	 it	 begun	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 parties.74	
Therefore,	what	we	can	see	is	that	when	we	include	the	investigation	stage	into	
these	time	periods	we	 inevitably	see	that	this	period	goes	up	significantly	and	
into	many	years,	 sometimes	more	 than	 trebling	 the	overall	 time	period	when	
compared	 to	 the	 settlement	 discussion	 period.75	Nonetheless,	 it	 should	 be	
noted	that	the	settlement	procedures	are	significantly	quicker	then	the	 length	
of	time	it	would	take	these	procedures	to	progress	via	the	standard	procedure.	










mode	 is	 4.	 What	 we	 can	 see	 from	 this	 is	 that	 the	 cases	 that	 appear	 to	 get	






likely	 to	 be	 down	 to	 a	 multitude	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 nature	 of	 cartels	
themselves	–	which	require	a	limited	number	of	suppliers	that	collectively	have	
a	high	market	share	–	but	also	it	could	be	because	this	is	an	optimal	number	of	





in	 the	 infringement	decide	 to	 settle.	 These	hybrid	 cases	may	 take	one	of	 two	
forms.	The	first	of	these	is	where	a	party	makes	 it	clear	from	the	beginning	of	
the	settlement	discussions	that	it	has	no	interest	in	partaking	in	them	(Type	1);	
the	 other	 is	 where	 the	 party	 withdraws	 from	 the	 settlement	 discussions	






These	 are	 perhaps	 some	 of	 the	 most	 interesting	 and	 unusual	 cases	 for	 this	
chapter	to	explore,	as	the	settlement	procedure	was	primarily	implemented	to	
‘allow	the	Commission	to	handle	more	cases	with	the	same	resources…[whilst]	
fostering	 the	 public	 interest	 in…the	 effective	 and	 timely	 punishment	 [of	
cartelists]	and	increasing	overall	deterrence’.77	However,	if	the	Commission	has	
to	 run	 dual	 procedures	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 positive	 efficiency	 gains.	 In	
essence	 the	 Commission	will	 still	 have	 to	 conduct	 the	 full	 proceedings	 for	 at	









should	 not	 be	 down	 played.	 Although	 the	 procedural	 gains	 will	 not	 be	 as	
significant	–	as	would	be	the	case	if	all	parties	were	to	settle	–	it	should	still	save	
the	Commission	and	undertakings	resources	from	converting	all	parties	back	to	
the	 standard	 procedure.78	Since	 the	 entering	 into	 force	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure	 the	Commission	has	managed	 five	hybrid	cases,	with	 there	being	a	
fairly	even	split	between	these	of	Type	1	and	2	cases.	As	was	noted	earlier	the	
first	hybrid	case	occurred	in	2010	and	resulted	from	a	party	dropping	out	of	the	
settlement	 discussions	 at	 a	 late	 stage.79	In	 the	YIRD	 case	 one	undertaking	 did	
not	 partake	 in	 settlement	 discussions	 and	 thus	 the	 Commission	 run	 dual	




becoming	 more	 common.	 The	 Commission	 is	 then	 opting	 to	 run	 the	 two	
procedural	 routes	concurrently,	and	as	has	been	previously	noted	this	defeats	
part	 of	 the	 key	 efficiency	 objective	 of	 settlements.	 Indeed,	 even	 Laina	 and	
Bogdanov	have	stated	categorically	that	unsuccessful	settlements	that	are	then	







to	 enforce	 Article	 101	 (TFEU).	 Indeed,	 we	 saw	 this	 in	 the	 Smart	 Cards	 Chip	












route	 quite	 far.	 Although	 it	 is	 good	 that	 the	 Commission	 continues	 to	 tackle	
cartelist	after	settlements	fail,	there	are	significant	efficiency	costs	from	having	
to	 switch	 back	 to	 the	 standard	 procedure	 after	 coming	 from	 the	 streamlined	
one;	namely,	 it	 is	more	time	consuming	and	resource	intensive.	This	 is	both	in	
the	sense	of	switching	between	the	two	and	also	because	the	normal	procedure	
is	 itself	highly	resource	intensive	and	requires	much	more	detail.	For	example,	
the	 Statement	 of	 Objections	 cannot	 be	 of	 a	 streamlined	 nature	 and	
undertakings	have	full	access	to	the	file.		
	
The	 second	 and	 final	 thing	 to	 consider	 is	 that	 one	 of	 the	 settlement	
programmes	 key	 aims	 is	 to	 reduce	 costs,	 and	 in	 regards	 to	 reducing	 litigation	
costs	it	appears	to	have	achieved	this	quite	effectively.	Normally	many	decisions	
that	 go	 via	 the	 standard	 procedure	 are	 appealed	 by	 undertakings	 before	 the	
European	 Courts.	 These	 appeals	 often	 focus	 on	 issues	 regarding	 the	
Commission’s	calculation	of	the	fine,	such	as,	the	gravity	or	length	of	the	cartel.	
However,	 so	 far	 based	on	 the	parties	 that	 have	 settled	with	 the	Commission,	
only	 one	 undertaking	 has	 sought	 to	 appeal	 the	 settlement	 decision	 –	 even	
though	all	parties	have	a	right	to	appeal	the	settlement	decisions.	The	appellant	
–	Société	Générale	–	was	involved	in	the	settlement	discussion	in	the	EIRD	case.	
They	 are	 primarily	 appealing	 the	 settlement	 decision	 based	 on	 the	
Commission’s	determination	of	 the	value	of	 sales.85	This	will	be	an	 interesting	
case	 to	 follow,	as	 it	will	hopefully	answer	some	of	 the	questions	around	what	














enforcement	 procedure.	 Although,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 this	 is	
down	to	the	fact	that	settling	parties	can	engage	in	discussions	(and	to	a	degree	
influence)	the	Commission	with	regards	to	a	variety	of	factors	in	their	case.	It	is	
still	 believed	by	 the	author	 that	 there	are	 further	efficiency	gains	 that	 can	be	
had	 with	 amendments	 to	 the	 current	 procedure.	 This	 is	 something	 that	 is	




areas	 that	 could	 be	 further	 improved	 to	 enhance	 the	 efficiency	 and	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 current	 settlement	 procedure,	 and	 another	 area,	 which	
needs	to	be	monitored	closely.	The	first	area	relates	to	the	 length	of	time	the	
decisions	 take	 as	 a	 whole.	 The	 settlement	 procedure	 time	 period	 averages	
around	13.28	months.	With	procedural	enhancements	made	this	period	of	time	
should	 be	 able	 to	 be	 reduced.	 However,	 the	main	 issue	 –	 from	 an	 efficiency	
point	of	view	–	seems	to	be	with	the	length	of	time	that	the	investigation	period	
can	 add	 to	 the	 settlement	 of	 the	 cases.	 From	 the	 examples	 considered	 we	
identify	that	the	investigation	period	takes	the	greatest	time	and	resources.	As	
the	 Commission	 cannot	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 parties	 until	 the	









monitoring	 closely	 is	 the	 case	 where	 Société	 Générale	 is	 appealing	 the	




the	 future	would	 lead	 to	higher	 litigation	costs	and	 thus	negatively	 impact	on	
the	procedural	and	cost	efficiency	benefits	 settlement	brings	 the	Commission.	




the	 current	 settlement	 procedure,	 we	 shall	 now	 determine	 whether	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	within	the	EU	for	settling	cartel	cases	
would	 address	 the	 issues	 raised.	 To	 begin	 this	 analysis,	we	 shall	 identify	why	
one	may	wish	to	 implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	within	the	EU.	Then,	we	
shall	 assess	 whether	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 ECHR	 through	 a	








potential	 to	address	 some	of	 the	 concerns	 that	have	been	 identified	with	 the	
current	direct	settlement	procedure.	Just	to	recap,	there	were	two	key	areas	of	
concerns	 and	 one	 area	 that	 needs	 to	 be	monitored	 closely;	 (a)	 the	 length	 of	
time	the	investigation,	settlement	discussions	and	decisions	take	to	be	reached,	





direct	 settlement	 procedure	would	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 dramatically	 reduce	
the	 length	 of	 time	 the	 Commission’s	 procedures	 take.	 These	 efficiency	
improvements	 would	 be	 achieved	 in	 various	 ways.	 To	 begin	 with,	 plea	
bargaining	would	 offer	 the	 potential	 for	 undertakings	 and	 the	 Commission	 to	
begin	 negotiations	 and	 discussions	 from	 the	 opening	 of	 the	 Commission’s	




Commission	all	parties	are	more	 likely	 to	 come	 to	an	agreement	quicker	 than	
when	 they	 have	 to	 wait	 until	 the	 investigation	 is	 completed	 to	 begin	
discussions.	 Indeed,	we	 see	 from	 the	 current	 settlement	 decisions	 that	when	
these	 discussions	 begin	 they	 often	 focus	 around	 the	 value	 of	 sales	 and	 the	
scope	 of	 potential	 objections.	 Under	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 procedure	 these	





There	 is	however	a	 cost	of	 implementing	a	plea	bargaining	 system	 to	achieve	
these	efficiency	benefits.	This	cost	is	not	financial	though,	it	is	at	the	expense	of	
investigatory	rigour.	By	allowing	discussions	to	occur	prior	to	the	 investigation	
being	 completed	 it	 potentially	 means	 that	 the	 investigation	 will	 not	 be	 as	
detailed	and	thorough.	In	addition,	the	role	of	judicial	scrutiny	is	limited,	as	an	
undertaking	 loses	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	 Although,	 we	 need	 to	 note	 that	 there	
would	still	be	‘checks	and	balances’	in	place	here.	For	example,	the	courts	prior	
to	 authorising	 the	 plea	 agreement	 will	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 assess	 the	
Commission’s	 case	 against	 the	 undertaking	 and	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 a	 factual	






side,	 against,	 speed,	 efficiency	 and	 resource	 savings	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 is	 a	
delicate	 task	 to	 perform	 and	 currently	 the	 EU	 has	 chosen	 to	 ensure	 that	





Some	 may	 also	 wish	 to	 question	 the	 necessity	 for	 utilising	 plea	 bargaining	
within	 the	 EU	 when	 the	 Commission	 operates	 a	 leniency	 programme	 that	 is	
designed	to	help	uncover	cartels	and	provide	information	on	the	infringements.	
Whilst	 it	 is	 correct	 that	 the	 Commission	 operates	 a	 leniency	 programme	 that	
helps	 it	 collect	 evidence	on	 cartels;	 plea	bargaining	offers	 something	 that	 the	
leniency	 programme	 does	 not.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 offers	 the	 ability	 for	
undertakings	 to	 engage	 in	 discussions	 and	 negotiations	with	 the	 Commission.	
The	 benefit	 of	 facilitating	 discussions	 between	 the	 Commission	 and	
undertakings	should	not	be	underplayed.	The	efficiencies,	which	can	be	derived	
from	 this,	 are	 significant.	 In	many	 instances	 it	will	mean	 undertakings	 do	 not	
seek	 to	discontinue	 the	negotiations	and	 return	 to	 the	 standard	procedure	or	
appeal	the	decision.	Litigation	costs	are	substantial	and	by	minimising	them	this	
enables	the	Commission	to	use	those	resources	to	 investigate	and	deter	other	
cartels.	 If	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	were	 to	be	 implemented	within	 the	EU	
the	 current	 leniency	 programme	 would	 need	 modifying.	 These	 modifications	








system,	 this	 can	occur	and	 therefore	 the	Commission’s	 settlement	discussions	
can	only	move	at	the	speed	of	the	slowest	party.		
	
However,	 under	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 programme	 this	 would	 be	 different.	 For	
example,	if	the	Commission	is	in	negotiations	with	a	party	(A)	who	are	stalling,	
the	 Commission	 can	 still	 progress	 effectively	 with	 discussions	 with	 the	 other	
parties	 (B,	C,	D)	 independently	and	not	have	 to	wait	 for	party	 (A)	 to	conclude	
the	 discussions.	 In	 addition,	 plea	 bargaining	 may	 help	 the	 Commission	 in	 its	
investigation	of	the	cartel.	If	we	consider	the	above	example	again,	we	may	find	




–	 parties	 (A,	 C	 and	D).88	There	 are	 even	 further	 potential	 benefits	 here.	 First,	
because	 all	 of	 the	 undertakings	 know	 that	 the	 other	 parties	 are	 also	 in	
negotiation	 talks	 with	 the	 Commission,	 this	 should	 help	 create	 a	 persuasive	
interest	 in	cooperating	and	settling	with	the	Commission	–	similar	to	the	‘race	
for	leniency’.	Second,	this	approach	will	assist	greatly	in	a	hybrid	case	scenario,	
because	 the	 Commission	 is	 already	 managing	 the	 case	 against	 each	 party	
individually.	 If	 the	Commission	begins	settlement	discussions	with	a	party	and	
they	 drop	 out	 of	 these	 discussions,	 this	 will	 not	 affect	 the	 discussions	 the	
Commission	is	having/has	had	with	the	other	parties	and	they	can	default	back	
to	 the	 standard	 procedure	 against	 this	 party	 once	 the	 investigation	 and	
discussions	 with	 the	 other	 parties	 have	 been	 concluded.	 If	 the	 Commission	
waits	 it	 can	 then	 utilise	 all	 of	 the	 information	 it	 gains	 from	 the	 settlement	









A	potential	 concern	with	 the	Commission	utilising	 a	plea	bargaining	 system	 is	
that	some	cases	may	not	be	appropriate	for	a	plea	agreement	as	they	contain	a	





the	 infringement	 decision	 when	 it	 is	 issued.	 Second,	 as	 will	 be	 shown	 later,	
under	the	judicial	safety	measures	the	Court	will	need	to	be	satisfied	that	there	
is	 a	 case	 to	 be	 answered.	 If	 the	 Court	 feels	 that	 the	 case	 against	 the	
undertaking(s)	 is	 questionable	 it	 can	 refuse	 the	 plea	 and	 force	 the	 parties	 to	




An	 additional	 benefit	 that	 plea	 bargaining	would	 bring	 for	 the	 Commission	 is	
that	it	would	prevent	further	litigation	costs,	because	once	the	Court	endorses	a	
plea	bargain	 the	undertaking	 loses	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	As	 litigation	 costs	 from	
undertakings	 appealing	 Commission	 infringement	 decisions	 are	 significantly	
high	–	in	terms	of	finance	and	time	–	this	will	greatly	benefit	the	Commission	by	
reducing	their	costs	and	saving	their	finite	resources.	The	Commission	can	then	
utilise	 the	 saved	 resources	 to	 detect	 and	 uncover	 additional	 cartels	 bringing	











problems	 regarding	 the	 perception	 the	 general	 public	 (and	 those	 in	 the	
judiciary)	 have	 of	 utilsing	 it.	 The	 general	 public	may	 struggle	 to	 comprehend	
why	 companies	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 Commission	 about	
their	breach	of	competition	law.	Indeed,	we	see	that	Stephan	identified	that	the	
general	public	have	 similar	misapprehensions	 regarding	 the	use	of	 leniency	 in	
cartel	 cases.89	Thus,	 there	 could	 be	 a	 comparable	 issue	 here.	 Actually,	 this	
problem	with	perception	of	negotiating	with	parties	may	be	part	of	the	reason	
the	 Commission	 has	 sought	 to	 reiterate	 on	 various	 occasions	 that	 it	 neither	
negotiates	 nor	bargains	 in	 settlement	 decisions.90	However,	 the	 concerns	 the	
general	 public	may	 have	 could	 be	 addressed	 to	 a	 degree	 by	 the	 Commission	
explaining	why	bargaining	in	these	cases	can	be	beneficial	and	sometimes	even	
necessary.	 Complex	 cases	 of	 fraud	 often	 require	 bargaining	 with	 the	
defendants,	as	they	are	so	time	consuming	and	difficult	to	prosecute.91		
There	are	 those	within	 the	 judiciary	who	may	 come	 from	backgrounds	where	
plea	 bargains	 are	 frowned	 upon,	 seen	 as	 inappropriate	 or	 are	 treated	with	 a	
great	 deal	 of	 cynicism	 and	 scepticism.	 For	 example,	 within	 the	 UK	 judiciary	
there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 general	 consensus	 against	 the	 use	 of	 plea	 bargaining.	
Raphael	has	noted	this	strong	feeling,	observing	that	it	is	often	argued	that	a	US	




















Viewed	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 English	 court	 the	
notion	 that	 a	 prosecutor	 may	 seek	 to	 induce	 a	 plea	 of	




EU	 General	 Court	 are	 similarly	 sceptical	 or	 disapprove	 of	 the	 use	 of	 plea	
agreements	it	may	cause	issues	if	the	EU	were	to	implement	a	plea	bargaining	
system.	 For	 example,	 it	 could	 lead	 to	 perfectly	 acceptable	 plea	 agreements	
being	rejected,	or	unfairly	scrutinised.	However,	the	exact	opposite	could	also	
occur,	 where	 judges	 who	 favour	 plea	 agreements	 may	 not	 conduct	 a	
thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 and	 treat	 it	 more	 as	 a	 ‘rubber	 stamping’	
exercise.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 issues	 could	 successfully	 be	 addressed	 with	
clear	guidance	from	the	both	the	Commission	and	Court’s	on	plea	bargaining	
and	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	 necessary	 judicial	 safeguards	 –	 that	 are	 discussed	
later	–	are	met.	
	
A	 further	concern	 that	could	be	 raised	 is	with	 regards	 to	 the	potential	 lack	of	
consistency	 between	 the	 reductions	 the	 Commission	 awards	 in	 plea	
agreements.	 This	 issue	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 plea	 bargaining	 reductions	
could	 be	 very	 flexible	 and	 hence	 can	 lead	 to	 concerns	 regarding	 unequal	
treatment	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 certainty	 in	 settlement	 decisions	 –	 something	
which	 this	 thesis	 has	 discussed	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	
procedure	 in	Chapter	3.	But,	 this	again	 is	not	 really	an	 issue	because	detailed	
guidelines	 (like	 those	 issued	 around	 the	 current	 leniency	 programme)	 can	
address	 these	 concerns	 by	 effectively	 helping	 undertakings	 understand	 what	
criteria	 are	 used	 in	 awarding	 the	 discounts	 and	 broadly	 how	 these	 ranges	 of	
discounts	are	set.		
	
Simply	 transplanting	 a	plea	bargaining	 system	 into	 the	EU	 cartel	 enforcement	
procedure	may	not	be	the	answer	to	addressing	the	issues	that	this	chapter	has	
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identified.	 Indeed,	 Alkon	 has	 analysed	 whether	 transplanting	 plea	 bargaining	
procedures	to	countries	which	are	trying	to	deal	with	multiple	cases	can	solve	
their	 problems.94	Her	 analysis	 identified	 that	 doing	 so	 can	 lead	 to	 unintended	
negative	 consequences	 and	 one	 has	 to	 identify	 if	 there	 are	 better	 ways	 of	
bringing	reform	to	address	the	issues.95	Yet,	we	have	identified	what	the	issues	
are	 with	 the	 current	 regime	 and	 seen	 what	 the	 potential	 benefits	 of	
implementing	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	are,	alongside	the	possible	problems	
that	could	result	from	doing	so.	Let	us	now	consider	how	we	can	implement	the	





As	 we	 are	 seeking	 to	 ascertain	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decision	 and	 views	 on	 plea	
bargaining	it	is	important	that	the	facts	and	procedural	background	to	this	case	
are	 examined	 in	 detail	 so	 that	we	 can	 understand	 how	 the	 plea	 bargain	was	
agreed	 between	 the	 Georgian	 prosecutors	 office	 and	 the	 applicants.96	This	 is	
crucial	 as	 we	 need	 to	 appreciate	 what	 procedural	 safeguards	 need	 to	 be	 in	
place	 to	 protect	 the	 individual’s	 right	 of	 fair	 trial	 for	 plea	 bargaining	 to	 be	
permissible.	 Additionally,	 this	 is	 the	 first	 case	 where	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 assessed	





and	 the	 second	 was	 Mrs	 Togonidze	 (henceforth,	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘N’	 and	 ‘T’	
respectively).	The	applicants	were	husband	and	wife	–	Georgian	nationals	–	who	







Mayor	 of	 Kutaisi	 from	1993-to-1995	 and	 the	managing	director	 of	 one	of	 the	
most	important	public	companies	(hereafter,	referred	to	as	‘the	factory’)	in	the	
country	 from	 1995-to-2000.97	Mr	 N	 held	 12.95	 percent	 of	 the	 shares	 in	 the	
factory,	Mrs	 T	2.6	percent	 and	 the	 State	held	 the	 remaining	78.61	percent	of	
shares.98		
	
In	 December	 2002	 Mr	 N	 was	 kidnapped	 and	 held	 for	 ransom.	 Whilst	 in	 his	
abductors	 care	 Mr	 N	 was	 ‘severely	 ill-treated’	 by	 his	 captors. 99 	He	 was	
eventually	 released	when	 his	 family	 paid	 a	 large	 ransom	 for	 his	 freedom.	On	
March	12th	2004	charges	were	brought	against	him	alleging	that	he	had	illegally	
reduced	 share	 capital	 in	 the	 factory.	 He	 was	 charged	 with	 ‘making	 fictitious	
sales,	transfers	and	write-offs,	and	spending	the	proceeds	without	regard	to	the	
company’s	 interests’.100	On	March	 15th	 2004	Mr	 N	 was	 arrested	 and	 on	 the	
16th	he	had	appointed	a	 lawyer	 to	 represent	himself.101	When	questioned	on	
the	17th	March	2004	Mr	N	protested	his	 innocence	and	exercised	his	 right	 to	
silence.102	On	the	same	day,	the	prosecution	brought	an	application	before	the	
Court	 for	Mr	N	 to	be	detained	 in	 custody	 as	 if	 not	he	may	 interfere	with	 the	
case.	The	Court	granted	 this	application	and	he	was	held	 in	 custody	 for	 three	
months.	On	March	25th	2004	Mr	N	sent	a	letter	to	the	prosecution	stating	that:		
	
“Since	 I	 [Mr	 N]	 am	 not	 indifferent	 to	 the	 future	 of	 the	















2004,	 and	 then	 again	 in	 July	 until	 15th	 September	 2004.104	For	 the	 first	 four	
months	of	Mr	N’s	detention	he	spent	 it	 in	a	cell	with	the	same	person	as	who	
was	charged	with	his	kidnapping	in	2002	–	alongside	another	 inmate	who	was	
serving	 a	 prison	 sentence	 for	 murder. 105 	The	 Public	 Defender’s	 Office	













this	 payment	 on	 the	 family’s	 behalf	 on	 the	 8th	 September	 2004	 by	 bank	
transfer.111		
	
Mr	 N	 then	 filed	 a	 written	 statement	 with	 the	 prosecutor’s	 office	 on	 9th	
























him	a	plea	agreement.115	The	prosecutor	promised	 that	he	would	 request	 the	
court	 to	 convict	 Mr	 N	 without	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 merits	 and	 seeking	 a	
reduced	sentence	in	the	form	of	a	35,000	Georgian	Laris	fine.116	At	this	stage	Mr	
N	 was	 informed	 that	 this	 plea	 agreement	 would	 not	 exclude	 him	 from	 civil	
liability	 and	 he	 stated	 that	 he	 fully	 understood	 this	 and	 the	 agreement	 itself	
again.	He	then	stated	how	he	was	ready	to	accept	the	agreement	and	that	the	







request,	and	 the	 judge	again	explained	 to	Mr	N	about	his	 rights	under	Article	
679-3	of	 the	Code	of	Criminal	Procedure.119	Mr	N	then	acknowledged	that	 ‘he	
was	 well	 aware	 of	 his	 rights	 and	 that	 he	 had	 agreed	 to	 bargain	 voluntarily,	











They	both	 then	asked	the	 judge	to	endorse	 the	plea	bargain	stating	 they	 fully	
assumed	the	consequences.	The	Court	accepted	that	the	charges	against	Mr	N	
were	well	 founded,121	and	that	after	 judicial	examination	the	plea	bargain	had	




The	 applicants	 raised	 various	 challenges	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 under	 the	
Convention.	However,	the	relevant	allegations	for	our	analysis	of	the	viability	of	
plea	 bargaining	within	 the	 EU	 are	 those	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 argument	 that	 the	
plea	bargaining	process	had	been	an	abuse	of	process	and	unfair	and,	therefore,	
was	 in	 breach	 of	 Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 ECHR;	 and,	 that	 the	 financial	 penalties	
imposed	on	 the	 applicants	 as	 part	 of	 the	plea	bargain	were	 a	 breach	of	 their	
rights	under	Protocol	1,	Article	1.123	
	
The	ECtHR	begun	by	noting	 that	 it	 is	 a	 common	 feature	of	 European	 criminal	
justice	systems	to	allow	for	the	accused	to	be	granted	a	reduction	in	sentence	
or	lessening	of	the	charges	if	the	defendant	pleads	guilty	or	provides	assistance	
with	 the	 authorities	 investigation.124	Indeed,	 if	 one	 wishes	 to	 consider	 how	
prevalent	plea	bargains	are	within	the	EU	consulting	the	Ahmad,	Aswat,	Ahsan	
















In	 the	Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 case	 the	 Court	 stated	 that	 in	 itself	 it	 is	 not	
improper	to	have	a	plea	bargaining	system	and	that	 ‘[the	Court]	subscribes	to	
the	idea	that	plea	bargaining,	apart	from	offering	[…]	important	benefits	[…]	can	
also,	 if	 applied	 correctly,	 be	 a	 successful	 tool	 in	 combating	 corruption	 and	
organised	 crime’.126	Indeed,	 the	 Court	 has	 held	 before	 there	 is	 not	 anything	
improper	in	the	process	of	a	prosecuting	authority	offering	charge	or	sentencing	
bargaining	 as	 long	 as	 the	 individual’s	 rights	 are	 adequately	 protected.127	The	
key	question	here	becomes	what	 is	 sufficient	 to	 form	adequate	protection	of	
the	 individual’s	 rights?	 The	 ECtHR	 sought	 to	 reiterate	 in	 the	Natsvlishvili	 and	
Togonidze	judgment	that	an	individual	can	waive	their	procedural	rights	if	they	
wish	 as	 there	 is	 nothing	 within	 the	 ‘letter	 or	 spirit’	 of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 which	
prohibits	a	person	from	waiving	them	as	long	as	it	is	of	their	freewill	and	there	




The	 Court	 stated	 that	 Mr	 N	 waived	 his	 right	 to	 have	 the	 case	 against	 him	
examined	 on	 the	 merits	 as	 he	 struck	 a	 bargain	 and	 plead	 no	 contest	 to	 the	




‘(a)	 The	 bargain	 [has]	 to	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	 applicant	 in	
full	 awareness	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 the	 legal	
consequences	 and	 in	 a	 genuinely	 voluntary	manner;	 and	













ensure	 that	 an	 individual’s	 rights	 are	 adequately	 protected.	 This	 therefore	
means	that	Mr	N	needed	to	be	fully	aware	of	the	facts	and	legal	consequences,	
and	 that	 he	 entered	 the	 plea	 agreement	 in	 a	genuinely	 voluntary	manner.	 In	
addition,	the	plea	agreement	has	to	also	be	subject	to	judicial	review	by	a	court.	
In	Mr	 N’s	 case	 one	 could	 question	 whether	 this	 has	 occurred.	 However,	 the	
ECtHR	felt	that	there	had	been	no	violation	of	the	Convention	as:	Mr	N	initiated	
the	plea	agreement;132	he	expressed	his	own	unequivocal	willingness	 to	 repay	
the	 harm	 he	 caused	 to	 the	 State	 (through	 the	 shares); 133 	he	 had	 legal	


































Another	 apprehension	 that	 can	 be	 had	 around	 this	 plea	 agreement	 is	 the	
peculiar	 way	 in	 which	 shares	 and	 money	 changed	 hands	 prior	 to	 the	 plea	
bargain	 being	 agreed.	 The	 shares	 in	 the	 factory	were	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	
State	 at	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 case	 prior	 to	 any	 agreement	 even	 being	
made.	 This	 in	 itself	 seems	 highly	 questionable.	 The	matter	 is	 however	 made	
worse	when	we	consider	 that	Mr	N’s	 family	 then	had	 to	pay	50,000	Georgian	
Laris	to	the	‘Fund	for	the	Development	of	State	Bodies	ensuring	the	Protection	
of	 the	Law’,	but	yet	his	and	Mrs	T’s	names	could	not	 appear	as	 the	ones	 that	
were	paying	the	money.	This	meant	that	Mrs	M.I.-dze	–	Mrs	T’s	sister-in-law	–	
had	 to	make	 the	payment.	 Then,	Mr	N	had	 to	pay	 a	 further	 35,000	Georgian	
Laris	 to	 the	 State	 budget,	 which	 again	 was	 paid	 by	Mrs	M.I.-dze.	 This	 seems	
rather	 suspicious	 even	 to	 the	 uncynical.	 Why	 did	 two	 payments	 have	 to	 be	
made	 (one	of	which	 could	not	have	 the	defendants	name	on	 it);	why	did	 the	
shares	 also	 have	 to	 be	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	 State	 of	 one	 of	 the	 country’s	
most	 important	 companies?	 It	 is	 felt	 that	 these	 are	 questions	 that	 the	 ECtHR	
should	 have	 asked	 and	 conducted	 a	 more	 detailed	 analysis	 into	 as	 it	 seems	
counterintuitive	not	to	when	one	is	supposed	to	be	ensuring	that	an	individual’s	




agreement.	However,	what	 is	not	clear	 from	the	 judgment	 is	how	much	of	an	
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analysis	 the	 National	 Court	 actually	 conducted	 into	 the	 agreement.	 It	 is	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 National	 Court	 did	 note	 that	 there	 was	 sufficient	
evidence	to	charge	Mr	N,	confirmed	that	he	understood	his	rights	and	that	he	
had	agreed	to	the	agreement	voluntarily.	However,	was	sufficient	time	allotted	
to	 truly	deliberate	on	 the	plea	and	 the	evidence	against	him?	 It	 is	possible	 to	
conclude	 that	given	 the	 time	 in	which	 this	plea	agreement	was	considered	 in,	
that	 the	 National	 Court	 might	 have	 actually	 just	 been	 conducting	 more	 of	 a	
‘rubber	stamping	exercise’	than	truly	assessing	the	case.	
	
These	 concerns	 and	 procedural	 irregularities	 within	 plea	 agreements	 are	
something	 that	has	often	been	 raised	as	potential	 issues	 and	 concerns	within	
the	academic	literature	on	plea	bargaining.137	The	vast	majority	of	this	literature	
is	 of	 US	 origin	 and	 therefore	 focuses	 on	 their	 procedure,	 but	 many	 of	 the	
concerns	 can	 transcend	across	all	plea	bargaining	programmes.	Therefore,	we	
shall	now	consider	some	of	the	 issues	raised	 in	the	 literature	 in	regards	to	Mr	
N’s	case	and	 into	the	 implementation	of	plea	bargaining	system	within	a	 legal	
system.		
	
It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 plea	 bargaining	 is	 unconstitutional	 as	 it	 sets	 up	 a	
system,	which	in	essence,	forces	defendants	to	plead	guilty	and	accept	the	plea	
bargain.138	This	 is	 because	 if	 the	 defendant	 opts	 for	 a	 trial	 by	 jury	 the	
prosecution	 will	 charge	 the	 defendant	 more	 harshly	 than	 if	 they	 agree	 to	
plead.139	This	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 fewer	 trials	 by	 jury.	 One	 could	 see	 this	 as	
potentially	being	the	case	for	Mr	N	where,	he	could	have	been	prosecuted	for	
an	offence,	which	carried	a	potential	prison	sentence	of	six-to-twelve	years	but	














to	 identify	 whether	 innocent	 ‘defendants’	 would	 plead	 guilty.140	They	 found	





of	 the	 case	 can	be	 fully	 assessed	by	 the	 court;	 and	hopefully	 a	 truly	 innocent	
defendant	would	be	found	not	guilty	here.	It	is	scenarios	like	this	where	we	see	
an	 innocent	 defendant	 coerced	 into	 pleading	 guilty	 because	 of	 the	 potential	
risks	from	taking	the	case	to	trial	are	much	higher	than	accepting	a	plea	bargain.	
This	 is	 the	 situation	 where	 plea	 bargaining	 becomes	 most	 dangerous	 to	
defendants;	namely,	a	truly	innocent	defendant.	Even	though	they	are	innocent	
they	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 prove	 their	 case,	 and	 no	 one	 can	 say	with	 certainty	
what	will	happen	if	they	go	to	court.	But,	if	they	accept	the	plea	agreement	they	
know	what	 fine	or	sentence	the	prosecution	will	 recommend	and,	 if	 the	court	
endorses	the	plea	what	fine	or	sentence	they	will	receive.	As	Mr	N	found,	once	
a	 court	 approves	 a	 plea	 agreement	 it	 is	 incredibly	 difficult	 for	 a	 defendant	 to	
manage	 to	overturn	 it.	 In	 the	US	 for	example,	 there	are	only	 three	categories	
that	a	defendant	can	raise	a	challenge	under.142	Yet,	even	if	the	defendant	can	
raise	 an	 issue	 under	 one	 of	 these	 categories	 they	 are	 unlikely	 to	 succeed	 in	

















bargain	 and	 that	 many	 of	 the	 criticisms	 levied	 against	 operating	 a	 plea	
bargaining	system	seem	to	occur	here,	it	could	legitimately	lead	one	to	question	
why	 the	 ECtHR	 did	 not	 find	 that	 in	 this	 case	 the	 plea	 agreement	was	 unfair.	
Perhaps,	given	 the	 fact	 that	 the	plea	bargaining	system,	had	at	 the	 time,	only	
recently	been	 introduced	 in	Georgia	 and	 that	 there	has	been	 further	 changes	




decision	 was	 herself	 much	more	 critical	 of	 the	 plea	 agreement.	 Judge	 Alvina	





Judge	 Gyulumyan	 begun	 by	 stating	 that	 there	 was	 no	 objection	 or	 concerns	
raised	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 utilisation	 of	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system.	 Indeed,	 she	
sought	to	make	this	fact	crystal	clear	by	stating	that	it	was	not	her	objective	‘to	
call	 into	 question	 the	 system	of	 plea	 bargaining	 as	 such,	 in	 general	 terms’.144	
The	 concerns,	 which	 she	 raised	 here,	 were	 related	 specifically	 to	 the	
circumstances	 of	 the	 case	 before	 the	 Court	 and	 the	 early	 Georgian	model	 of	
plea	bargaining.		
	
The	opinion	of	 Judge	Gyulumyan	was	 that	 the	question	of	whether	Mr	N	and	





plea	 bargaining	 process	 negotiations	 had	 not	 been	 recorded	 in	 full.145	Judge	
Gyulumyan	 was	 also	 concerned	 that	 there	 had	 been	 several	 ‘shady	 factual	
circumstances	of	 the	case’	–	 such	as	 factory	 shares	changing	hands	as	well	as	
monetary	 payments	 prior	 to	 the	 procedural	 agreement	 being	 agreed	 –	which	
leads	 to	 one	 questioning	 the	 equality	 of	 power	 during	 the	 negotiations.146	In	
addition	to	these	concerns	Judge	Gyulumyan	had	questions	as	to	whether	Mr	N	
could	have	agreed	to	the	plea	bargain	in	a	‘truly	voluntary	manner’	because	of	







sufficiently	 examined	 by	 the	National	 Court	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	was	 a	
strong	enough	case	against	him	that	he	had	to	answer.	This	was	based	on	the	
fact	that	the	National	Court	only	examined	the	brief	in	a	day	and	approved	the	
plea	 bargain	 the	 next	 day.	 Judge	 Gyulumyan	 argues	 that	 this	 did	 not	 allow	
















The	 concerns	 raised	by	 Judge	Gyulumyan	are	 similar	 to	 those	 that	 the	author	
raised	and	 to	what	one	would	presumably	have	expected	 the	other	 judges	 to	
wish	to	be	discussed	in	the	case.	Perhaps	this	difference	in	opinion	is	down	to	







independent	 court	 that	 assesses	 the	 plea	 agreement	 and	 the	 agreement	 is	
documented	and	entered	into	voluntarily	by	the	defendant,	then	there	will	be	
no	 issues	with	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR.	 Indeed,	as	 long	as	 these	safe	guards	are	
met	a	company	or	individual	may	freely	waive	its/their	right	to	a	trial.	Although	
the	 author	 feels	 there	 are	 areas	 of	 questions	 around	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 plea	
agreement	 in	 the	 Natsvlishvili	 and	 Togonidze	 case;	 plea	 bargaining	 systems	
themselves,	are	not	suspect.	However,	to	avoid	the	issues	identified	within	the	
Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	 judgment	 it	would	be	essential	that	 if	the	EU	were	
to	 implement	a	plea	bargaining	system	that	clear,	documented	guidance	–	on	





We	shall	now	take	what	we	have	 learned	 from	the	previous	discussion	of	 the	









now.	The	Commission	would	 conduct	 the	 investigation;	 calculate	 the	 fine	and	
award	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 reductions	 to	 undertakings.	 However,	 the	
Commission	 would	 no	 longer	 determine	 whether	 there	 has	 been	 an	
infringement	and	impose	the	fine	on	an	undertaking;	this	would	be	conducted	
by	 the	 General	 Court.	 This	 is	 a	 requirement	 of	 operating	 a	 plea	 bargaining	
system;	 namely,	 having	 effective	 judicial	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 agreement.	 The	
Commission	in	essence	becomes	the	prosecutor.	The	Court	will	then	assess	the	
Commission’s	 case	and	 the	 calculation	of	 the	 fine.	Once	 they	have	 conducted	
this	 assessment	 the	 Court	 will	 be	 able	 to	 endorse	 the	 Commission’s	 decision	
(and	if	there	 is	one	the	plea	bargain)	or	reject	the	case	 if	they	feel	there	 is	no	
case	 to	 answer	 (or	 the	 plea	 bargain	 if	 it	 is	 inappropriate).	 The	 Commission	




the	 infringement	 decision	 to	 become	 final	 –	where	 currently	 the	 Commission	
makes	the	 infringement	decision	final	through	the	College	of	Commissioners	–	
this	will	 be	 very	 different	 to	 a	 fully	 litigated	 case	 that	 goes	 before	 the	 courts	
currently.	Therefore,	the	litigation	costs	of	having	to	have	the	decision	imposed	





be	 required	 to	waive	 the	 right	 to	appeal	 the	Commission’s	decision	 (once	 the	
bargain	has	been	approved	by	the	Court),	challenge	the	Commission’s	evidence,	
calculation	 and	 assumptions.	 Although,	 through	 the	 plea	 agreement	 the	
undertaking	should	have	had	a	chance	to	effectively	 influence	and	discuss	the	
Commission’s	 evidence,	 calculations	 and	 assumptions.	 The	 undertaking	would	
also	 have	 to	 admit	 its	 liability	 for	 the	 infringement	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 TFEU.	 In	
return	for	waiving	all	of	these	rights	an	undertaking	would	receive	a	significant	
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reduction	 in	 the	 fine	 imposed	 upon	 it	 for	 its	 infringement,	 a	 much	 quicker	
decision	 and	 procedure,	 and	 have	 limited	 legal	 fees	 to	 pay,	 because	 the	
undertaking	 will	 not	 have	 to	 challenge	 the	 case	 before	 a	 court	 since	 it	 has	
influenced	the	decision	through	discussions	with	the	Commission.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 above	 changes	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	
programme,	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 programme	 will	 also	 have	 to	 be	
amended	 if	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 procedure	 were	 implemented.	 The	 leniency	
programme	 would	 need	 to	 align	 itself	 more	 with	 the	 US-style	 of	 leniency	
programme.	That	is	to	say,	only	the	first	undertaking	to	come	forward	would	be	
able	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency	 under	 the	 programme,	 the	 remaining	 undertakings	
would	need	to	enter	into	plea	bargains	with	the	Commission.	This	change	would	
be	important,	as	it	would	encourage	undertakings	to	settle	so	that	the	benefits	
of	 plea	 bargaining	 can	 be	 achieved.	 If	 undertakings	 can	 still	 get	 reductions	 in	




which	 will	 also	 need	 to	 be	 put	 in	 place.	 The	 ECtHR	 listed	 these	 ‘judicial	
safeguards’	in	the	Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	case.		The	court	stated	
that	 where	 there	 is	 a	 plea	 agreement	 involving	 a	 defendant	 it	 needs	 to	 be	
accompanied	by	the	following	conditions:	that	the	bargain	was	accepted	in	full	
awareness	of	 the	 facts	of	 the	 case	and	 the	 legal	 consequences	 in	 a	 genuinely	
voluntary	 manner	 to	 comply	 with	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR.	 In	 addition,	 the	
bargain’s	contents	and	the	manner	in	which	the	parties	had	reached	it	have	to	








force,	 threats,	 assurances,	 promises	 or	 representations	 from	 the	 Commission	
which	are	not	contained	within	 the	plea	agreement.	To	do	 this	effectively	 the	
General	Court	will	need	to	ensure	that	the	bargain	itself	and	the	way	in	which	it	
was	reached	had	been	done	so	 fairly	and	 legally	by	thoroughly	examining	and	
considering	 all	 the	 details	 of	 the	 agreement,	 the	 case	 and	 the	 negotiations.	
Because	 of	 this	 it	 will	 be	 very	 important	 that	 all	 of	 the	 negotiations	 are	
documented	so	that	the	Court	can	adequately	inspect	them	and	establish	how	
the	 agreement	 was	 reached	 and	 ensure	 there	 were	 no	 false	 promises	 or	
coercion	 made.	 A	 potential	 way	 of	 addressing	 this	 could	 be	 to	 have	 an	
independent	party	sit	in	on	all	the	discussions	that	reports	directly	to	the	court	
itself.	This	is	something,	which	is	explored	more	generally	in	the	next	section	of	
the	 chapter	 as	 a	 potential	 improvement	 under	 the	 current	 settlement	
procedure;	 therefore,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 discussed	 in	 any	 depth	 here.	 Finally,	 the	
General	 Court	 will	 need	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 undertaking	 is	 full	 aware	 of	 its	
procedural	rights,	the	facts	of	the	case	and	the	legal	consequences	of	entering	
into	 a	 plea	 bargain.	 As	 long	 as	 these	 requirements	 are	 met	 an	 undertaking	
waving	certain	procedural	rights	would	not	result	in	a	breach	of	Article	6	ECHR.	
In	addition,	with	 these	protections	 in	place	and	 the	General	Court	 thoroughly	
examining	and	scrutinising	 the	plea	agreements	we	should	not	 see	any	of	 the	




of	Article	 263	 TFEU	when	 contemplating	 how	 the	 EU	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	










settlement	 of	 cartel	 cases.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 such	 a	 problem	 as	 it	 first	
appears.	We	need	to	remember	that	every	plea	agreement	would	be	subject	to	
review	by	 the	European	Court	before	 it	would	be	accepted	and	 implemented.	
This	means	 that	 the	court	will	 assess	 the	agreement	and	 the	case	against	 the	
undertaking.	 Consequently,	 ensuring	 that	 there	 is	 a	 case	 against	 the	
undertaking,	that	the	undertaking	understands	the	implications	of	entering	into	
the	agreement,	 that	 it	did	so	without	duress	and	any	 false	promises,	and	that	
the	 undertaking	 wishes	 to	 waive	 its	 right	 to	 appeal.	 Alongside	 this	 an	
undertaking	has	the	right	–	under	Article	6	of	 the	ECHR	–	to	waive	 its	 right	to	
appeal	where	it	wishes	too.	This	therefore	means	that	Article	263	TFEU	will	be	
complied	 with	 and	 will	 not	 be	 breached	 if	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 were	
implemented	within	the	EU.	
	
As	 has	 been	 illustrated	 within	 this	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	
Commission	 could	 implement	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 for	 cartel	 cases	 that	
would	 comply	 with	 the	 ECHR	 and	 also	 bring	 a	 variety	 of	 benefits	 to	 the	
settlement	procedure.	However,	this	would	involve	a	radical	overhauling	of	the	





Still,	 if	 the	EU	were	 to	undertake	 the	necessary	 changes	 to	 the	Treaty	and	 its	
policies	then	the	benefits	identified	in	this	section	can	be	achieved.	Indeed,	the	
analysis	 in	 this	 research	 will	 be	 invaluable	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 such	 a	
procedure.	 The	 next	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 now	 consider	 other	
improvements	 that	 can	 be	 made	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	 procedure	
which	 are	 less	 radical	 and	 easier	 to	 implement,	 but	 yet,	 can	 still	 bring	







bring	 to	 the	 EU.	 This	 section	 takes	 a	more	 restrictive	 approach	 and	 considers	
less	 radical	 options	 for	 improving	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	
procedure.	 These	 options	 stem	 from	 the	 identification	 of	 areas	 within	 the	
current	 procedure	 that	 need	 improving	 and	 the	 comparison	 had	with	 the	 US	
system	 of	 plea	 bargaining.	 There	 are	 four	 suggestions	 for	 improvements	 put	
forward	within	this	section,	specifically;	(1)	allowing	an	undertaking	to	request	
and	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	
proceedings,	 including	within	 the	 investigation	 period;	 (2)	 having	 the	 Hearing	
Officer	 sit	 in	 on	 all	 settlement	 discussions;	 (3)	 removing	 the	 mandatory	 ten	
percent	reduction	in	settlements	and	allowing	this	to	be	flexible;	and	finally,	(4)	





another	 in	 various	 arrangements	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 current	
procedure.	 Each	 of	 the	 four	 options	 seeks	 to	 help	 address	 the	 problems	
identified	 in	 relation	 to	 time	 and	 resources	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways.	 There	 are	
further	improvements	that	have	been	identified	by	the	analysis,	however,	these	













This	 first	 option	 would	 allow	 an	 undertaking	 –	 if	 the	 Commission	 deems	 it	
appropriate	in	the	case	–	to	begin	settlement	discussions	with	the	Commission	
at	any	stage	of	its	procedure.	The	benefits	of	allowing	an	undertaking	to	enter	
into	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 investigation	 stage	 were	
highlighted	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 when	 the	
implementation	of	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	within	the	EU	was	considered.	
Therefore,	 these	 benefits	 and	 potential	 issues	 need	 not	 be	 debated	 again.	
However,	there	are	some	additional	points	we	can	note	and	discuss	here	in	this	




of	 settlement	 discussions.	 Although,	 there	 are	 those	 who	 would	 dispute	 this	
claim.	 For	 example,	 Laina	 –	 the	 head	 of	 the	 cartel	 settlement	 unit	 at	 the	
Commission	 –	 believes	 ‘the	 fact	 that	 the	 Commission	 does	 a	 complete	
investigation	before	deciding	whether	a	case	will	 follow	the	settlement	or	 the	







allowing	 undertakings	 to	 settle	 during	 the	 investigation.	 For	 example,	 there	
would	 be	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 consequently	 the	
decision	because	the	discussions	can	begin	earlier	which	allows	the	parties	and	












allowing	 an	 undertaking	 to	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 during	 the	
investigation	 is	 that	 the	 judicial	 safety	 measures	 required	 in	 plea	 bargaining	
would	not	be	necessary	as	an	undertaking	would	not	be	mandated	to	waive	its	
right	 to	 appeal.	 In	 essence	 the	 EU	 would	 gain	 one	 of	 the	 most	 beneficial	
features	 of	 the	 US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 (with	 regards	 to	 speed	 and	
efficiency),	yet	this	would	come	without	the	high	costs	usually	associated	with	
it.	However,	an	additional	safety	measure,	which	should	be	put	in	place	to	help	
protect	 an	undertakings	 rights	 if	Option	1	were	 to	be	 implemented	would	be	
that	mooted	 in	Option	 2.	 A	 Hearing	Officer	 should	 be	 present	 for	 settlement	




Currently	 undertakings	 ‘may	 call	 upon	 the	Hearing	Officer	 at	 any	 time	 during	
the	settlement	procedure	 in	relation	to	 issues	that	might	arise	relating	to	due	
process.	The	Hearing	Officer's	duty	is	to	ensure	that	the	effective	exercise	of	the	
rights	 of	 defence	 is	 respected.’155	This	 means	 that	 the	 Hearing	 Officer	 only	
becomes	involved	in	the	Commission’s	settlement	procedure	if	an	undertaking	









were	 a	 due	process	 problem	and	 the	Hearing	Officer	 is	 not	 in	 the	 settlement	
discussions	 (as	 is	 the	 case	 now)	 then	 the	 discussions	 have	 to	 stop	whilst	 the	
Hearing	 Officer	 investigates	 and	 addresses	 the	 undertakings	 concerns.	 The	
Hearing	 Officer	 will	 need	 to	 collect	 and	 evaluate	 the	 necessary	 information	
before	 the	 discussions	 and	 settlement	 can	 continue.	 Yet,	 had	 the	 Hearing	
Officer	been	 in	 the	 settlement	discussions	when	 it	happened	 they	would	 fully	
appreciate	the	context,	have	the	necessary	information	and	be	there	to	assess	
and	address	 the	problem	 immediately.	By	having	a	Hearing	Officer	within	 the	
settlement	 discussions	 it	 means	 that	 the	 undertakings	 concerns	 may	 be	
addressed	 and	 dealt	with	 quickly	which	 in	 turn	 leads	 to	 procedural	 efficiency	
gains	over	cases	where	the	Hearing	Officer	is	not	there.	It	also	means	that	the	
Hearing	Officer	maybe	able	to	assist	with	communications	and	issues	between	










be	 less	 thorough	as	 the	Commission	will	not	have	completed	 its	 investigation.	
This	 means	 that	 the	 undertaking	 will	 be	 entering	 into	 discussions	 with	 the	




important	 that	 there	 is	 a	 Hearing	 Officer	 present	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	
undertaking’s	 right	 to	 defence	 is	 resected	 and	 that	 the	Commission	 considers	
the	 parties’	 settlement	 submissions.	 By	 having	 the	Hearing	Officer	 present	 at	
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However,	 a	 superior	 approach	 to	 utilising	 a	 Hearing	 Officer	 would	 be	 to	
implement	 a	 truly	 independent	body	 to	 sit	 in	on	 these	procedures.	 This	 body	




that	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 were	 reached	 fairly.	 This	 role	 would	 be	 of	
particular	 importance	 if	 the	 settlement	 decisions	 were	 to	 begin	 during	 the	
investigatory	stage	or	involve	negotiations.	As	these	would	be	the	cases	where	
















Currently	 the	 Commission	 awards	 settling	 undertakings	 a	 flat	 ten	 percent	
reduction	 in	 the	 fine	 for	engaging	 in	settlement	discussions	with	 them.	This	 is	
low	in	comparison	to	many	other	jurisdictions.156	For	example,	in	the	UK	up	to	a	
twenty	 percent	 discount	 may	 be	 awarded	 for	 undertakings	 settling	 with	 the	
CMA.157	In	France,	the	fine	ceiling	is	reduced	from	ten	percent	of	global	annual	
turnover	 to	 five	 percent	 when	 undertakings	 settle.158	This	 reduction	 is	 an	
important	 part	 of	 the	 benefit	 of	 settling	 with	 the	 competition	 authority	 or	
Commission	 for	 an	 undertaking.	 Removing	 the	 mandatory	 reduction	 and	
allowing	 it	 to	be	more	 flexible,	 so	as	 to	 represent	how	an	undertaking	assists	
the	 Commission	 in	 settling	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 greater	willingness	 on	 the	 part	 of	
undertakings	 to	 settle	 and	 other	 procedural	 benefits	 relating	 to	 speed	 to	 be	
achieved.	This	is	because	undertakings	will	have	an	increased	incentive	and	thus	
desire	 to	 cooperate	 to	 receive	 a	 higher	 reduction,	 as	 the	 reduction	 they	 can	
receive	will	vary	based	upon	their	assistance.	By	allowing	undertakings	greater	
reductions,	 so	 as	 to	 reflect	 the	 effort	 and	 information	 they	 provide	 this	 will	
incentivise	 and	 encourage	 cooperation,	 negotiation,	 discussions	 and	
information	 sharing	 with	 the	 Commission.	 All	 of	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 an	
enhancement	of	the	settlement	procedure.	
	
Having	 said	 this,	 it	has	been	 implied	 that	 the	Commission	 is	already	awarding	













infringement.160	If	 this	 is	 the	case,	 it	 is	good	that	the	Commission	 is	rewarding	
undertakings	 for	 cooperating,	 however	 this	 procedure	 needs	 to	 be	 clear	 and	
transparent.	 Awarding	 discounts	 ‘under	 the	 table’	 so	 to	 speak,	 does	 not	
enhance	the	procedure	or	allow	undertakings	to	appreciate	the	true	benefits	of	
settling	 from	the	outside.	This	 is	because	undertakings	will	be	unaware	of	 the	
potential	 reductions	they	may	receive	 if	 they	partake	 in	a	settlement	with	the	
Commission.	The	legislation	and	guidance	clearly	states	that	only	a	ten	percent	
reduction	 for	 settling	 will	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 undertakings	 fine.	 A	 better	 way	









By	 implementing	 a	higher	 reduction	 for	 settling	 and	producing	 clear	 guidance	







discussion	would	 be	 limited,	 with	 the	 Commission	 deciding	 which	matters	 to	
negotiate	on	and,	the	Court	having	the	final	say	on	the	calculation	of	the	fine.	
These	 points	 would	 usually	 focus	 around:	 the	 length	 of	 the	 infringement,	






to	 influence	 the	 overall	 fine	 imposed	 upon	 them.	 This	 in	 turn	 should	 lead	 to	
more	fruitful	discussions,	quicker	settlements	and	a	reduction	in	the	likelihood	
of	 the	 settlement	 process	 being	 abandoned	 by	 an	 undertaking	 or	 the	
settlement	decision	being	appealed.		
	




undertaking	 could	get	 from	settling,	namely	 the	ability	 to	discuss	parts	of	 the	
cases	with	the	Commission.	Yet	having	claimed	this,	 the	settlement	procedure	
clearly	 states	 that	 the	 Commission	 should	 consider	 the	 parties’	 settlement	
submissions	 so	 that	 their	 rights	 of	 defence	 can	 be	 exercised	 effectively	 and	
taken	into	account	in	the	preliminary	analysis.161	In	fact,	when	we	consider	the	
comments	 from	 practitioners	 who	 deal	 with	 settlement	 cases	 we	 see	 that	 it	
appears	 that	 the	 Commission	 may	 already	 be	 negotiating	 to	 a	 degree	 with	
settling	 parties.	 For	 example,	 Van	 Gerven	 a	 partner	 at	 Linklaters	 stated	 in	 a	
interview	that	there	is	an:	
	
‘Expectation	 that	 settlement	 discussions	 allow	 for	 a	 more	
meaningful	 discussion	with	 the	 Commission	 staff	 than	what	
would	be	possible	in	a	standard	procedure	and	that	you	have	















the	 same	 fine	 as	 cases	 resolved	 in	 a	 full	 procedure.	 I	 do	
have	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 dialogue	 with	 the	
Commission	in	the	months	leading	to	a	settlement	is	able	
to	 influence	 the	 scope	 and	 duration	 of	 the	 infringement.	
And	 certainly	 the	 dialogue	 on	 affected	 turnover	 ensures	
that	 fines	 are	 set	 by	 reference	 to	 sales	 volumes	 that	 are	
clearly	impacted	by	the	infringement.’163		
	




current	procedure.	Namely,	 some	know	that	 they	can	have	an	 impact	on	 the	
Commission’s	findings	and	the	resulting	fine.	If	it	is	the	case	that	undertakings	
can,	 and	 currently	 do,	 influence	 the	 Commission’s	 findings	 and	 analysis	 it	
would	be	beneficial	 to	have	 this	 recognised	within	 the	 settlement	procedure	
documentation	 somewhere,	 clearly	 laying	 down	 the	 areas	 which	 the	
Commission	may	discuss	or	be	willing	to	negotiate	upon	with	the	undertakings.	
This	 is	 important	 as	 without	 guidance	 on	 this	 we	 have	 the	 situation,	 which	










reduction	 in	 fine	would	 be	 a	 further	 incentive	 for	 undertakings	 to	 cooperate	
and	apply	for	settling	it	is	important	that	this	reduction	and	procedure	is	clearly	
laid	down	in	guidelines	for	undertakings	to	understand.	Indeed,	for	procedural	







the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 system	 to	 further	 enhance	 its	 procedural	
efficiency.	Though	each	of	these	options	will	bring	differing	levels	of	gains,	the	
most	beneficial	of	these	appears	to	be	Option	1:	allowing	undertakings	to	enter	
settlement	 discussions	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 –	 including	 the	
investigatory	 stage.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 investigatory	 period	 typically	 takes	 a	
long	time	and	has	a	significant	impact	on	the	length	of	the	proceedings	and	the	
resources	 utilised	 during	 the	 case.	 However,	 Option	 1	 could	 come	 at	 the	
expense	of	investigatory	rigor.	Nevertheless,	if	the	Hearing	Officer	is	allowed	to	






own.	 Nevertheless,	 ideally	 all	 four	 of	 these	 options	 would	 be	 considered	 for	
implementation,	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 only	 some	 could	 be	 chosen.	 This	
approach	is	the	opposite	to	the	‘radical	approach’	which	would	require	all	of	the	
recommended	changes	to	be	made	so	as	to	allow	the	plea	bargaining	system	to	





This	 chapter	 has	 taken	 the	 timely	 opportunity	 to	 identify	 what	 the	
Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 process	 can	 learn	 from	 the	 DOJ’s	 plea	
bargaining	procedure	to	enhance	its	efficiency	whilst	complying	with	Article	6	of	
the	ECHR.	The	Commission’s	direct	settlement	procedure	has	been	in	operation	
for	seven	years	now,	yet	 it	has	had	a	very	slow	uptake	 in	use.	 In	 recent	years	
there	 has	 been	 a	 rise	 in	 cases	 settled	 under	 the	 procedure	 yet	 there	 has	 still	
only	been	a	mere	seventeen	cases	settled.	Nonetheless,	the	lack	of	cases	being	
settled	is	not	the	real	issue	here,	that	is	to	say,	although	it	is	disappointing	there	
has	 not	 been	 more	 settlements	 in	 this	 period	 of	 time,	 the	 real	 issues	 and	
concerns	 –	 from	 an	 efficiency	 and	 effective	 perspective	 –	 relate	 to	 (a)	 the	
amount	 of	 time	 it	 takes	 for	 a	 case	 to	 be	 settled	 and	 (b)	 the	 fact	 that	 various	
cases	are	having	to	proceed	as	hybrid	ones.		
	
The	concerns	under	 (a)	 relate	to	 the	matter	 that	an	undertaking	cannot	begin	
settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	 Commission	 until	 the	 Commission’s	
investigation	 has	 been	 completed.	 This	 means	 that	 though	 the	 beginning	 of	
settlement	 discussions	 to	 the	 final	 imposition	 of	 the	 decision	 only	 takes	 an	




resources	 it	 is	 still	 not	 as	 efficient	 and	 effective	 as	 it	 can	 be	 owing	 to	 the	
inability	 for	 an	 undertaking	 to	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	 with	 the	
Commission	at	an	early	stage.	As	was	noted	earlier,	allowing	these	discussions	
at	 any	 stage	will	 significantly	 enhance	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 Commission	
and	 undertakings	 and	 this	 in	 turn	 should	 help	 the	 Commission	 complete	 the	
investigation	 much	 more	 quickly,	 as	 undertakings	 are	 cooperating	 from	 the	
start.	However,	one	has	to	be	cautious	here,	as	by	reducing	the	Commission’s	
investigatory	 rigour	 it	 can	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 strength	 and	
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The	 concerns	 raised	 in	 regards	 to	 (b)	 hybrid	 cases	 surround	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Commission	 has	 to	 run	 two	 separate	 proceedings	 –	 one	 via	 the	 streamlined	
approach	 and	 one	 via	 the	 standard	 procedure.	 Whilst	 it	 is	 important	 for	 a	
variety	 of	 reasons	 –	 that	 were	 recognised	 within	 the	 chapter	 –	 for	 the	
Commission	to	be	able	to	operate	hybrid	procedures,	doing	so	inevitably	has	a	
resources	 implication	 cost.	 As	 the	 Commission	 implemented	 the	 settlement	
procedure	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 making	 the	 most	 efficient	 use	 of	 its	 resources	 it	
would	 seem	 important	 to	 identify	 ways	 of	 reducing	 the	 resource	 cost	 of	 the	
current	hybrid	system.	
	
Through	 the	 examination	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 –	
and	a	comparison	with	the	US	DOJ’s	plea	bargaining	system	–	it	was	identified	
that	 there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 ways	 of	 addressing	 the	 two	 key	 aforementioned	
problems	 and	 further	 enhancing	 the	 current	 EU	 procedure.	 Broadly,	 these	
improvements	could	be	achieved	by	adopting	one	of	 two	distinct	approaches,	
with	each	bringing	 varying	 levels	of	 enhancement	 to	 the	procedure.	Adopting	
the	 first	 approach	 would	 involve	 a	 significant	 overhauling	 of	 the	 current	 EU	
cartel	 enforcement	 procedure,	 but	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 bring	 the	 most	
significant	benefits.	The	first	approach	involved	implementing	a	plea	bargaining	
system	within	the	EU	and	amending	the	Commission’s	leniency	programme	–	so	
that	 it	 was	 an	 option	 open	 only	 to	 the	 first	 undertaking	 to	 come	 forward	 to	
report	a	cartel.	This	approach	was	defined	as	the	‘radical	approach’,	because	of	
the	 significant	 overhauls	 to	 the	 procedure	 that	 it	 would	 lead	 too.	 The	
Commission	would	still	conduct	the	investigation	and	calculate	the	fine	that	an	
undertaking	 should	 receive.	 However,	 this	 would	 then	 be	 authorised	 by	 the	
General	Court,	which	in	turn	allows	the	Court	to	assess	the	calculation	made	by	
the	Commission	and	scrutinise	the	settlement	agreement	(if	any	is	made)	with	
the	 undertaking.	 This	 approach	 would	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 litigation,	 remove	
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appeals, 164 	and	 increase	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 current	 procedure	 and	 the	
investigative	 stage.	 	By	 considering	 the	ECtHR	 jurisprudence	–	particularly	 the	
Natsvlishvili	and	Togonidze	v	Georgia	case	–	regarding	Article	6	of	the	ECHR	we	
identified	that,	as	long	as	the	necessary	procedural	safeguards	are	in	place	and	
sufficient	 judicial	 scrutiny	 occurs	 then	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 that	 includes	
removing	the	right	to	appeal	will	comply	with	the	ECHR.	
	
The	 second	 approach	 was	 classified	 as	 the	 ‘hybrid	 approach’,	 as	 it	 involves	




1. Allowing	 an	 undertaking	 to	 request	 and	 begin	 settlement	 discussions	
with	 the	Commission	whilst	 the	 investigation	 into	cartel	conduct	 is	 still	
being	conducted;	
2. Having	 the	Hearing	Officer	–	or	more	 ideally	a	 truly	 independent	party	
who	 can	 report	 concerns	 to	 the	 Commission/Court	 –	 sit	 in	 on	 all	
settlement	 discussions	 so	 as	 to	 ensure	 that	 undertakings	 rights	 are	
adequately	protected	and	that	settlements	are	reached	fairly;		
3. Removing	the	arbitrary	mandatory	ten	percent	reduction	on	settlements	






willing	 the	policy	makers	 are	 to	make	 the	 changes,	which	 to	 a	 degree	will	 be	






Although	 the	 ‘radical	approach’	would	 lead	 to	potentially	 the	greatest	 savings	
and	 improvements	 it	would	 limit	 an	undertakings	 ability	 to	 appeal	 and	would	
require	 a	 significant	 change	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 current	 procedures	 and	
structure,	 including	 the	 need	 for	 every	 case	 to	 be	 heard	 before	 the	 General	
Court.	For	 these	reasons	 it	 is	advocated	that	 the	 ‘hybrid	approach’	 is	 the	best	
way	 forward	 for	 the	Commission	 to	 improve	 the	current	procedure;	whereby,	
all	of	 the	recommendations	 from	the	second	section	of	 the	chapter	should	be	
implemented.	This	should	include,	but	is	not	limited	to,	allowing	an	undertaking	
to	propose	settlement	discussions	at	any	point	of	 the	 investigation;	having	an	
independent	 party	 sit	 in	 on	 settlement	 discussions	 between	 the	 Commission	
and	 undertakings;	 and,	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 fixed	 ten	 percent	 reduction	 for	
settling.	 By	 implementing	 these	 changes	 the	 Commission’s	 settlement	
procedures	efficiency	can	be	enhanced	–	leading	to	greater	cost	savings.	At	the	
same	 time	 the	 settlement	 programme	 also	 becomes	 more	 appealing	 to	




cases	 occur	 as	 undertakings	 are	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 case	 and	 engage	 in	
discussions	sooner	with	the	Commission.		
	
Whether	 the	 direct	 settlement	 procedure	 stays	 the	 same	 or	 one	 of	 the	
approaches	forwarded	in	this	chapter	were	to	be	considered	it	 is	 important	to	






Finally,	 it	 is	worth	 stressing	 again	 that	 this	 chapter	 has	 potential	 implications	




plea	 bargaining	 system,	 so	 that	 it	 complies	 with	 the	 ECHR.	 Therefore,	 the	
chapter	has	a	much	wider	impact	in	the	literature	than	that	of	just	competition	














This	 thesis	 has	 analysed	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 (hereafter	 the	
‘Commission’)	 cartel	 enforcement	 policies	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	 rights	
enshrined	 in	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,1	‘the	 ECHR’,	 other	
procedural	 rights;	 and	 to	 identify	 areas	 for	 further	 improvements	 to	 the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 programme	 –	 while	 remaining	 compatible	
with	rights	protection.	Whilst	the	thesis	broadly	found	compliance,	there	were	a	
variety	 areas	 identified	 where	 improvements	 and	 enhancements	 could	 be	











under	 the	 ECHR	 and	 why	 one	 would	 want	 an	 undertaking	 to	 have	 its	 rights	
protected.	The	importance	of	the	security	of	rights	protection	in	the	context	of	
competition	law	proceedings	was	identified.	It	was	concluded	that	corporations	
do	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection	 under	 the	 Convention,	 when	 national	
competition	law	legislation	is	being	applied.	However,	until	the	EUs	accession	to	
the	 ECHR	 undertakings	 will	 not	 have	 standing	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 against	 the	
Commission.	Nonetheless,	as	this	thesis	made	clear,	this	research	is	conducted	
against	 the	backdrop	of	when	the	EU	does	accede	 to	 the	ECHR,	which	 the	EU	
intends	to	do	and	has	provided	for,	within	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon.2	There	were	a	
variety	of	arguments	put	 forward	within	the	thesis	as	to	why	one	would	want	
undertakings	 to	 qualify	 for	 right	 protection,	 alongside	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
potential	 challenges.	 The	key	 challenges	against	 rights	protection	 consisted	of	
the	 following:	 (1)	 the	 ECHR	 was	 never	 intended	 to	 protect	 a	 corporation’s	
rights;	(2)	corporations	are	not	humans	so	how	can	they	have	human	rights?;	(3)	
granting	 corporations	 rights	 devalues	 and	 dehumanises	 human	 rights;	 (4)	
human	rights	were	designed	to	protect	the	vulnerable,	not	corporations;	(5)	the	
‘flood-gate’	 argument;	 and	 (6)	 the	 criticisms	 around	 corporations	 only	 having	
‘selective	 rights’.	 The	arguments	against	 these	and	 for	undertakings	 to	qualify	
for	 rights	 protection	 included	 that:	 (1)	 the	 ECHR	 provides	 corporations	 with	
rights	protection	and	 it	was	always	the	drafter’s	 intention;	 (2)	by	corporations	
having	 rights	 protection	 it	 brings	 additional	 benefits	 to	 the	 Commission’s	
procedures;	 (3)	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 stronger	 and	 better	 rights	 protection	 for	
individuals;	(4)	a	corporation	is	in	essence	a	group	of	individual	right	holders;	(5)	
corporations	 are	 treated	 as	 ‘legal	 persons’	 to	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	 offences	 in	










Next	 a	 consideration	 was	 had	 as	 to	 how	 specific	 ECHR	 rights	 could	 become	
engaged	when	 the	Commission	 imposes	 fines	on	undertakings	 (and	when	 the	
Convention	is	acceded	to).	Arguments	were	subsequently	developed	in	regards	
to	 the	 importance	 of	 certainty	 and	 equal	 treatment	 within	 the	 Commissions	
fining	procedures,	which	comprised	of	the	following:	(a)	that	legal	certainty	and	
equal	treatment	are	fundamental	legal	principles	and	hence	are	required	to	be	
complied	 with;	 (b)	 compliance	 with	 these	 will	 help	 prevent	 over-deterrence,	
which	could	lead	to	a	reduction	in	pro-competitive	behaviour	within	the	market	
which	 competition	 law	 seeks	 to	 promote;	 (c)	 by	 ensuring	 these	principles	 are	
complied	with	it	will	prevent	the	perception	or	the	actual	occurrence	of	abuses	
of	process	by	the	Commission;	(d)	by	complying	it	enables	the	retention	of	the	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 underlying	 offence,	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 fining	 process	
itself;	 (e)	 the	 financial	 implications	 and	 harm	 that	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 fining	
process	can	cause	to	undertakings	and	the	wider	society	as	a	whole;	(f)	so	as	to	
ensure	that	the	leniency	and	settlement	stages	in	the	procedure	are	as	effective	
and	 efficient	 as	 they	 can	 be	 and	 are	 actively	 utilised	 by	 undertakings;	 and	
finally,	 (g)	 to	 ensure	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 leniency	 and	 settlement	 stages	 of	 the	
fining	procedure.			
	
The	 aforementioned	 analysis	 established	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 thesis,	which	
led	to	an	examination	of	the	various	Commission	procedures.	The	first	of	these	
considered	was	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 procedure	 overall.	 This	was	 assessed	
for	its	compliance	with	legal	certainty.3	The	chapter	began	by	assessing	(a)	the	
use	of	non-exhaustive	 lists,	 (b)	 the	 ‘specific	deterrence’	 stage,	 and	 (c)	 the	 ten	
percent	cap.	Whilst	 it	was	 identified	that	there	were	various	concerns	 (from	a	





there	 were	 improvements	 identified	 that	 could	 be	 made	 to	 the	 current	
procedure	 –	 which	 would	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 current	 enforcement	 aims	 of	








the	 sales	 of	 goods	 or	 services	 to	which	 the	 infringement	 relates.’	 As	 there	 is	
currently	a	lack	of	guidance	on	this,	concerns	were	raised	that	this	may	lead	to	
confusion	 and	 potential	 unequal	 application	 of	 this	 stage.	 A	 further	
recommendation	 (in	 relation	 to	 this	 stage)	 is	 that	 illustrations	 of	 the	 liable	
percentage	 increases	 in	 fines	 are	 given	 to	 enhance	 certainty	 for	 undertakings	











These	 potential	 improvements	would	 require	 additional	 guidance	 being	 given	
by	 the	Commission	 in	 its	documentation	but	would	not	necessitate	 significant	
changes	to	its	current	practice.	Though	the	improvements	would	see	a	further	
reduction	of	the	discretion	afforded	to	the	Commission	through	various	stages	






Next,	 the	 thesis	 analysed	 whether	 the	 Commission	 applies	 its	 fining	 policy	
equally	 to	 undertakings.	 Focus	 began	 by	 assessing	 the	 tenth	 stage	 of	 the	
Commission’s	fining	procedure:	the	‘inability	to	pay	discount’.	 It	was	identified	
that	as	 the	Commission	was	offering	such	a	wide	 range	of	 reductions	with	no	
express	 mention	 being	 given	 at	 this	 stage	 about	 how	 or	 why	 in	 a	 particular	
instance	 the	Commission	was	awarding	such	a	discount	 that	 it	was	difficult	 to	
understand	 how	 the	 Commission	 was	 applying	 this	 stage	 equally	 and	 fairly.	
Indeed,	 the	 arbitrary	 nature	 of	 these	 adjustments	makes	 effective	 scrutiny	 of	
the	reductions	impossible	and	in	fact,	inconsistencies	of	application	in	this	stage	
of	 the	 fining	 procedure	 inevitable.	 Owing	 to	 this,	 this	 stage	 can	 be	 greatly	
enhanced	with	more	transparency	with	regards	to	the	application	of	stage	ten	
and	more	detailed	guidance	as	to	how	this	stage	in	the	fining	procedure	is	likely	
to	be	 applied.	But	of	 course,	 the	balance	must	be	maintained	here	 to	 ensure	
that	transparent	application	and	clear	guidance	is	available	as	well	as	flexibility	
and	discretion	for	the	Commission.	If	the	guidance	is	overly	transparent	it	could	






the	 nationality	 of	 an	 undertaking	 being	 defined	 here	 as	 ‘the	 country	 of	 the	
undertaking	 involved	 in	 the	 cartel’.	 What	 was	 identified	 from	 the	 empirical	
analysis	of	the	thirty-four	cartels	which	 involved	non-EU	national	undertakings	
(and	 the	 in-depth	 investigations	 of	 fining	 decisions)	 is	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	
currently	 applying	 its	 fining	 procedure	 equally	 based	 on	 an	 undertakings’	
nationality	 with	 no	 in	 discrepancies	 in	 the	 thirty-four	 cases.	 Therefore,	 the	
Commission	 should	 continue	 its	 current	 practices	 and	 continue	 to	 apply	 its	
	300	
policy	equally	in	this	regard.	Of	course,	periodic	reviews	and	comparison	of	this	
data	 are	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 no	 lapse	 or	 slippage	 occurs	 from	 this	 current	
equality	approach.		
	
Finally,	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 treatment	 of	 National	 Champions	 (NC)	 by	 the	
Commission	was	had.	This	examination	defined	a	NC	as	an	undertaking	that	has	
a	turnover	of	more	than	ten	billion	Euros.	Of	the	Commission’s	fining	decisions,	
twenty-five	 involved	 at	 least	 one	 NC.	 It	 was	 identified	 that	 the	 NC	 often	
received	 the	 lowest	 or	 some	 of	 the	 lowest	 percentage	 fines	when	 they	were	
compared	to	non-NC.	There	were	only	two	cartels	where	the	Commission	fined	
a	NC	more	harshly	than	non-NC:	the	‘Gas	Insulated	Switchgear’	and	the	‘Power	
Transformers’	 cartel.4	Therefore,	 the	 empirical	 data	 demonstrates	 that	 the	
Commission,	in	many	instances,	offers	favourable	treatment	to	an	NC	over	that	
of	a	non-NC	 in	 the	same	cartel.	This	appears	 to	be	unequal	 treatment,	as	 the	
undertakings	 in	 question	 are	 in	 the	 same	 position,	 apart	 from	 one	 being	
classified	as	an	NC.	Whilst	this	is	true	it	is	must	be	noted	that	it	is	unclear	as	to	
the	reasoning	why	NC	are	fined	less.	Thus,	it	is	difficult	to	say	with	certainty	that	
unequal	 treatment	 is	 definitely	 occurring,	 as	 we	 are	 not	 privy	 to	 all	 the	
information	 and	 data	 that	 is	 available	 to	 the	 Commission.	 However,	 the	
empirical	 data	 does	 clearly	 identify	 that	 –	 in	 the	 twenty-five	 cartels	 that	
involved	 NC	 –	 only	 two	 of	 these	 resulted	 in	 the	 NC	 receiving	 the	 highest	













reasons	 for	 advocating	 for	 a	 blanket	 ban	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	
documents.	While	it	was	noted	within	the	discussion	that	there	were	a	variety	
of	arguments	that	one	could	make	about	the	importance	of	non-disclosure;	this	
thesis	 focused	 on	 the	 novel	 potential	 procedural	 rights	 reasons.	 Indeed,	 this	
discussion	 is	what	made	Chapter	4	unique	 to	 the	previous	 conducted	 studies.	
Further	 originality	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 chapter’s	 unique	 consideration	 of	
whether	there	were	ways	of	enhancing	the	current	approach	to	disclosure.	
	
First	 an	 undertakings	 legitimate	 expectation	 of	 non-disclosure	 by	 the	
Commission	was	analysed.	 It	was	 identified	that	 throughout	 the	Commissions’	
Guidance	 Documentation	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	 European	
Union,6	and	 Regulation	 1/2003	 EC,7	a	 variety	 of	 assurances	 are	 given	 that	
confidential	information	will	not	be	disclosed	to	third	parties.	Because	of	these	
assurances	 and	 the	 subsequent	 analysis	 undertaken	 considering	 the	 case	 law	





the	 ECHR.	 It	 was	 identified	 (by	 considering	 the	 five	 stages	 of	 the	 standard	
approach),	 that	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 assess	 what	 the	 ECtHR	 would	 decide,	 with	
regards	to	the	disclosure	of	leniency	documents.	It	was	noted	that	it	is	possible	
the	 Court	 would	 hold	 that	 there	 is	 no	 breach	 when	 leniency	 documents	 are	
divulged,	because	the	disclosure	is	proportionate.	However,	because	there	is	a	
less	 restrictive	 approach	 –	which	 could	 pursue	 the	 legitimate	 aim	of	 enabling	
third	 parties	 to	 bring	 follow-on	 damage	 actions	 –	 it	 is	 possible	 the	 Court	will	



















It	 was	 therefore	 identified	 that	 the	 strongest	 procedural	 right	 challenge	 an	
undertaking	could	bring	against	disclosure	of	leniency	documents	would	be	that	
by	 doing	 so	 breached	 an	 undertakings	 ‘legitimate	 expectation’	 of	 non-
disclosure.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 Damages	 Directive	 has	 adopted	 the	 correct	
approach.	Nonetheless,	the	next	part	of	the	analysis	identified	various	potential	
options,	which	could	 lead	 to	a	better	approach	 than	placing	a	blanket	ban	on	
third	 parties	 being	 granted	 access	 to	 leniency	 documents.	 The	 approach	
recommended	was	 that	 judges	 be	 granted	 full	 access	 to	 these	 documents	 so	
that	they	can	balance	both	sets	of	rights	effectively:	those	of	the	undertakings	






notice	 –	 and	 the	 Damages	 Directive	 –	 are	 amended	 so	 that	 an	 undertaking	











The	 discussion	 began	 by	 considering	 the	 Commission’s	 seventeen	 settlement	
decisions	 thus	 far	 and	 identified	 areas	where	 this	 procedure	 could	 be	 further	
enhanced.	These	improvements	related	to	(a)	the	amount	of	time	it	takes	for	a	
case	to	be	settled,	and	(b)	the	fact	that	various	cases	are	having	to	proceed	as	
hybrid	 cases.	When	 the	potential	 for	 the	 implementation	of	a	plea	bargaining	
procedure	 was	 examined	 it	 was	 identified	 that	 for	 it	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
requirements	 of	 Article	 6	 of	 the	 ECHR	 it	 would	 be	 necessary	 that;	 (a)	 the	
applicant	 accepts	 the	 bargain	 in	 a	 genuinely	 voluntary	manner;	 (b)	 in	 the	 full	
awareness	 of	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 case	 and	 legal	 consequences	 of	 doing	 so;	 and	
finally,	 (c)	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 bargain	 and	 the	 fairness	 of	 the	manner	 in	
which	 it	was	reached	 is	subjected	to	sufficient	 judicial	 review.10	Though	 it	was	
illustrated	 that	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 implement	 and	
utilise	a	plea	bargaining	procedure	 to	 settle	 cartel	 cases	within	 the	EU,	 it	was	
not	felt	that	this	was	the	best	way	forward	for	the	EU,	because	of	the	significant	
amendments	that	this	would	require	to	the	Commission’s	procedures.	In	fact,	it	
was	 felt	 that	making	 specific	 changes	 to	 the	 current	 system	would	 achieve	 a	
similar	 level	 of	 efficiency	 to	 that	 of	 the	US	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 but	 retain	
what	 is	 at	 its	 core	 a	 separate	 European	 Antitrust	 approach.	 These	 measures	
comprised	 of	 (a)	 allowing	 undertakings	 to	 begin	 discussions	 during	 the	














for	 the	 Commission	 to	 implement	 into	 its	 current	 procedures	 and	 would	
enhance	both	the	efficiency	and	transparency	of	the	present	approach.	This	 is	
particularly	 true	 when	 compared	 with	 the	 complete	 overhaul	 to	 the	







are	 signatory	 states	 to	 the	 ECHR.	 The	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 5	 discussed	 and	





procedural	 rigour	 and	 fair	 and	 reasonable	 treatment	 –	 it	 has	 enabled	 the	
achievement	 of	 a	 variety	 of	 definite	 gains	 for	 the	 thesis.	 To	 begin,	 utilising	




achieve	 this	 in	 practice	 in	 the	 future.	 Further	 to	 this,	 it	 has	 facilitated	 the	
exploration	of	a	variety	of	questions	which	have	arisen	as	the	analysis	has	been	




these	questions	 to	be	 raised	so	 that	 in	 further	 research	projects	 these	can	be	
explored	by	the	author	and	others.	These	questions	are	of	vital	importance	but	
are	often	overlooked	or	not	investigated	–	or	adequately	addressed	–	within	the	
literature.	However,	 various	questions	which	have	arisen	 through	 the	analysis	
















Chapter	4	explored	 the	balancing	of	 rights	 in	 regards	 to	disclosure	 in	 leniency	
cases,	whilst	facilitating	the	legitimisation	of	the	operation	of	the	Commission’s	
leniency	 programme	 and	 illustrating	 the	 importance	 and	 necessity	 of	 the	
procedure,	 alongside	 identifying	 ways	 of	 improving	 the	 current	 programme.	
Considering	 the	 conflicting	 rights	 of	 both	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 and	 the	 third	
parties	 enabled	 the	 identification	and	exploration	of	ways	of	better	balancing	
both	of	these	parties’	rights.	Namely,	by	granting	only	courts	access	to	leniency	
documents	 –	 to	 be	 utilised	 in	 the	 proving	 and	 calculation	 of	 cartel	 damage	
actions	–	it	enables	a	fairer	and	more	balanced	protection	of	both	sets	of	rights.	
	
Finally,	 Chapter	 5	 investigated	 the	 balancing	 of	 rights	 in	 a	 different	 way.	 It	




settlement	 procedure	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 changes	 to	 the	 current	
programme	 or	 through	 the	 radical	 overhauling	 and	 implementation	 of	 a	 plea	
bargaining	procedure.	 The	balancing	discussion	here	 focused	on	 the	 flexibility	
and	 efficiency	 gains	 which	 could	 come	 from	 the	 amendments	 or	 the	
implementation	 of	 a	 plea	 bargaining	 system	 versus	 the	 costs	 of	 doing	 so	 –	 a	
reduction	in	investigatory	rigour	and	legal	certainty.	
	




Another	 gain	 from	 this	 form	 of	 analysis	 is	 that	 it	 enabled	 other	 non-legal	
reasons	 for	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 compliance	 with	 procedural	 rights	 to	 be	
considered.	 These	were	 able	 to	 be	 explored	 in	 this	 thesis	 and	 brought	many	
benefits	 to	 the	 findings.	 Indeed,	by	asking	and	examining	 these	questions	 the	




occur,	 and	 consequently	 make	 recommendations	 for	 improvements	 here.	
Additionally,	 it	was	possible	to	examine	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	the	
Commission’s	 fining	procedure	whilst	enhancing	 justice	 for	all	parties	 involved	
through	 ensuring	 that	 they	 were	 treated	 fairly	 and	 reasonably.	 This	 analysis	








the	 compliance	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedures	 and	






This	 thesis	 has	made	 an	 important	 and	 invaluable	 contribution	 to	 the	 field	 of	
competition	 and	 procedural	 rights	 law	 by	 ascertaining	 whether	 the	
Commission’s	 three	key	policies	 for	cartel	enforcement	comply	with	 the	ECHR	
and	other	procedural	 rights	 requirements.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	 it	has	 identified	
improvements	 that	 can	 enhance	 detection,	 deterrence,	 prevention	 and	 the	






A	 variety	of	 further	 research-based	projects	 could	be	 founded	and	built	 upon	





the	 ECHR. 11 	For	 example,	 a	 possible	 approach	 could	 be	 to	 provide	 the	
protection	 of	 corporations’	 rights	 via	 a	 specific	 convention	 or	 piece	 of	
legislation.	 This	 piece	 of	 legislation	 would	 only	 apply	 to	 corporations	 and	
individuals	would	still	have	their	 rights	protected	under	 the	ECHR	or	domestic	
legislative	equivalents.	This	would	mean	that	the	legislation	could	be	tailored	to	





that	 countries	would	need	 to	 sign	up	or	 agree	 to	 it,	which	 leads	 to	questions	
regarding	how	achievable	this	would	be	in	practice.	Additionally,	 it	would	take	
years	 for	 the	 courts	 to	 develop	 jurisprudence	 and	 case	 law.	 Finally,	 this	
approach	 could	 also	 lead	 to	 assertions	 of	 the	 dehumanisation	 and	 the	
commercialisation	of	human	rights.	
	
Another	 potential	 method	 could	 be	 to	 grant	 corporations	 only	 specific	 rights	
under	 the	ECHR	and	clearly	 state	what	 these	 rights	are.	This	would	overcome	
some	of	 the	 concerns	 regarding	which	 rights	 apply	 to	 corporations	 under	 the	






way	 the	 Convention	 is	 able	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	 modern	 day	
circumstances.	 It	 is	also	questionable	how	plausible	 it	would	be	to	amend	the	





lack	of	examination	of	 this	 issue	within	 the	 literature.	First,	a	 further	 in-depth	





level.	Whilst	 undertaking	 this	 analysis,	 the	 post-July	 2012	 data	 could	 also	 be	
included	and	exploited	as	this	was	not	 incorporated	within	the	analysis	of	this	
thesis.	 Second,	 the	 NC	 issue	 could	 be	 explored	 in	 vaster	 depth	 to	 seek	 to	
establish	with	greater	 certainty	and	clarity	what	 is	occurring	 in	practice.	From	
the	analysis	 in	 this	 thesis	 it	 appears	 that	NCs	 receive	more	 lenient	 treatment,	
and	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 and	 whether	 this	 is	 actually	 occurring	 need	 to	 be	
explored	 further.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 one	 could	 seek	 to	 drill	 down	 further	within	
the	 cases	 that	 involve	 NC	 and	 analyse	 whether	 there	 were	 any	 mitigating	
factors	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 reduced	 fines	 or	 if	 there	 were	 any	 aggravating	
factors	which	 led	 to	 the	 non-NC	 receiving	 higher	 fines	 or	 if	 something	 else	 is	










period	 of	 time	 an	 investigation	 takes.	 This	 analysis	 would	 also	 allow	 for	 an	
effective	comparison	of	the	US	approach	to	leniency	(of	only	allowing	the	first	




EU,	 against	 the	period	of	 time	 to	 reach	an	agreement	 in	 the	US,	would	 allow	
further	evaluations	to	be	made	and	drawn	regarding	the	efficiencies,	similarities	
and	differences	between	the	two	systems.	In	addition,	further	development	of	
this	 analysis	 could	 consider	 the	 length	 of	 time	 it	 takes	 for	 the	 Commissions’	
normal	procedures	to	progress	to	that	of	the	cases	that	they	settle.	This	would	
allow	 an	 effective	 analysis	 of	 the	 benefits	 in	 reduction	 in	 times	 that	 the	
Commission	 and	 undertakings	 gain	 from	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 settlement	
procedure.	This	examination	could	be	even	further	enriched	by	also	attempting	
to	 calculate	 the	 potential	 financial	 cost	 saving	 which	 are	 made	 through	 the	
settlement	 procedure	 over	 the	 standard	 procedure.	 If	 the	 aforementioned	
evaluations	and	analysis	were	undertaken	it	would	produce	data	and	allow	for	





















be	 conducted	 into	 the	 settlement	 decisions,	 particularly	 with	 regards	 to	 the	
time	period	it	takes	for	settlement	decisions	to	be	concluded	–	so	as	to	be	able	



















































































Sony Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A 10 
 (Not 
Appealed) 
Fuji Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A N/A 
  Maxwell Japan 18 32 3 N/A N/A N/A 
Flat Glass            
(Appeal 
Pending) 






N/D N/D N/D 
  Guardian USA 18 10 1 N/D N/D N/D 
  Pilkington UK 18 13 1.5 N/D N/D N/D 




Bayer Germany 16 24 2 50 N/A 10 
 (Not 
Appealed) 






N/A N/A N/A 
Car Glass Saint-Gobain France 16 60 5 60 N/A N/A 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
Asahi / AGC 
Flat Glass 
Japan 16 58 5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Pilkington UK 16 53 4.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Soliver Belgium 16 16 1.5 N/A N/A N/A 
Marine Hoses      Bridgestone Japan 25 228, 183 19, 15.5 N/A 30 N/A 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
Yokoham Japan 25 217 18.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Dunlop Oil & 
Marine / 
Continental 
Germany 25 94, 81, 25 8, 7, 2.5 N/A N/A N/A 
  Trelleborg France 25 227, 107 19, 9 N/A N/A N/A 
  Parker ITR Italy 25 228, 63 19, 5.5 N/A 30 N/A 
  Manuli Italy 25 92 8 N/A N/A N/A 
Power 
Transformers  
Siemens Germany 16 47, 23 4.2 N/A N/A 20 
(Appeals 
Pending) 
ABB Switzerland 16 47 4 50 N/A N/A 
  Alstom / Areva France 16 47 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Fuji Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Hitachi Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A 20 
  Toshiba Japan 16 47 4 N/A N/A 10 
LCD Samsung Korea 16 15 4 N/A N/A 20 
  LG Display Korea 16 14 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  AU Optronics Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Chimei Innolux 
Corporation 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  Chunghwa 
Picture Tubes 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
  HannStar 
Display 
Corporation 
Taiwan 16 15 4 N/A N/A N/A 
Table	Apen.2	Selected	Fining	Cases	Table	
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